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European integration considerably developed in the aftermath of World War II.
Ideas and early attempts to bring Europe together melted into the creation of the
European Union (EU), which today includes 28 countries (as of August 2015). 19 of
these countries have adopted the euro, which represents the most advanced status of
integration. However, there are still challenges ahead for Europe. The recent Euro-
pean debt crisis revealed many weaknesses, which have to be addressed to enhance
further (economic) integration in Europe.
This thesis discusses different aspects of European integration. Doing so, it focuses
on the economic components of this discussion. The selection of different aspects of
European integration ranges from standard macroeconomic issues, such as institu-
tions, fiscal policy and currency regimes to the German banking market. This chapter
introduces and motivates this selection of different aspects of European integration.
2 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The general introduction provides an understanding of the relevant aspects of
European integration, in order to equip the reader with the necessary knowledge
to put the research questions, which will be addressed separately in the following
chapters, into context. It is important to disentangle the economic dimension from the
overall framework of European integration. The economic component of European
integration is the centrepiece of my thesis. However, although the EU and the euro
area are different frameworks, they are also overlapping. Many policy measures can
be understood as a response to the current European economic crisis (as of August
2015). Hence, the European crisis and some measures (expected) in response will be
examined in some detail. This general introduction is followed by a general motivation
of the whole work. An outline of my thesis closes this chapter.
This chapter also connects the different analyses I conducted for my thesis. The
different research questions addressed in this thesis all relate to and are connected
by the issues introduced in this chapter. The motivation of this thesis is partly
driven by the institutional design of the EU, the still existing economic potential
of European integration and the emergence of a severe economic crisis in Europe.
In addition, there is a methodological motivation for my thesis. Given the recent
increase in the availability of microeconomic-data, I make use of this development in
a macroeconomic setting.
It is noteworthy that, due to the unique design of the EU, history outside of
Europe offers some lessons but in general it offers only a poor analogy (O’Rouke
and Taylor, 2013; Alesina and Perotti, 2004). This makes my research topic both
interesting and challenging, but it also means that an extensive historical overview
of unions or monetary agreements outside of Europe is not required for the scope
of this thesis. However, this does not imply that economic history does not provide
lessons at all. With respect to the recent economic crisis in Europe, for example,
economic history can tell us a lot (e.g. Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Schularick, 2013;
Jordà et al., 2013; Reinhart et al., 2012).
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1.1.1 European Integration
The idea and the origins of European integration are well summarized in a quote
by Spolaore (2013):
“At the end of World War II, the promoters of European integration looked back
at the previous decades and saw a continent fragmented in independent and uncon-
strained nation states which had pursued costly beggar-thy-neighbor policies during
the Great Depression and engaged in two major wars. The goal of European integra-
tion was to create a system where nation states would no longer follow such unilateral
and destructive policies.”
The idea of integration led to the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949
following the foundation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) in 1948. The OEEC was succeeded by the OECD in 1961. In 1951, the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was initiated based on the treaty of
Paris. Based on the treaty of Rome in 1957, the European Economic Community
(EEC), which became the European Community in 1993 and became part of the
EU’s wider framework in 2009, was founded. In 1969, the EEC decided to declare
an economic and monetary union as an official goal of European integration. The
European Union was officially initiated based on the Maastricht treaty in 1992, which
came into force on 1 November 1993. The Maastricht treaty was followed by the
Lisbon treaty in 2009. As of August 2015 the EU consists of 28 member countries1.
There are three institutions involved in law-making at the European level. First,
the European Parliament, which is directly elected by and represents the EU’s citi-
zens. Second, the Council of the European Union, which represents the governments
of the individual member countries. The Council of the European Union is where
1Austria (1995), Belgium, Bulgaria (2007), Croatia (2013), Cyprus (2004), Czech Republic (2004), Denmark,
Estonia (2004), Finland (1995), France, Germany, Hungary (2004), Ireland, Italy, Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004),
Malta (2004), Netherlands, Poland (2004), Portugal (1986), Romania (2007), Slovak Republic (2004), Slovenia (2004),
Spain, Sweden (1995) and the United Kingdom. Years in parentheses refer to the accession date if it was after 1
November 1993.
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governments defend their national interests. The EU’s agenda is set by the European
Council. The European Council comprises national heads, out of which one is the
president of the council, and the president of the European Commission. The Eu-
ropean Commission, the third of the three law-making institutions, represents the
interests of the Union as a whole. In addition, there are other EU institutions like
the Court of Justice of the European Union, or the European Central Bank. The
European Central Bank is an example of a specialized interinstitutional body, since
it leads the cooperation of national central banks in the eurozone.
The hybrid design of the EU, already mentioned in the preamble to the treaty
of Rome, describes a union that includes intergovernmental, supranational, federal,
confederal and functional elements. Together with its complex institutions, struc-
tures and procedures, this design of the EU defies a definition in conventional po-
litical terms (Diez and Wiener, 2009). Alesina and Perotti (2004) describe this mix
of intergovernmentalists and supranationalist or federalists as a natural conflict re-
garding the future shape of Europe. In addition, due to the fact that the EU can be
understood as a union of independent countries, Alesina and Perotti (2004) deny an
understanding of the EU as the “United States of Europe”. European integration as
carried out by the EU is additionally related to political and social integration. Hav-
ing said that, the focus of my thesis is solely on the economic aspects of European
integration.
At the EU conference in Lisbon in the year 2000, European leaders articulated
the goal to make the European Union “the world’s most dynamic and competitive
economy within ten years” (Blanchard, 2004). Four years later, Blanchard (2004)
describes this goal as largely empty and pathetic. Eleven years later and just before
I started this work, Sapir (2011) illustrates the overall situation - in an unfortunate
context - of European integration:
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“The year 2011 is likely to be a watershed in the history of European integration
with the euro-debt crisis having started a process going either forward toward political
unification or backward in time if the monetary union collapses.”
Roughly four years later, we have witnessed a process going forward toward more
unification. However, there are still measures on the agenda and many measures not
yet fully implemented. To approach this topic, I will now focus on the economics of
European integration.
1.1.2 Economic Integration
From an economic point of view, different stages of integration can be distin-
guished (Balassa, 2011), which are increasingly demanding in terms of the abolish-
ment of discriminatory measures: in a free-trade area tariffs between the participating
countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against nonmembers;
a customs union includes the equalization of tariffs in trade with nonmembers as well
as the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the
union; in a common market not only trade restrictions, but also restrictions on fac-
tor movements are abolished; in an economic union some degree of harmonization of
national economic policies is required; finally, complete economic integration requires
the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies as well as the
setting-up of a supra-national authority.
Even though its stages can be illustrated in ascending order, economic integra-
tion is not necessarily a sequential process. Economic integration can, for example,
be introduced in the form of a common market and stay at this stage forever. An
important distinction has to be made regarding the motives for different stages of
economic integration. Whereas a free-trade area is supposedly economically moti-
vated, complete economic integration is also driven politically (Sapir, 2011). These
differences in motivation are also reflected in different approaches to European in-
tegration. Until 1995, for example, some European countries which are today EU
6 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
member states were part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In com-
parison to the European Economic Community at the time, the European Free Trade
Association was solely economically motivated.
Naturally, economic issues can be decomposed into costs and benefits. Accord-
ing to Spolaore (2013), the costs and benefits of European integration arise due to
heterogenous populations. Spolaore (2013) broadly summarizes the following major
costs: the provision of the ultimate “public good”, namely the federal government
about which people from different countries may have very different views; according
to (Alesina et al., 2003) there is microeconomic evidence that links ethnic heterogene-
ity to an underprovision of public goods at the local level; there is also macroeconomic
evidence of negative correlations between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and gov-
ernment performance (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). The main benefits of European
integration are: economies of scale with respect to the provision of public goods; the
ability to internalize positive and negative externalities over a large area; redistribu-
tion policies, which could provide insurance against asymmetric shocks given that
an overall budget exists.
Obviously, costs and benefits are interrelated. In addition, economic integration
theoretically provides welfare effects through three different channels: trade, terms-of-
trade and factor movements.2 Moreover, dynamic effects due to economies of scale are
beneficial as well. A larger market could facilitate economies of scale in production,
which in turn causes productivity gains and growth (Balassa, 2011).
Since the European project includes economically very different countries, the
concept of convergence has to be mentioned. The EU includes very mature economies
such as Germany and the United Kingdom, but also much less mature economies
in Central and Eastern Europe. Figure 1.1 compares gross domestic product (GDP)
per person employed3 in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), that
2See Sapir (2011) for a summary of the related empirical literature.
3It should be noted that this is only a generic approximation of productivity due to the omission of the capital-
labor ratio (Blanchard, 2004).
1.1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 7
are part of the EU with Germany and the United Kingdom for 1999 and 2014. This
graph is highly selctive, since it excludes a number of European countries ranging
economically between the illustrated countries. The comparison over time shows a
significant increase in GDP per person employed for all CEECs, which is in line with
the convergence identified by the ECB (2015). All CEECs that are part of the EU
more than doubled their GDP per person employed. There is still some distance
to mature economies such as Germany and the United Kingdom; however, visual
inspection also reveals that this distance has decreased on average over time. Finally,
Figure 1.1 confirms that there are still considerable economic differences across the
illustrated EU countries. Hence, the potential for further convergence still exists.4
Economically, real convergence measured by real GDP per capita is of main inter-
est and supported by economic integration. Real convergence is the catch-up of lower
income countries in terms GDP per capita with higher income countries. However,
there are also the complementary concepts of beta convergence (β-convergence) and
sigma convergence (σ-convergence). Beta convergence refers to low income countries
growing faster than high income countries. Sigma convergence represents a reduc-
tion in dispersion of income levels across countries. In a recent report, the European
Central Bank finds different patterns of convergence in Europe (ECB, 2015). It is
found that there was some real convergence in the European Union since 1999. This
is due to the catch-up of CEECs. However, within the euro area, which will discussed
in the next sub-chapter, no process of real convergence among the twelve countries
which adopted the euro between 1999 and 2002 could be observed.
4In Chapter 4 one source of further economic convergence will be illustrated.
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Figure 1.1: Gross domestic product at current prices per person employed for selected
countries and years
Notes:
(1) Gross domestic product at current prices per person employed is measured in keur.
(2) Source: Ameco.
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1.1.3 Euro Area
Based on two principles, the Maastricht treaty paved the way towards monetary
union in Europe. These principles are gradualism and convergence5.
The declaration of the European Council in Brussels in May 1998 stated that
eleven European countries6 were going to create a monetary union. This marked the
beginning of the euro area. The exchange rates among member states were fixed in
January 1999, although the euro was introduced physically only in 2002. By now,
the founder states of the euro shared considerable experience of a centralized mone-
tary policy being accompanied by common fiscal discipline measures, defined by the
Maastricht Convergence Criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. So far, eight
more countries7 have joined the currency club (as of August 2015). The euro area,
which constitutes the most advanced status of association within the process of Eu-
ropean integration, has never before attracted so much attention as at the present
time. The European sovereign debt crisis within the euro area has brought up doubts
about the idea of a common European currency and a centralized monetary policy.
The theoretical foundation for a monetary union is given by the Optimum Cur-
rency Area (OCA) theory. Based on OCA theory, a sufficient degree of business cycle
synchronization is required to constitute an optimum currency area (Mundell, 1961;
McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969). It is noteworthy that the euro area scores poorly
according to OCA theory (Wyplosz, 1997; O’Rouke and Taylor, 2013).8 However,
the single currency contributes to deepening economic integration by reducing cross-
border transaction costs, encouraging cross-border mergers, improving price trans-
parency, increasing competition among member states, and eliminating exchange
rate risk (Dominguez, 2006).
5The “convergence criteria” will be explained in detail in Chapter 2, where they partly represent the motivation
of the research question.
6Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Greece joined in 2002.
7Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovak Republic (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithua-
nia (2015). Years in parentheses refer to the accession date.
8This theoretical framework will be fully explored in Chapter 2.
10 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The European Central Bank (ECB) is the centrepiece of the euro area (De Grauwe,
2012). In 1999, the European Central Bank was created and took over monetary
decision-making powers from national central banks. However, national central banks
are involved in the decision-making process and carry out decisions in their national
money markets. According to Article 105 of the Maastricht treaty, the primary ob-
jective of the European Central Bank is price stability, accompanied by economic
growth as a secondary objective. Article 107 of the Maastricht treaty establishes the
political independence of the European Central Bank. Seven years after its creation,
Dominguez (2006) attributes some success to the ECB, but questions how well the
euro will function when severe macroeconomic or financial shocks occur. As already
mentioned, the European Central Bank is organized decentrally. It is interesting
to note that the Federal Reserve System (FED) was initially organized decentrally
as well. Yet it became highly centralized in the aftermath of the Great Depression
(Wynne, 1999). Friedman and Schwartz (1963) claim that this initially decentralized
organizational structure might have led to inappropriate and overly contractionary
monetary policy decisions which prolonged the Great Depression. Dominguez (2006)
recommends understanding the experience of the Federal Reserve System as a lesson
for the European Central Bank.
O’Rouke and Taylor (2013) provide an extensive historical overview illustrating
that the euro area substantially differs from previous currency unions. There are
similarities to the United States, which has a true monetary union. However, the
United States’ monetary union was preceded by a political union which represents
a major difference. In contrast, the architects of the euro area assumed political
union to follow monetary integration (Bengsten, 2012). Moreover, the gold standard
during the Bretton Woods system of monetary management was a series of country-
by-country monetary regimes accompanied by independent national central banks,
which also represents a clear distinction from the euro area.
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The economic crisis in Europe, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, re-
vealed structural and institutional weaknesses and the corresponding need for sound
economic policies in euro area member countries (ECB, 2015).
1.2 Crisis and Responses
Despite the benefits of economic integration, Europe entered a severe crisis in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis which emerged in the United States in 2007.
The European epicentre of this crisis is the euro area and, in particular, its member
countries in the periphery. Five European countries, namely Spain, Greece, Portugal,
Ireland and Cyprus, had to rely on financial assistance between 2009 and 2015. In
order to allow for financial assistance, the initial reaction to the crisis was to build
two bailout institutions from scratch: the temporary European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF), followed by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
In addition, the European Central Bank implemented a range of new measures, such
as for example the securities market program (SMP) in 2010, the outright monetary
transactions (OMTs) in 2012 or the expanded asset purchase program (APP) in
2015.
Although the European crisis is often referred to as a European debt or European
sovereign debt crisis, it is multifaceted. Bengsten (2012) describes the European crisis
as a multiply overlapping and mutually reinforcing crisis, consisting of a fiscal crisis,
a competitiveness crisis and a banking crisis. Another notable point is that the out-
break of the global financial crisis in 2008 triggered a reassessment among investors
of the sustainability of the pre-crisis developments in the European periphery (Lane,
2012). This process began with a general reassessment of asset prices and growth
prospects, but especially the pre-crisis development associated with macroeconomic
imbalances in the European periphery called investors’ attention. The severity of
this crisis is well illustrated in a recent publication by Conesa and Kehoe (2014).
Their contribution relies on the assumption that on outside party can put an end to
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a sovereign debt crisis by executing a bailout which assures free lending at a penalty
interest rate and good collateral. They focus on Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and
Spain. Conesa and Kehoe (2014) find that such a bailout, which worked for example
in Mexico in 1995, is unlikely to work in Europe, since debt levels are so high that
the bailout cannot provide sufficient incentives to reduce debt anymore.
In the following, I will summarize some of the key characteristics and causes of
this crisis. This summary is not intended to be a complete analysis of the crisis, but
it reveals to a large extent the motivation of this thesis. It is needless to say that my
analysis of this crisis heavily benefits of hindsight.
1.2.1 Characteristics
I will start by looking at long-term interest rates, which are one of the most com-
monly used illustrations of the different developments among European countries in
the aftermath of the global financial crisis and during the European sovereign debt
crisis. German long-term interest rates are most commonly used as an European
benchmark. In order to illustrate the severity of the crisis, I will also include France.
France is economically in a less favourable condition than Germany, but still faces
significantly lower long-term interest rates than the countries most hit by the cri-
sis. Figure 1.2 plots long-term interest rates of Germany, France, Cyprus, Portugal,
Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland. Hence, it compares Germany and France, as the
two largest economies in the EMU, with Italy and those five economies, which had
to rely on financial assistance between 2009 and 2015.
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Figure 1.2: Long-term interest rates in comparison for selected countries since 1999
Source: ECB.
All graphs show that the beginning of the interest rate divergence coincides with
the global financial crisis. However, the interest rate spreads peaked approximately
between 2010 and 2012. Spreads were and are most pronounced for Greece, which
reflects the severity of the crisis there. Interest rate spreads developed quite similarly
for Portugal and Ireland - even though the latter is more an example of a banking
crisis which transmits into a fiscal crisis, whereas the Portuguese crisis is considered
to have its roots in public finances. Italy and Spain also experienced similar devel-
opments. Given that the latter formally requested financial assistance in July 2012,
this shows that interest rate spreads do not fully reflect the severity of a crisis or
the fundamentals of an economy, respectively. Cyprus, which submitted a request
for financial stability support in June 2012, faced a development of interest rate
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spreads similar to Italy and Spain. Although France is economically not as strong
as Germany, it serves well as a benchmark. This shows that the interest rates of
peripheral European economies did not only diverge from Germany. This illustration
only includes the recent divergence in long-term interest rates. In contrast, during
the run-up and first years of the single currency, there was considerable convergence
of long-term interest rates. This convergence is often named as one of the reasons for
the current economic crisis in Europe.
Figure 1.3 compares the changes of the output gap between actual and trend gross
domestic product for selected countries and years. The lower panel of Figure 1.3 illus-
trates that EU countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark exhibit
a pattern very similar to the United States. These four very mature economies were
all hit by the global financial crisis, but subsequently approached their economic po-
tential again. This picture looks quite different in the upper panel for Spain, Greece,
Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. Italy, often said to be quite similar to this group,
reveals a path more similar to Germany than the other countries in the upper panel.
Greece is a special case, with a continuous decline in output gap since 2009. In the
case of Spain, the decline in output gap is also a continuous process since 2008. Most
European countries reveal an initial drop in output gap in 2008, which coincides
with the global financial crisis, but also a second drop between 2010 and 2011, which
coincides with the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis.
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Figure 1.3: Gap between actual and trend gross domestic product for selected coun-
tries and years
Notes:
(1) Gap between actual and trend gross domestic product at 2010 reference levels is measured in percentage
of trend GDP.
(2) Source: Ameco.
(3) For the benefit of comparison, both graphs are scaled equally.
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Figure 1.4: Unemployment rates (in %) EMU selected countries and years
(1) Source: Ameco.
(2) For the benefit of comparison, all graphs are scaled equally.
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However, the European crisis is characterized by more than long-term interest
rate divergence or different declines in output gap. Figure 1.4 compares unemploy-
ment rates in 2002 and 2012 for those twelve countries which adopted the euro
between 1999 and 2002. The arithmetic mean of unemployment rates of these coun-
tries jumped from around 7% to above 11%. The unemployment rates of Austria
and Belgium remain fairly unchanged. Germany is the only country where unem-
plyoment in 2012 is lower than in 2002. In Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain, the
unemployment rates significantly increased from 2002 to 2012. In Spain and Greece,
the unemployment rates are at approximately 25%. Additionally, this already very
high unemployment is accompanied by even higher youth unemployment in Spain
and Greece (O’Rouke and Taylor, 2013).
1.2.2 Causes
In Cyprus, Ireland and Spain, a banking crisis caused the economic collapse due
to a vicious circle between banks and their sovereigns (O’Rouke and Taylor, 2013).
The costs of bank bailouts deteriorated governments’ fiscal positions, which in turn
put further strain on banks’ balance sheets, and so on. Whereas aggregated debt
dynamics of the eurozone compared to the United States in the mid-2000s did not
appear to be a looming problem, the developments at the individual country level
evolved towards a severe fiscal crisis (Lane, 2012). And yet, in 2008 and largely in
2009, sovereign debt markets remained relatively calm.
Figure 1.5 compares general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP for
selected countries since 1999. Since graphs are scaled differently, auxiliary lines col-
ored in red are included. The first auxiliary line reflects a debt level of 60% relative
to GDP which is a crucial threshold according to the Stability and Growth Pact.
The second auxiliary line reflects a debt level which equals GDP.
The upper left panel of Figure 1.5 includes the five euro area countries which
had to rely on financial assistance between 2009 and 2015, namely Spain, Greece,
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Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. The graph also includes Italy for the same reason as in
Figure 1.3. It shows that Greece and Italy entered the single currency club with much
higher levels of debt than Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Cyprus, Ireland and
Spain are good examples of how the emergence of a banking crisis disrupts supposedly
sustainable public finances. All three countries found themselves at debt levels below
60% in 2008. The sharpest acceleration in public debt took place in Ireland, where
the banking crisis was also the most severe. In 2014, only Spain is at a level of debt
which roughly equals economic output, whereas all other countries have debt levels
considerably higher than their GDP.
The upper right panel of Figure 1.5 shows the debt levels CEECs. Bulgaria is one
of the few countries in Europe which significantly reduced its debt over the last couple
of years and its debt level is at a fairly low level in 2014. Croatia, the Czech Republic
and Poland increased their public debt since 1999 and are at a level of around 60%
debt relative to GDP in 2014. The only country with public debt significantly above
60% relative to GDP is Hungary. Hungarian public debt levels have continuously
increased between 2001 and 2010 and since then remained at around 80%.
The lower left panel of Figure 1.5 shows Belgium, Luxembourg and Sweden, three
northern European countries, as well as two countries which joined the euro a couple
of years after its introduction, namely Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Sweden
decreased its debt to GDP ratio from around 60% to around 40%, Luxembourg
increased from an extremely low level of slightly below 7% to a still low level of
slightly above 20%. In Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, public debt levels increased
simultaneously with other member countries of the euro. However, the increase in
debt to GDP in Slovenia was stronger and its debt level ranges at around 80% in
2014, which is 20 percentage points above the Slovak Republic. The Belgian banking
system and correspondingly public finances were hit relatively hard by the crisis.
The Belgian debt to GDP exhibits a U-shape over time and has stabilized at around
100% in recent years.
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The lower right panel of Figure 1.5 includes Austria, France, Germany and United
Kingdom. The graph shows that the debt levels and dynamics of Austria, France and
Germany were quite similar until 2008. From 2008 on, Austria was subject to a much
more modest but continuous increase in debt relative to output. Germany decoupled
from France in 2010 and could even reduce its debt ratio after that. In 2014, debt to
GDP of France was close to 100%, whereas it was slightly below 80% in Austria and
Germany. Public debt relative to GDP in the United Kingdom started at a much
lower level than in Austria, France and Germany in 1999. But the global financial
crisis has accelerated British debt to GDP to close to 100% in 2014.
Admittedly, public debt alone does not provide a comprehensive picture without
the inclusion of private debt. One may wonder, why Ireland and Spain ended in such
trouble given their comparably low debt levels in 2007. Of course, domestic banking
crises offer an answer. But these domestic banking crises were preceded by excessive
credit growth in the private sector (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Schularick, 2013;
Jordà et al., 2013). This gives rise to the role of private debt. According to Schu-
larick (2013) and Jordà et al. (2013), private debt is defined as the total lending of
financial institutions to the private non-financial sector. The fact that aggregate debt
levels have grown to historical highs was driven by an unprecedented accumulation
of private debt (Schularick, 2013; Jordà et al., 2013). In advanced economies, pri-
vate instead of public debt growth increases the probability financial stability risks
(Jordà et al., 2013). If a banking crisis caused by high levels of private debt occurs,
public debt increases due to automatic stabilizers and, in particular, bank bailouts
(Reinhart et al., 2012). A causal chain which can be well observed in the public debt
developments of Ireland and Spain.
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Figure 1.5: General government gross debt as percent of GDP for selected countries
and years
Source: IMF.
With a focus on the fiscal dimensions of the euro crisis, Lane (2012) identifies
three sources of the relationship between the euro and the European sovereign debt
crisis. Each source materialized in a different phase. First, there were incentives to
take fiscal risks during the pre-crisis period due to the initial institutional design.
Second, during the crisis, a flawed institutional design amplified the fiscal impact of
the crisis dynamics. Third, there was a delayed and extended post-crisis recovery,
due to the restrictions of a monetary union accompanied by a chaotic policy response
and no institutions able to fight the crisis.
Another crucial development, which contributes to the severe crisis in Europe, are
current account imbalances (Lane, 2012). In the pre-crisis phase, significant current
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account imbalances accumulated, in particular between countries in the eurozone.
However, current account imbalances are not economically undesirable in general. In
a monetary union, current account imbalances could facilitate income convergence
by channeling resources from capital-abundant high-income countries to low-income
countries in need of capital (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002). In case current income
is expected to be below future income, current account deficits could allow catch-
up countries to smooth consumption (Lane, 2012). Nevertheless, there are risks and
costs associated with current account imbalances. If capital inflows remain ineffec-
tive regarding productivity growth or delay the necessary adjustments to structural
shocks, current account deficits impose macroeconomic risks (Blanchard, 2007; Gi-
avazzi and Spaventa, 2011; Chen et al., 2012). In a monetary union, the potential
misallocation of resources from tradables to non-tradables can be associated with a
detrimental effect on medium-term growth, according to Blanchard (2007). Finally,
reversals in capital flows increases the risk of a banking crisis (Lane, 2012). Cap-
ital flows are, among other reasons, also stimulated by country-specific issuances
of sovereign debt (Brunnermeier et al., 2011): in boom phases, investors search for
“yield” in the periphery and in a crisis, investors search for “safe havens” such as
Germany. Hence, current account imbalances and the associated risk of reversals in
capital flows are naturally linked to fiscal policy, since the mutualisation of sovereign
debt (fiscal union) would mitigate this problem.
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Table 1.1: Current account balance as percent of GDP


























Austria -2.329 -1.074 2.179 2.826 3.664 2.049
Belgium 5.243 5.098 3.689 1.910 -0.010 -1.610
Cyprus -2.245 -3.458 -3.681 -8.210 -12.058 -3.868
Estonia -9.382 -4.948 -11.072 -13.751 -1.190 -0.327
Finland 5.063 7.157 6.495 3.924 1.967 -1.331
France 2.170 2.118 0.837 -0.688 -1.464 -1.853
Germany -0.596 -1.008 2.850 6.256 6.174 7.269
Greece -4.403 -6.833 -6.278 -11.211 -12.075 -3.866
Ireland 2.638 -0.252 -0.523 -4.127 -2.278 4.089
Italy 2.575 0.363 -0.514 -1.218 -2.783 -0.887
Latvia -5.660 -7.153 -9.259 -19.204 -0.565 -1.815
Lithuania -9.934 -7.149 -6.534 -10.712 -3.102 -1.034
Luxembourg 9.974 10.895 10.178 10.668 6.773 6.641
Malta -7.591 -6.364 -2.107 -7.397 -6.681 0.814
Netherlands 5.028 2.849 5.271 7.819 5.615 9.770
Portugal -5.640 -9.785 -7.665 -10.370 -11.380 -2.834
Slovak Republic -9.106 -5.505 -7.203 -7.203 -4.315 0.290
Slovenia -0.043 -2.294 -0.787 -2.550 -2.025 3.383
Spain -0.497 -3.610 -4.006 -8.770 -6.314 -1.407
Bulgaria 1.235 -5.288 -4.701 -18.131 -11.148 0.422
Croatia -7.707 -4.276 -5.781 -6.404 -5.114 0.094
Czech Republic -4.833 -4.003 -5.518 -2.478 -2.803 -2.098
Denmark 0.399 2.150 2.982 2.894 4.040 6.175
Hungary -5.111 -7.506 -7.814 -7.386 -2.468 1.533
Poland -3.251 -5.535 -3.520 -4.154 -5.231 -3.389
Romania -6.308 -3.823 -5.839 -10.817 -6.708 -3.329
Sweden 3.793 4.422 6.088 8.268 7.215 5.997
United Kingdom -0.355 -2.618 -1.904 -2.290 -1.684 -2.843
Notes:
(1) Deficits are colored in red.
(2) Source: IMF.
Table 1.1 illustrates the current account balances as a percentage of GDP for all
EU member countries for selected time intervals. Some developments are notewor-
thy. Austria and Gemrany changed from deficits to surpluses, with the increase of
German surpluses being comparably large. Conversely, Belgium, France and Italy
developed from surpluses to deficits. Only Luxembourg and Netherlands constantly
exhibited current account surpluses. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovak
Republic, who all joined the currency club at a later stage, could reduce their deficits
considerably. Slovenia and Slovak Republic even achieved a change from a deficit to a
surplus. Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain consistently generated current account
deficits. These deficits peaked between 2005 and 2011, most pronounced in Cyprus,
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Greece and Portugal. Ireland entered the euro area with a surplus, followed by many
years with a deficit, but reversed back to a surplus recently, which is another example
of how its situation was structurally different from the situation in Cyprus, Greece
and Portugal. Excluding the most recent time period, Finland always achieved a
current account surplus. Regarding those states that are members of the EU, but
not part of the eurozone, Denmark and Sweden achieved permanent surpluses. The
CEECs faced mainly current account deficits, most pronounced in Bulgaria between
2005 and 2011 and in Romania between 2005 and 2007. The United Kingdom showed
moderate current account deficits over the whole time period.
1.2.3 Responses
Bengsten (2012) claims that the European crisis is the result of a failure in institu-
tional design, but assumes the completion of the original concept of a comprehensive
economic and monetary union as a response. With respect to the institutional de-
sign, Bengsten (2012) argues that the solution to Europe’s problems is additional
integration in the form of a banking, a fiscal or perhaps even a full political unions.9
However, these measures cannot be addressed in isolation due to the interdepen-
dencies between banking union, fiscal union and political union (Véron, 2012). For
example, a banking union requires fiscal backing. In a similar vein, Sapir (2011) ar-
gues that the greater the extent of market integration, the greater the need for policy
integration is likely to be.
Not all measures in response to the crisis are set yet, some are still on the agenda
and to see the results of policy responses will take time. As mentioned in the be-
ginning, the history of economic and currency unions outside of Europe does not
provide transferable solutions, and yet, the short history of a unified Europe gives
hope. As illustrated by Bengsten (2012), Europeans have resolved many crises that
have threatened the project of European integration. Sapir (2011) provides an ex-
9The creation of a European banking union represents the economic motivation for Chapter 5 and 6, whereas
fiscal policy partly motivates Chapter 2.
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ample, which is the single market program, launched in 1985 as a response to the
“Euro-sclerosis” threatening European integration in the form of low growth and
unemployment in the early 1980s.
1.2.3.1 Financial Integration
The need of banking and financial stability within a monetary union belongs to
the most important issues neglected by OCA theory (Obstfeld, 2013), but considered
as essential for the euro area (O’Rouke and Taylor, 2013; Lane, 2012; Brunnermeier
et al., 2011).
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, which peaked in 2008, regulatory
authorities have put a lot of attention to a reform of the regulation of capital re-
quirements for banks (Hellwig, 2010). In December 2010, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision published a comprehensive set of reforms. This set of reforms
aims at strengthening the regulation, supervision and risk management of the bank-
ing sector, known as Basel III. Main changes in Basel III are reflected in the fields
of capital requirement, risk coverage, leverage ratio, and liquidity. In addition, the
introduction of the non risk-weighted leverage ratio gained popularity. This reflects
the criticism regarding potentially flawed model-based approaches. In Germany, as
in other EU countries, the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision will be implemented via the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD
IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). In Germany, these reforms are
accompanied by the German restructuring law (Schäfer et al., 2013).
Another important part of future financial integration is the European Banking
Union. The term banking union is most conveniently explained by Véron (2012):
“The expression banking union is used here to refer to a policy framework that
locates key instruments of banking policy at European level to enable the formation
and maintenance of an integrated European banking system.”
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The European Commission conducted different policy measures in order to re-
store the safety and soundness of the financial sector in Europe in June 2012.10 This
toolbox shall allow for crisis prevention, early intervention and bank resolution. A
single rulebook was created which applies to all financial actors in the European
Union. This single rulebook represents the foundation of the banking union, which
ought to result in deeper integration of the banking system. The banking union is
also intended to break the vicious circle between sovereign and banking credit con-
ditions (Lane, 2012). The banking union applies to countries in the eurozone, whilst
other EU countries can also join. At the heart of the banking union lies the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The
impartial supervision by the European Central Bank aims at making bank failures
less likely. The incorporation of banking supervision extends the initial duties of the
European Central Bank. The Single Resolution Mechanism shall assure that banks
can be resolved more easily and with less taxpayers’ money.
The political discussion about the implementation of a banking union has been
associated with the question to which banks the uniform rules and supervision should
be applied. According to Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012), there are two corner solutions.
First, a partial banking union which covers only systemically important financial in-
stitutions. Second, a complete version which covers all banks in Europe. In particular
in Germany, there was strong resistance against this by saving banks and cooperative
banks, which argued that a banking union represents a competitive disadvantage for
them. In contrast, the Deutsche Bank as the largest German private Bank mainly
lobbies against the non risk-weighted leverage ratio part of Basel III.
This shows that the discussion implies a need to understand the country-specific
characteristics of the EU countries’ banking systems.
10See for this and the following EC (2015) - European Commission webpage:
http : //ec.europa.eu/finance/general − policy/banking − union/index en.htm.
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1.2.3.2 Fiscal Integration
There are many ideas of how a fiscal union or a mutualization of fiscal policies in
the European Union could look like. Practically, the recent crisis in Europe clearly
emphasizes the need for sustainable public finances. Theoretically, sustainable public
finances are important as well. According to Lane (2012) the mutlitple equilibria
problem may have greater force in a monetary union.
The first amendment of fiscal policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis
was the implementation of the European Fiscal Compact in 2013. The European
Fiscal Compact requires that countries embed the associated fiscal rules into national
legislation. The reforms are based on two principles (Lane, 2012). First, high public
debt makes countries more prone to fiscal instability. Second, the fiscal balance ought
to be close to zero “over the cycle”. Correspondingly, the new fiscal rules focus more
on the structural budget balance. This allows to adjust for cyclical effects and one-
offs. This new set of rules is supposed to provide an incentive for countercyclical
fiscal policy (Lane, 2012). However, Lane (2012) identifies two problems associated
with the European Fiscal Compact. First, the focus on the structural budget balance
exposes the new rules to measurement errors. Second, responses to structural budget
imbalances are national.
O’Rouke and Taylor (2013) propose a eurozone-wide safe bond to break the vicious
feedback loop between national banking systems and national sovereigns; for the
same purpose, Lane (2012) proposes “eurobonds” in combination with a banking
union. Such a supposedly safe eurozone asset could facilitate sovereign debt default or
restructuring without strains on a country’s financial system or eurowide contagion.
Eurobonds rely on the mutualisation of government debt across Europe. Of course,
such a mutualisation of different credit risks opens the door to moral hazard. To
counteract this, limiting eurobonds’ maturities to the short term or limiting volumes
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to, for example, a debt to GDP level of 60% are options discussed in the literature
(Delpla and von Weizsäcker, 2011; Philippon and Hellwig, 2011).
In a similar vein, Brunnermeier et al. (2011) propose European Safe Bonds (ES-
Bies). Interestingly, they propose this new safe asset not only from a European fiscal
perspective: they argue that the global demand for safe assets combined with the lack
of supply of such assets is one reason for the gobal financial crisis, but also a chance
for Europe. However, the major distinguishing feature of their proposal is the way
they envision a European Safe Bond to be constructed. According to Brunnermeier
et al. (2011), European Safe Bonds are securities issued by a newly installed Euro-
pean Debt Agency. These bonds represent a senior tranche of a portfolio of sovereign
bonds issued by European countries and held by the European Debt Agency. They
do not require further fiscal integration but would benefit from the price stability
target of the European Central Bank.
1.3 Motivation
The motivation of this thesis is twofold. There is an economic and a methodolog-
ical motivation. To sum it up, in the broad field of European integration relevant
research questions are identified and addressed. By employing microeconomic-data
to address the majority of these macroeconomic research questions, my work is also
methodologically relevant.
1.3.1 Economic Motivation
The general introduction has already made parts of the economic motivation for
specific research questions obvious. However, all research questions addressed will be
motivated and explained separately in each chapter of this work. The whole work
aims at providing a clearer picture of the economics of European integration and at
identifying further steps to enhance economic integration. Since European economic
integration is manifold, I will address a diverse range of research questions related
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to this phenomenon. Needless to say that none of the research questions I address
here have been addressed in the literature so far.
1.3.1.1 Theoretical Motivation
The interaction between fiscal policy and banks, referred to as the vicious circle
between sovereigns and banks, has already been mentioned. This interaction repre-
sents the centrepiece of motivation of the selected research questions. Normally, this
vicious circle between sovereigns and banks is emphasized at the country-specific
level. However, there is natural interaction of countries within the European Union
and, in particular, within the euro area. One sovereign’s fiscal conditions, like in the
case of Greece, can easily threaten the remaining countries.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the interaction of a sovereign’s fiscal conditions, banking
system and growth.11 Chapters of this thesis relate to or are motivated, respectively,
by one of these components. Given the lack of regulatory discrimination among bonds
(Brunnermeier et al., 2011), banks hold large amounts of their sovereigns’ debt. Let us
assume that the circle starts with worsening fiscal conditions of the sovereign. Banks’
sovereign debt holdings increase bank risk and, in turn cause higher refinancing costs
for banks. Facing both more expansive refinancing conditions and more risk, banks
reduce loans to firms. The impaired financing conditions of firms reduce growth,
which in turn reduces the sovereign’s tax revenues. The sovereign’s fiscal conditions
further deteriorate, given lower tax revenues and the increasing probability of bank
bailouts. According to previous regulations, there was no discrimination between the
bonds of different EU member countries. However, there was still de facto currency
risk in many cases, since not all member countries of the European Union are part
of the euro area. Nevertheless, this circle is not country-specific. Fiscal conditions
of one country or the fragility of this country’s banking system create the risk of
contagion. Once this vicious circle gains momentum in one country, it can transmit
into another country.
11Figure 1.6 is closely related to illustrations mady by (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
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Figure 1.6: Circle between sovereigns and banks
1.3.1.2 Economic Policy Motivation
Understanding the euro area as the final stage of integration within the European
Union framework is why I devote a considerable amount of work to questions related
to the euro area. The idea of a fiscal union emphasizes the role, fiscal policy plays
for euro area member states and for the functioning of the currency area. I will
shed some light on the connection of fiscal policy and the functioning of the euro
area in the second chapter of this work. The third chapter is also closely related to
the euro area. Reserve currencies are held in significant quantities by governments
and institutions and are characterized by their international role in trade-settlement
and their perceived safe value. Wyplosz (1997) describes Europe’s desire to create
the world’s premier currency as a publicly understated part of the motivation of
the euro. According to Dominguez (2006), there was a belief that the euro could
surpass the dollar as the world’s international reserve currency. Chinese exchange
rate management provides an opportunity to empirically assess the role of the euro
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as an international currency. This second research question also relates to the first
research question, since Europe does not offer a safe asset (for example, European
Safe Bonds) which could rival United States Treasuries (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
Such a safe assets is supposedly required for a reserve currency.
The role both institutions and institutional harmonization play in the context
of European integration is indisputable. The resolving of insolvency represents an
important tessera of a market economy. Yet, there are substantial differences in in-
stitutional quality in terms of resolving insolvency frameworks across EU countries.
In Chapter 4, the role of institutional quality in terms of resolving insolvency is
illustrated and the potential need to increase institutional quality in CEECs is em-
phasized. This chapter also provides insights for further convergence of CEECs.
A general consensus in academia exists regarding the need of a banking union
within the European Union. In June 2012, the European Commission paved the way
for the implementation of a banking union. In addition, EU countries implemented
Basel III through a new legislative package (Capital Requirements Directive). Dif-
ferent measures will be introduced stepwise until 2019. However, cross-country reg-
ulation also requires country-specific knowledge. This motivates me to conduct two
studies related to the German banking market, which are represented in Chapter
5 and 6. The first study in chapter 5 is motivated by the need to understand how
an EU-wide regulatory change could affect the German economy. The regulatory
change relates to Basel III. Looking at the prospect of a European Banking Union
in the future, in Chapter 6 relationship banking, a characteristic very specific to the
German banking market, is explored and its determinants are revealed. Blanchard
(2004), with respect to the economic future of Europe, emphasizes the importance
of economic and social relations between firms and suppliers of funds. Relationship
banking represents both economic and social relations between firms and banks. Even
though these two chapters focus on Germany, given the similarities of bank-based
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systems such as in Germany and other European countries, both chapters provide
results that are also relevant beyond their direct interpretation for Germany.
1.3.2 Methodological Motivation
In addition to the pure economic motivation, my thesis is also methodologically
motivated. In general, I use innovative empirical methods in order to address eco-
nomically relevant questions. Economists have witnessed a considerable increase in
the availability of micro-data during the last couple of years (as of summer 2015).
Making use of detailed micro-data in addressing macroeconomic issues is impor-
tant and brings the possibility of implementing new empirical methods in macroe-
conomics. This methodological development is well illustrated by the fact that the
American Economic Review published papers related to the topics “Big Data in
Macroeconomics: New Insights from Large Administrative Datasets”12 and “Macro
Development with Micro Data”13 in May 2014. In a similar vein, the Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives published the “Symposium: Big Data”14 in Spring 2014. Both
are top journals and their emphasis on this methodological development more than
underlines its importance for the whole profession of economics.
Making use of micro-data is the major technical motivation of my work. In Chap-
ter 2, I employ standard macro-data but I use a panel estimator, which is the method
mainly used in my thesis. In Chapter 3, daily exchange rate data are used. In Chap-
ter 4, 5 and 6, I use microeconomic data. Thus, in 3 out of 5 studies presented here,
I use micro-data, but provide macroeconomically relevant results. With respect to
the use of micro-data in macroeconomics, my work provides methodologically state
of the art research in economics.
From a methodological point of view, Chapter 4 and 5 represent the centrepiece
of this thesis. Both chapters make use of large micro-data sets. Chapter 4 includes
12See Chetty et al. (2014), Guvenen et al. (2014) and Kreiner et al. (2014).
13See Buera et al. (2014), Gollin et al. (2014) and Kaboski et al. (2014).
14See Varian (2014), Belloni et al. (2014), Nickerson and Rogers (2014) and Heffetz and Ligett (2014).
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micro-data for more than 10 European countries between 2005 and 2012. In Chapter
5, two micro-data sets are combined and employed using multilevel regressions.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis includes five research papers. Each research paper represents a chapter.
A set of research questions is addressed separatly:
1. Are the “convergence criteria”, defined by the Maastricht treaty and the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, linked to the theory of optimum currency areas by
aligning demand shocks among euro area member states? Do new euro area
member countries play a different role?
2. What role does the euro play as an international currency? What is the compo-
sition of the secret currency basket used by the Chinese central bank to manage
the Chinese yuan?
3. Do more efficient institutions in terms of resolving insolvency ensure a more
efficient use of assets in the economy? How could a narrow channel through
which institutions potentially affect income per capita in the long-run look like?
4. What are the possible effects generated by tighter capital requirements for banks
due to Basel III on the German economy? Do such regulatory changes transmit
differently into different industries?
5. What determines relationship banking in a bank-based system like in Germany?
How does this relate to standard capital structure theory?
In the following, the treatment of each of these research questions will be presented
as a separate paper in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis. For each paper, I will
provide short background information. Finally, in chapter 7, I will give a summary
of my work and derive policy recommendations embedded in the overall topic of
European integration.
Chapter 2
Determinants of Demand Shock
Synchronization in the EMU
2.1 Abstract and Details of the Article
2.1.1 Abstract
The impact of selected variables on bilateral demand shock synchronization among
euro area member states is analyzed. Compliance to the “convergence criteria” is
introduced as a binary variable to assess whether there is an indirect connection
between these criteria and the theory of optimum currency areas. The results provide
weak evidence that bilateral trade linkages decrease bilateral business cycle deviation.
For new member states, fiscal policy is more important. With respect to economic
integration, new member states’ accession path has to be taken into account and it
is recommended to overachieve fiscal rules prior to a new member’s entry into the
eurozone, in order to retain some flexibility.
JEL Classifications: E32, E42, C32, C33.
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2.1.2 Details of the Article
This article is my single-author paper.1 I presented it at the following conferences:
• Falling Walls Lab, Berlin/ Germany, November 2012.
• Political Economy of Eurozone Crisis: Is Fiscal Union Feasible?, Brno/ Czech
Republic, November 2012.
• INFER International Workshop on European Economic Integration: Present
and Future Challenges, Lisbon/ Portugal, June 2014.
2.2 Introduction
The theoretical assessment of whether a country is suitable for a monetary union
is provided by the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory. Based on OCA theory,
a sufficient degree of business cycle synchronization is required for economies to
constitute an optimum currency area. Ex ante this decision might be biased, due to
the endogeneity of the criteria. But even when countries have already merged into
a monetary union, asymmetric shocks can still appear, as the recent history of the
euro area proved. Hence, ex post the matter of interest is rather skewed towards
the question of whether a monetary union is a sustainable framework. Since the
less business cycles deviate among member states, the more sustainable a monetary
union is, the determinants of business cycle synchronization among member states
are of high interest. In particular, variables which might cause bilateral demand
shock deviation or synchronization, respectively, need to be identified and examined
empirically for their influence.
As can be seen from the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact
(“convergence criteria”), which were put into place by European politicians specifi-
cally to assure a sustainable framework, fiscal policy is unambiguously of high interest
1I would like to thank Jarko Fidrmuc, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Viktor Winschel, Philipp Schreiber and the
participants of several conferences for helpful comments and discussions.
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and generally acknowledged as an important factor in a monetary union (De Grauwe,
2012). The important role of fiscal policy is highlighted by the decision to implement
the so called European Fiscal Compact and the ongoing academic debate (Sly and
Weber, 2013; Agnello et al., 2013; Alesina et al., 2012; Alesina and Ardagna, 2012;
Reinhart et al., 2012). The role of fiscal policy in the euro area is also visible from
the sovereign debt crisis, characterized by excessive debt in some countries, in par-
ticular in the periphery. In general, facing a one-fits-all monetary policy makes fiscal
policy an even more important tool for national governments to steer the economy
(Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2011). Additionally, it is easy to imagine that there is a
considerable probability of future fiscal shocks related to demographic developments,
such as increasing government expenditures due to pension liabilities. There are sim-
ple reasons why fiscal discipline is favorable in the long term: reasonable expenditures
ought to improve the allocation of financial resources and lower interest rates ought
to stabilize inflation expectations (Babetski et al., 2003).
The research question here is if and how fiscal policy is linked to the theory
of optimum currency areas. To be precise, does a common fiscal discipline such
as the convergence criteria align demand shocks among eurozone member states?
It is well understood that there are important factors for a sustainable monetary
union other than demand shock synchronization. However, to address the question
of whether there is a linkage between the convergence criteria and demand shocks
has been omitted from the literature so far. Yet, after more than one decade of the
euro, the data to address this question is now certainly available. A potential linkage
between the convergence criteria and demand shocks can be interpreted as an indirect
connection of fiscal policy and OCA theory. It is indirect since the convergence
criteria lack a sound economic foundation (Wyplosz, 1997) but intend to provide an
outcome which is theoretically desirable according to the OCA theory.
The present paper finds that bilateral trade linkages weakly increase bilateral busi-
ness cycle synchronization among member states of the euro area and that in case of
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new memeber states there is an indirect connection between the convergence criteria
and the theory of optimum currency areas. I understand an indirect connection as
fiscal rules which assure business cycle synchronization.
To identify bilateral business cycle synchronization among euro area member
states, I decompose business cycles into demand and supply shocks. Demand and
supply shocks reveal that the financial crisis at its peak hit member countries asym-
metrically. In line with most of the OCA literature this paper’s focus lies on demand
shocks. Business cycle asymmetries make a centralized monetary policy to come
at higher costs. Since aggregating demand shocks among euro area member states
might be associated with losing some information, demand shock deviation among
euro area member states is measured bilaterally and time varying. Thus, bilateral
business cycle synchronization is measured as the modulus between demand shocks
of two euro area member states.
Whereas the bulk of the existing literature dilutes the time dimension by av-
eraging over periods, this paper takes the time-varying nature of shocks explicitly
into account by using the modulus between two countries for each period. In a panel
regression of bilateral business cycle synchronization on selected macroeconomic vari-
ables, the coefficients of bilateral trade linkages between two countries take on the
hypothesized sign and enter the panel regression through most specifications statisti-
cally significantly. Higher trade integration reduces the asymmetry of demand shocks
between euro area member states. A binary variable designed to reflect compliance
with the convergence criteria turns out to have no impact on bilateral business cycle
deviation in general, but it has a statistically significant impact with the hypothe-
sized sign when applied solely to new member countries.
To address the question of which variables cause bilateral demand shock synchro-
nization or deviation, respectively, and what role a common fiscal discipline plays, a
set of variables is empirically employed. The paper contributes by explicitly taking
bilateral measures into account. Hence, this study will contribute to the discussion
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regarding the role of a common fiscal discipline in the euro area. It contributes to
our understanding of why business cycles differ among member states. Finally, it
provides empirical insight regarding further economic integration in the euro area.
This paper relates to at least two strands of literature. Firstly, the theory of opti-
mum currency areas in a broader sense. Secondly, the role of fiscal policy in a narrow
sense, since solely measures related to the eurozone are taken into account.
2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1 Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
Mundell (1961) finds, based on the appearance of an asymmetric demand shock,
that an optimum currency area is a territory characterised by high internal labour
mobility and low external labour mobility. McKinnon (1963) argues that small and
highly open economies shall merge into a single-currency area until they constitute a
currency area which is sufficiently large to float against other currency areas. Kenen
(1969) identifies product diversification as a necessary precondition to join a mon-
etary union. Ingram (1969) criticizes that the optimum size of a currency area is
not attributable to real economic determinants and emphasizes the practical need
of integrated capital markets. Fleming (1971) argues that different countries may
prefer different points along the Phillips curve or different ratios of inflation and em-
ployment, respectively. Vaubel (1976) introduces the real exchange rate as another
criterion, since countries using their nominal exchange rates as mechanisms of adjust-
ment or those which experience high real exchange rate changes are no candidates
for a currency union.
As to the question of whether an economy is suited to enter a monetary union, dif-
ferent OCA-criteria could easily provide conflicting answers (Matthes, 2009). Hence,
the OCA-criteria lead to a cost-benefit analysis, where costs arise mainly on the
macro-level and benefits are seen mainly on the micro-level. The symmetry of shocks
implies that countries which experience similar shocks and aligned business cycles,
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respectively, fit best for a common currency or they at least could give up mone-
tary authority at the lowest costs. Hence, a methodology to recover economic shocks
is required. Structural vector autoregression (SVAR) was initially developed to de-
compose the influence of demand and supply shocks on output and unemployment
assuming that both shocks are uncorrelated (Blanchard and Quah, 1989). Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1994) adapted structural vector autoregression to the needs of
the OCA theory (Kenen, 2000), in order to identify demand and supply shocks and
separate them from the corresponding response. Based on a Keynesian long-term
framework, it is assumed that demand shocks affect output only temporary and that
supply shocks have a permanent effect on output. However, both affect the price level
in the long-run. These restrictions make it possible to separate exogenous shocks from
their endogenous response.
2.3.2 Endogeneity
When considering the introduced OCA criteria as the foundation of making a
decision whether to join or create a currency area, the idea of endogeneity plays
an important role and represents a major limitation to the approach of applying
the OCA criteria to define an optimum currency area ex ante. The argument of
endogeneity was introduced into OCA theory by Frankel and Rose (1998), who un-
derstand their work as a simple application of the “Lucas Critique”, which in this
context leads to the conclusion that historical data cannot be used to judge on a
country’s suitability to join a monetary union due to the endogeneity of the criteria.
They find strong empirical evidence of a positive relationship between the degree
of bilateral trade intensity, which increases significantly once a country has joined
a monetary union, and the cross-country bilateral correlation of business cycles. A
more recent study is provided by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and shows that
bilateral trade is a robust determinant of business cycle comovement. In addition to
the initial hypothesis by Frankel and Rose (1998), Matthes (2009) names two more
potential endogeneity factors related to the eurozone: (1) The influence of the euro
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area on structural reforms, which could enhance product and labour market flexi-
bility; (2) fiscal policies, in particular the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which
could theoretically make shocks more symmetric. Analysing endogeneity with regard
to the euro area, Willett et al. (2010) and Matthes (2009) do not clearly support
the argument of endogeneity, whereas Boewer and Guillemineau (2006) as well as
Gouveia and Correia (2013) support the argument of endogeneity. Fidrmuc (2004)
modifies the prediction of Frankel and Rose (1998) of business cycles getting more
correlated by emphasizing the role of intra-industry trade; Babetskii (2004) supports
endogeneity considering demand shocks. Finally, Willett et al. (2010) offer a useful
limitation regarding measurement: he notes that it is not always easy to distinguish
between the effects of EU-wide initiatives and the effects of the euro itself. The Eu-
ropean Union and the euro area are, to some degree, different policy frameworks,
but have a lot of overlapping issues at the same time.
2.3.3 Convergence Criteria
Together with a common monetary policy, the convergence criteria represent the
main feature of the policy framework in the euro area. In order to take into ac-
count the characteristics of transition economies, Babetski et al. (2003) emphasize
that the Maastricht criteria must be applied to “comparable economies”. Baskaran
(2009) aims to investigate the causal impact of the Maastricht treaty on several
macroeconomic variables and concludes that the belief of the Maastricht treaty’s
supporters, namely that it would lead to sustained improvement of fiscal balances
and macroeconomic stability in the eurozone, was wrong. Jonas (2006) argues that
potential member countries should overachieve the fiscal rules already some time
prior to their final accession, in order to be equipped with some flexibility when join-
ing the monetary union. Barrell and Sefton (1997) find that the Maastricht criteria
are generally contractionary with regard to output and employment in the short to
medium term. Sargent and Wallace (1981) illustrate the importance of fiscal policy
with regard to inflation. They suggest that, under certain circumstances, monetary
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policy will increase inflation, depending on the assumptions about either current or
future inflation and given that the fiscal authority runs a persistent deficit.
2.3.4 Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle Synchronization
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011) find that once a high degree of trade integration is
reached by countries involved in the European integration process, the role of fiscal
policy is particularly relevant. They stress the fact that the conduct of monetary
policy by the ECB is a potential source of asymmetric shocks in the euro area, due to
the heterogeneity in monetary transmission mechanisms. But they still consider the
main problem to be asymmetric shocks themselves, as suggested by Mundell (1961),
rather than the asymmetric transmission of common shocks. In order to measure
business cycle synchronization, they decompose GDP series into an unobservable
trend and a cyclical as well as an irregular component; they then use the (smoothed)
cyclical component to analyze the degree of synchronization of one country with a
whole set of countries. The standard deviation of the smoothed cycles is used to
indicate synchronization.
Darvas et al. (2005) pose the question of whether there is an indirect connec-
tion between the convergence criteria, in particular fiscal variables, and the most
important optimum currency area criterion, namely business cycle synchronization.
They show that persistent cross-country differences in government budget positions
tend to lower the synchronization of business cycles. The resulting inference is that –
whether intended or not – the application of the convergence criteria brought euro-
zone entrants closer to an optimum currency area. The intuition of the contribution
is straightforward: fiscally irresponsible countries create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks.
Hence, more fiscal discipline reduces the scope of idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. Darvas
et al. (2005) use correlations between two countries of different business cycle mea-
sures as the dependent variable in their panel and employ fiscal divergence according
to Frankel and Rose (1998) as the independent variable. Using the same cyclically
adjusted fiscal deficit measure like Darvas et al. (2005) in a different empirical frame-
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work, Artis et al. (2008) find that fiscal divergence causes less synchronized business
cycles.
2.4 Data
The initial intention was to exercise the empirical analysis for all current euro
area member states. The data sources presented in Table 2.1 were used to obtain the
relevant data for all countries. Due to a lack of availability in bilateral trade data,
Cyprus and Malta need to be excluded from the analysis. Latvia is excluded from
the analysis since it entered the euro area too recently. Data until the end of 2012 are
used, mainly because 2013 the European Fiscal Compact came into effect meaning
that fiscal rules have changed since then.
For the structural VAR approach preliminary treatment of the data is required. To
check for stationarity, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) is employed. Given
the methodology, time series of real GDP and GDP-deflator ought to be integrated
of order one, I(1). Robust evidence is obtained that all time series are non-stationary
in levels but stationary in first differences of the natural logarithm (see Table 2.2).

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test








































GDP-Deflator -1.929* GDP-Deflator -3.625***
Notes: * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
Since data are mainly available quarterly, I transformed monthly data (Consumer
Price Index, Producer Price Index, International Trade) into quarterly data by cal-
culating their arithmetic averages.
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2.5 Business Cycle Analysis of Euro Area Member States
2.5.1 Estimating Demand and Supply Shocks using a Structural VAR
Model
Even though empirical literature often claims to stick to the foundation of the the-
ory of optimum currency areas, they do not decompose business cycles into demand
and supply shocks as introduced by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). To inquire
which variables cause business cycle synchronization in an OCA sense and whether
there is an indirect connection between OCA and the fiscal framework in the euro
area, this decomposition is necessary for two simple reasons: first, the decomposi-
tion is a major difference between general business cycles analysis and the theory of
optimum currency areas; second, both types of shocks have different indications for










where the vector xt contains ∆Yt and ∆Pt, representing the logarithmic change
of output and prices. Independent demand and supply shocks are represented by
(εdtεst)
′. These shocks have to be orthogonalised by et = Cεt. For a two dimensional
xt four restrictions are needed to identify C, where the fourth restriction represents
the assumption that the effect of a demand shock on output is only temporarily
∞∑
i=0
a11i = 0. (2.2)
Optimal lag length is specified for each country-specific estimation using the Akaike
Information Criterion. Quarterly data are used to calculate the change in natural
logs of real GDP (∆Yt) as a proxy for output and the change in natural logs of the
GDP-Deflator (∆Pt) as a proxy for the price level.
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Calculating an unweighted arithmetic average of demand and supply shocks of
euro area member states shows that the financial crisis hit the member states asym-
metrically, as illustrated by the increase in the standard deviation of shocks (see
Figure 2.1). Here and in the following analysis, new member states were added to
the analysis up to two years prior to their euro area entry, because at this point in
time, due to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), common rules
are already binding. Baskaran (2009), for example, argues that those common rules
are even more binding prior to entering the euro area. Figure 2.1 shows that supply
shocks were more pronounced during the peak of the financial crisis than demand
shocks, but that the asymmetry among member states, as measured by the stan-
dard deviation of shocks, increased similarly on the demand and the supply side.
Visual inspection reveals a spike in the standard deviation of shocks among euro
area member states in 2009.
Figure 2.1: Unweighted Mean and Standard Deviation of Demand and Supply Shocks
in the Euro Area
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Albeit the financial crisis revealing some asymmetry among member states, the
motivation is to examine the determinants of demand shocks in a broader sense and
across a longer time horizon. In addition, the analysis shall be broken down from an
aggregate perspective to country pairs. Given the strong emphasis on demand shocks
throughout the whole OCA literature, the following analysis will focus on demand
shocks.
2.5.2 Measurement of Demand Shock Synchronization
After its operationalization, OCA theory was often applied by checking the cor-
relation between the residuals of the SVAR model to assess whether countries are
sufficiently synchronized for a monetary union. Taking into account the role of busi-
ness cycle volatility, in particular in periods of crisis, the use of correlation coefficients
to check for synchronization seems to be flawed, given that the true relationship does
not change (Corsetti et al., 2005; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). In addition, correlation
coefficients do not take potential differences in the size of shocks into account. Hence,
other measures of dispersion seem to be superior in the context of business cycle syn-
chronization analysis. To measure synchronization, this analysis uses a methodology





where Ŝt|Ω−i is the cross-country standard deviation of demand shocks to the group
Ω excluding country i and Ŝt|Ω is the cross-country standard deviation of demand
shocks to the group Ω including country i. Hence, the indicator, synchroit|Ω, takes
negative (positive) values when the standard deviation of the group increases (de-
creases) if country i is included. This measure indicates whether one country’s busi-
ness cycle volatility is similar to the rest of the countries. Table 2.3 illustrates results
according to the methodology of Equation (2.3) for 15 euro area member states from
1999 to 2012. An equal amount of positive and negative signs attached to countries
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is not necessarily required, since “new member states” are added successively (two
years before finally joining the euro area) to the anlysis, which changes the compo-
sition of Ŝt|Ω over time. Mean and standard deviation of synchroit|Ω is reported in
Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Demand Shock Synchro-
nization à la Crespo Cuaresma et al.
(2011)

















(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10%
(5%) [1%] level.
(2) The analysis spans from 1999Q1 - 2012Q4
and new member countries
are added to years prior to their euro area entry.
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Table 2.3 reveals that the inclusion of Belgium, Finland, France, and Slovenia
results in a higher measure of group synchronization over the whole sample period.
The inclusion of Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, and Spain results in a lower measure of
group synchronization over the whole sample period. Interestingly, it is not the case
that peripheral countries generally lower group synchronization, whereas for example
“DM-zone” countries generally contribute to a higher group synchronization.2
2.6 Determinants of Bilateral Demand Shock Deviation
2.6.1 Dependent Variable
Using the estimated demand shocks for each country, a time series is calculated to
inquire into the causes of different demand shocks among euro area member states.
Rolling correlations take the time-varying characteristic of business cycle correlation,
raised by Babetski et al. (2003) in the context of OCA, into account to some degree.
As already emphasized, correlation coefficients may be inappropriate due to business
cycle volatility and the size of shocks. In addition, rolling correlation coefficients cause
technical problems when using them as a dependent variable and make it necessary
to set a window span. In light of these considerations, Cerqueira and Martins (2009)
propose a synchronization index without any aggregation over time. Hence, I decided
to use the modulus of the demand shocks of two countries in each period as a measure
of dispersion, which does not aggregate data over time and, thus, does not lose the
time variability:
DSijt = |DSit −DSjt| (2.4)
where DSijt is the difference of the amount between a demand shock in country i at
time t (DSit) and country j at time t (DSjt). For the following analysis this measure
2Members of the DM-zone (Germany, France, the Benelux countries and Austria) were supposed to be a set of
suitable economies for a monetary union before the euro was introduced (De Grauwe, 1989).
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will serve as the dependent variable. Given that demand shocks were estimated for
15 countries, 105 bilateral relationships are calculated in total.
2.6.2 Control Variables
As already emphasized, the endogeneity of an optimum currency area is based
on increasing trade intensity. Thus, bilateral trade intensity is supposed to reduce
bilateral demand shock deviation. According to Frankel and Rose (1998), I focus
on export, import and total trade flows between countries. Since exports from i to
j do not necessarily equal imports of j from i, I calculate three averages between
countries related to either exports, imports or total trade. bTθijt represents bilateral
trade between country i and j in year t, where θ can take values from 1 to 3: 1 if the
measure is calculated based on exports, 2 in case of imports and 3 if the underlying
trade measure is total trade, which is the trade variable of main interest here.
Another variable of interest is the price development in the sector of non-tradable
goods, NT. The price development in this sector for each country is proxied by
the consumer price index, CPIit, divided by the producer price index, PPIit (Cre-
spo Cuaresma et al., 2005; Égert et al., 2002). It is hypothesized that the more similar
prices in the sector of non-tradables develop between two countries, the less demand
shocks deviate from each other. To account for differences in external shocks, the
current account balance relative to GDP, CA, is employed. It is assumed to enter the
regression with a positive sign. Like demand shocks, these variables are transformed
to the modulus of their difference:
λijt = |λit − λjt| (2.5)
where λ = NT or CA. Table 2.4 shows pairwise correlation coefficients of all vari-
ables. All three measures of bilateral trade intensity are highly correlated with each
other. Prices of non-tradables and the current account balance relative to GDP are
negatively correlated with trade measures and positively correlated with each other.
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None of the variables is significantly correlated with the employed measure of demand
shock synchronization.
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics
DSijt bT1ijt bT2ijt bT3ijt CAijt NTijt
DSijt 1.000
bT1ijt -0.0036 1.000
bT2ijt -0.0030 0.9768* 1.000
bT3ijt -0.0034 0.9939* 0.9943* 1.000
CAijt -0.0173 -0.2882* -0.2853* -0.2884* 1.000
NTijt -0.0101 -0.1776* -0.1702* -0.1745* 0.0408* 1.000
* denotes significance at the 5%-level.
2.6.3 Fiscal Divergence
The issue now becomes in which way fiscal policy should be used to investigate
whether common fiscal discipline is linked to OCA or not. One could employ fiscal
policy in the manner of Darvas et al. (2005) and assume that irresponsible fiscal policy
causes idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. But alternatively, one can understand business
cycle fluctuations as a regular feature of the economic system (Long and Plosser,
1983; Lucas, 1977). I will assume that governments accumulate debt as they act
counter-cyclically in troughs but that they do not reduce this debt later in boom
periods. This assumption is straightforward for the euro area, given the finding that
fiscal policies became less countercyclical after the creation of the euro (Lane, 2012).
It is noteworthy that the period from 2003-2007 created an opportunity for many
euro area countries to reduce debt since tax revenues were historically high (Lane,
2012).
Assuming this type of government behavior implies that, once a government has
reached a critical threshold, fiscal capacity to counteract a recession diminishes and
the next business cycle trough gets deeper. Hence, once this threshold is reached, the
impact of fiscal policy on demand shocks stems from a government which intends
to smooth those regular fluctuations by fiscal measures, but ran out of capacity at
some point in time. Such a threshold or the limits of fiscal capacity, respectively, can
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be determined by political rules (debt ceiling, treaty, etc.), the market, or something
else.
Taking this perspective makes it viable to introduce the role of fiscal policy in
the form of a binary variable based on such a threshold. The most obvious choice
for identifying such a threshold for the purposes of the present analysis is the use of
the thresholds defined by the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.
This means that countries need to comply with a debt/GDP ratio below 60% as well
as deficit/GDP ratio below 3%. In line with the treaty, if a country violates these
thresholds, the binary variable takes on the value of 1 for this period and reflects
diminished capacity to smooth regular business cycle fluctuations by fiscal measures.
The definition of this binary variable for a pair of countries i and j is straightforward,
best illustrated by a 2x2 matrix, as shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Fiscal Divergence Dummy (FDijt)
i  j in check above specified threshold
in check 0 1
above specified threshold 1 0
The hypothesis is that if the binary variable takes the value 1, the coefficient should
reflect a negative impact on the chosen synchronization measure. This effect is caused
by the fact that one country is running out of capacity to counteract business cycle
fluctuations, whereas the other country still has that capacity. I am fully aware that
the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact lack a sound economic
foundation. However, the research question here for the present analysis is the ques-
tion of whether there is an indirect connection between the convergence criteria and
the OCA theory. Such an indirect connection would be fiscal rules which assure busi-
ness cycle synchronization. It is indirect since the convergence criteria lack a sound
economic foundation, but intend to provide an outcome which is desirable according
to OCA theory.
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Assume the convergence criteria to be strictly binding in a two country world,
where one country is frequently subject to idiosyncratic demand shocks. If the cor-
responding government permanently counteracts asymmetric demand shocks with
discretionary/expansionary fiscal policy, it will reach a point at which convergence
criteria de jure prohibit a further use of fiscal policy. At this point, such a country’s
business cycle ought to diverge from the other country’s business cycle given the lat-
ter can still smooth fluctuations. See Agnello et al. (2013) for a different approach,
which nonetheless has some similarities, as for example the impact of unilateral fiscal
consolidation on business cycle synchronization.
In general, the empirical literature on this issue reveals some ambiguity. Gaĺı
and Perotti (2003) question the argument that the common fiscal discipline in the
eurozone constraints the use of fiscal policy when countries need it the most and
is conducive to pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Hence, they ask whether and how those
constraints may have made fiscal policy in euro area member states effectively more
pro-cyclical or, equivalently, less counter-cyclical. They find that constraints on fiscal
policy in euro area member states have not impaired countries’ ability to use fiscal
policy in its stabilizing role. It is noteworthy, however, that their sample periods ends
in 2001, a point in time at which most euro area countries were in either compliance
with the common fiscal rules or on a path towards compliance. Gaĺı and Perotti
(2003) also mention that eurozone countries experienced only few real recessions
during the observed period of time. Candelon et al. (2010) extend the contribution of
Gaĺı and Perotti (2003) to the year 2004 and find, contrary to Gaĺı and Perotti (2003),
that fiscal policy is consistently pro-cyclical over the sample. Their implication is
that the common fiscal discipline in the eurozone provides member states with less
room for effective discretionary fiscal policy. Recall Matthes (2009), who claims that
fiscal policies, in particular the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), could theoretically
make shocks more symmetric. In sum, introducing a binary variable which reflects
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the different capacities to counteract business cycle fluctuations is theoretically and
empirically justifiable.
2.7 Estimation and Results
2.7.1 Baseline Regression
To assess which variables cause deviating demand shocks between two euro area
member countries, a fixed effects panel model is applied.
DSijt = αij + βbTθijt + γFDijt + x
′
ijtβ + µij + δt + εijt. (2.6)
Given the use of several measures, bTθijt reflects bilateral trade intensity where θ
can take values from 1 to 3. FDijt reflects fiscal divergence as introduced in the
form of a binary variable. αij represents the constant, while other covariates, such as
prices of non-tradables, NT , and current account balance relative to GDP, CA, are
included in the vector x′ijt. In addition, µij reflects entity fixed effects, which control
for unobserved contemporaneous correlation between countries due to heterogeneous
country pairs, and δt reflects time fixed effects, which control for unobserved effects
different across country pairs but equal across periods of time. Clustered standard
errors are estimated.
Results are shown in Table 2.6. The only variable which remains statistically sig-
nificant at the 10%-level with the proposed sign across most specifications is bilateral
trade. Even though all measures for trade-intensity are highly inter-correlated, the
first measure, based solely on exports, enters the regression analysis statistically
insignificantly. The second as well as the third measure of trade intensity are statis-
tically significant at the 10%-level across all respective specifications. Hence, weak
evidence is provided that the role of trade is in line with the existing literature, seems
to be independent from the construction of the dependent variable, and also holds
using a richer set of controls compared to other studies. Artis and Okubo (2011) and
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Cerqueira and Martins (2009) also use synchronization indices different from stan-
dard correlations in a panel framework and find trade intensity to be deterministic.
Table 2.6: Fixed Effects Panel Model (1/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FD 0.034 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.036
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
T1 -7.915 -6.558 -8.315
(7.185) (7.064) (7.194)
T2 -14.945* -15.279* -14.984*
(8.943) (9.065) (8.976)
T3 -15.629* -15.126* -15.849*
(9.069) (9.018) (9.113)
CA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.692) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NT -0.435 -0.438 -0.460 -0.460 -0.435 -0.434
(0.453) (0.578) (0.576) (0.575) (0.577) (0.576)
Constant 0.448*** 0.969*** 0.437*** 1.321*** 1.062*** 1.296*** 0.489*** 1.068*** 0.476***
(0.085) (0.133) (0.084) (0.166) (0.148) (0.166) (0.082) (0.149) (0.081)
Number of obs 4016 4030 4016 4023 4037 4023 4016 4030 4016
Number of groups 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
R-sq: within 0.169 0.168 0.169 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.169 0.169 0.169
R-sq: between 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
R-sq: overall 0.149 0.153 0.146 0.119 0.115 0.118 0.114 0.114 0.112
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The binary variable reflecting fiscal divergence is statistically insignificant across
all specifications, which reflects a common claim in the literature that the Maastricht
treaty ignores the OCA criteria (Sapir, 2011). The most obvious reason as to why
the employed thresholds fail to enter the regression statistically significant is the lack
in bindingness of those thresholds (Spolaore, 2013; Lane, 2012). Whether strictly
binding thresholds would enter the analysis with statistical significance remains an
open question. What can, however, be answered based on the obtained results is
that, as long as a common fiscal discipline is not strictly binding, there is no indirect
connection to the principles of OCA theory.
2.7.2 New Member States
Jonas (2006) emphasizes that new member countries should overachieve the fiscal
rules some time prior to their entry, in order to be equipped with some flexibility
when joining the monetary union. One can easily extend this argument by assuming
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that fiscal rules are more binding for newer member states. This is due to the fact
that those economies are much smaller than countries like Germany or France. Prior
to the creation of the euro, Wyplosz (1997) already expected Germany and France
to exercise their veto power should they lack compliance with the common fiscal
discipline. As we know today, this did indeed happen. In general, it is assumed that
political power is determined by economic size and that more political power reduces
incentives to comply with common rules (Berger et al., 2007). In order to take this
argument into account, equation (2.6) is modified
DSijt = αij + βbTθijt + γFDijtxDnew + x
′
ijtβ + µij + δt + εijt (2.7)
where Dnew equals 1 if one of the countries i or j joined the euro area after 1999. In
more than 50% of observations across all country pairs, new member states violated
the common fiscal discipline. Results are shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Fixed Effects Panel Model (2/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FD 0.118* 0.117** 0.121** 0.117* 0.116* 0.120** 0.117* 0.116** 0.120**
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060)
T1 -9.577 -7.758 -9.906
(6.916) (6.625) (7.031)
T2 -9.583 -9.894 -9.568
(7.969) (8.049) (8.082)
T3 -12.457 -11.755 -12.625
(8.496) (8.294) (8.699)
CA -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NT -0.297 -0.262 -0.328 -0.295 -0.310 -0.273
(0.521) (0.513) (0.522) (0.513) (0.521) (0.513)
Constant 2.427*** 2.380*** 2.491*** 2.420*** 2.402*** 2.477*** 2.462*** 2.431*** 2.523***
(0.344) (0.338) (0.299) (0.333) (0.329) (0.289) (0.345) (0.339) (0.301)
Number of obs 4178 4205 4214 4185 4212 4221 4178 4205 4214
Number of groups 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
R-sq: within 0.177 0.176 0.180 0.178 0.177 0.181 0.177 0.176 0.181
R-sq: between 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
R-sq: overall 0.149 0.155 0.151 0.152 0.148 0.155 0.137 0.138 0.139
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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The impact of trade vanishes, whereas the coefficient of fiscal divergence takes on
the hypothesized sign and becomes statistically significant across specifications at
the 10% or 5% level, respectively. How can these results be interpreted? As empha-
sized, new member states have less political power, which makes the common fiscal
discipline more binding for them. Consequently, the manner in which a measure of
fiscal divergence was introduced in the present study is more appropriate for those
countries. If new member states breach the political threshold, their fiscal ability to
smooth fluctuations will be more constrained. Hence, although in general the results
do not sketch a clear explanation of what determines demand shock synchroniza-
tion for the complete set of euro area member states, results are supportive to the
argument outlined by Jonas (2006), who argues that new member countries shall
overachieve the fiscal rules prior to their euro area entry. Less political power at the
European level might cause this finding.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper aims at identifying potential sources of demand shock synchronization
across euro area member states. The distinction between demand and supply shocks
is relevant for the empirical analysis to be in line with theory of optimum currency
areas and also due to the different implications for monetary policy making that
arise from either demand or supply shocks. To elaborate on the determinants of
bilateral demand shock synchronization, which historically has received much more
research attention compared to supply shocks, demand shocks are estimated with
a structural vector autoregression. Applying a synchronization measure does not
reveal any pattern which would indicate the existence of a “periphery” of countries
systematically different from the other euro area member countries.
Variables of interest assumed to induce differences in demand shocks between
countries are identified and employed in a fixed effects panel model. The regression
analysis provides weak evidence that higher bilateral trade intensity is associated
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with demand shock synchronization among euro area member states. The analy-
sis fails to attach any significant role to fiscal thresholds as defined by the Maas-
tricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Given the existing literature (Cre-
spo Cuaresma et al., 2011; Mikek, 2008; Artis et al., 2008; Darvas et al., 2005), when
it comes to business cycle synchronization it seems to be more about a sustainable
fiscal position or path and less about thresholds.
However, taking into account that fiscal rules might be more binding for new
member states, which are assumed to be equipped with less political power changes
the initially obtained results. For new member states, fiscal divergence is associated
with bilateral demand shock divergence. Hence, the results support Jonas (2006)
arguing that new member countries should overachieve the fiscal rules some time
prior to their final entry into the euro area to be equipped with some flexibility when
being an euro area member. From the perspective of European integration, further
enhancement of intra-eurozone trade would be supportive to the single currency area
and new member states are recommended to enter the euro area with sufficient fiscal
capacity.
Chapter 3
Exchange Rate Policy in China
after the Financial Crisis:
Evidence from Time-Varying
Exchange Rate Basket
3.1 Abstract and Details of the Article
3.1.1 Abstract
We analyze the period of a managed floating exchange rate policy in China be-
tween June 2010 and November 2014. We estimate a time varying structure of a
hypothetical currency basket using the Kalman filter. We show that the exchange
rate policy continues to focus on the US dollar. However, its weight has been grad-
ually declining, while this decline has moderated in 2014. The euro played some
role before summer 2011, but became negligible after the outbreak of the European
sovereign debt crisis. Finally, the Thai baht has positive implicit weights.
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JEL Classifications: E58, F33, C32.
3.1.2 Details of the Article
This article is joined work with Jarko Fidrmuc.1 I presented it at the following
conferences:
• INFER Annual Conference, Orléans/ France, May 2013.
• Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Singapore, August 2013.
• Exchange Rates, Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in Emerging Markets
and Developing Countries, Leipzig/ Germany, October 2014.
The Verein fuer Socialpolitik in cooperation with the Deutsche Bundesbank pro-
mote an international presence of young scientists with a subsidy of 500 euro for
presentations at prestigious international conferences. Since the Asian Meeting of
the Econometric Society is among these prestigious international conferences, I was
honored with this award in 2013. In 2014, my participation at the conference in
Leipzig was sponsored by the Stiftung Geld und Waehrung.
Since August 2015, this article is published in Review of Development Economics:
Volume 19, Issue 3, pages 608-623.
3.2 Introduction
The World Bank expects China to become a high-income economy as well as the
world’s largest economy before 2030 (World Bank, 2013). After the Chinese admin-
istration introduced unprecedented reforms in 1980s, today nearly a quarter of the
population lives in cities with an income per capita which resembles that of certain
OECD countries. In particular, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) in Chinas richest 25 metropolitan areas is on average
1We would like to thank Iikka Korhonen, Linlin Niu, and the participants of several conferences for helpful
comments and discussions.
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equivalent to Portugals value (OECD, 2013). Not surprisingly, growth in the world’s
most populous country has changed the distribution of economic activities across the
world. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) data, the share of Chinese
GDP in the world economy, valued at purchasing-power-adjusted prices, nearly dou-
bled from 7.5% in 2001 to 14.3% in 2011. This remarkable economic development is
accompanied by financial sector reforms and growing competition among domestic
companies.
In contrast to the majority of central banks in advanced economies, the People’s
Bank of China (PBC) does not only use standard instruments of monetary policy.
The use of multiple instruments is aimed at supporting the PBC’s monetary policy,
which pursues multiple objectives − price stability, economic growth and exchange
rate stability (Sun, 2013). The objective of exchange rate stability led observers of the
Chinese exchange rate regime witnessing several back-and-forth changes, accompa-
nied by minor adjustments, between 1996 and 2014. Those changes mainly consisted
of two different regimes – namely, a currency peg against the US dollar and a peg
against a basket of currencies with secret weights. Due to its opaque composition,
the latter is of main interest. The actual composition of the basket of currencies is
relevant for economists in order to gain a better understanding of the Chinese ex-
change rate management, but for policy makers and business as well. In addition, for
economists, the actual composition of the basket of currencies relates to many dis-
cussions beyond exchange rate regimes, such as global imbalances and international
trade competitiveness, to name the most important ones.
Compared to the first period of a managed floating exchange rate regime, the
second period has received surprisingly little academic attention so far. However,
analyzing this second period of a managed floating exchange rate regime allows
to identify changes in the Chinese exchange rate management in the aftermath of
the financial crisis, by comparing findings to those obtained from the first period
of a managed floating exchange rate regime. Another observation motivating an
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assessment of the current regime is the gradual widening of the floating bands of the
renminbi against the US dollar, which implies a more market oriented exchange rate
and is mirrored in the halt of accumulation of foreign exchange reserves2 by the PBC
in 2012 (OECD, 2013). The first period of managed floating regime was characterized
by a remaining de facto peg against the US dollar, allowing for less appreciation than
expected. It is important to note that expectations regarding the current regime seem
to have adjusted. Most recently, the difference between the spot rate of the renminbi
against the US dollar and the corresponding 12 months non-deliverable forwards is
rather negligible, whereas it achieved considerable values during the first period of
managed floating from 2005 to 2008 (see Figure 3.1a).
To our best knowledge, there are only very few treatments of the second floating
exchange rate regime period so far. We aim to fill this gap in the literature. We
apply the methodology proposed by Fidrmuc et al. (2010) and estimate the weights
of selected international currencies for the renminbi exchange rate management. We
show that the second and most recent period of exchange rate reforms shows some
similarities to the first, but also many differences. First, we confirm the dominance of
the US dollar also during this second period of managed floating. Second, we observe
a declining weight attached to the US dollar between 2010 and 2014, while the decline
of the US dollar weight moderated after a short-lived increase in 2014. Furthermore,
deviations from the gradual decline of the weight attached to the US dollar coincide
with major political and economic events in the Unites States. Third, we observe
slight evidence that the euro was used as an exchange rate target at the beginning
of the second period of managed floating, but its weight approached zero after the
deepening of the debt crisis in the European Monetary Union. Finally, the Thai baht
gained importance compared to the first period of managed floating (Fidrmuc et al.,
2010).
2This is consitstent with the observation by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) that the variance of reserves should be
zero in a pure float.
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Hence, this study contributes to the discussion regarding China’s managed floating
exchange rate regime and sheds some light on the most recent composition of the
secret basket of currencies used by the PBC. It contributes to our understanding
of how far China’s exchange rate policy has changed in the aftermath of the latest
policy announcements and the financial crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
development of the Chinese exchange rate policy and the corresponding deviations
from de facto and de jure policies, and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 de-
scribes the data and identifies relevant sub-periods for our estimations, while Section
4 describes the empirical method for the estimation of time-varying exchange rate
baskets. Section 5 reports and describes the results using time-varying coefficients
based on the Kalman filter. Section 6 provides robustness analyses. The last section
concludes the paper.
3.3 Chinese Exchange Rate Policy
3.3.1 De Jure Exchange Rate Policy
Since the introduction of current account convertibility in 1996, the stable ex-
change rate has been used to anchor inflation expectations (see e.g. McKinnon and
Schnabel, 2012; Nair and Sinnakkannu, 2010). After more than a decade of pegging
the renminbi (RMB) to the US dollar (USD) at an exchange rate of RMB 8.28 per 1
USD, the PBC announced a revaluation of its currency and a reform of the exchange
rate regime on the 21st of July, 2005. The main part of the exchange rate reform was,
according to the announcement of the PBC, the introduction of a peg to a basket of
currencies with secret weights and with narrow fluctuation bands of ± 0.3% on daily
changes against the USD and ± 1.5% on daily changes against the Japanese yen
(JPY) and the euro (EUR). There were more currencies but USD, EUR and JPY
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should be the most important.3 However, in August 2008, the PBC again pegged the
RMB to the USD after the outbreak of the financial crisis.
The PBC announced a return to the managed floating exchange rate policy on
the 19th of June, 2010. In addition, the PBC widened the floating bands of the
RMB against the USD in the inter-bank spot foreign exchange market from 0.5%
to 1% in April 2012 and to 2% in March 2014. This has signaled a move towards
a more market-determined exchange rate regime. Moreover, the exchange rate has
depreciated in the first half of 2014.
3.3.2 Literature Review - De Facto Exchange Rate Policy
Due to the rising importance of the Chinese economy and its deep trade integra-
tion with other economies, Chinese policy measures are of increasing consequence
outside of China. Exchange rate regimes and the possible equilibrium level of ex-
change rates belong to one of the most controversial issues in the world economy
today.
This first period of a managed floating exchange rate regime from 2005 to 2008 is
analyzed in several papers (Frankel, 2006; Funke and Gronwald, 2008; Fidrmuc et al.,
2010; Tian and Chen, 2013). The empirical evidence confirmed the international
markets’ skeptical view, as they believed that the old policy would be continued
under the new regime. This first period of managed floating was characterized by
a remaining de facto peg against the US dollar allowing for some appreciation of
the renminbi against the US dollar. The history of exchange rate regimes witnessed
many deviations between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes across countries
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2002, 2004). To pursue a more rigid exchange rate policy
than officially announced corresponds to the so-called fear-of-floating phenomenon
3During the first period of flexible exchange rates in China, de jure exchange rate policy was designed as a peg to
a secret basket of selected international currencies which are supposed to remain more or less the same also during
the current period (PBC, 2010). According to the PBC, the secret basket for the Chinese exchange rate policy
may include the US dollar (USD), the Japanese yen (JPY), and the euro (EUR). Other currencies, namely those of
Australia (AUD), Canada (CAD), Great Britain (GBP), Malaysia (MYR), Russia (RUB), Singapore (SQD), South
Korea (KRW), and Thailand (THB), were also announced to play some role, however this has not been confirmed
by previous research (Fidrmuc et al., 2010).
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(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Moreover, the empirical literature is accompanied by
several theoretical arguments in favor of a managed floating regime. In addition to
the implication for the trade between China and the USA, the discussion points
out that the de facto peg of the RMB against the USD results in a stabilization of
the RMB against a much broader set of currencies. This has important implications
for inter-regional trade in Asia and for the dollar-based financial and commodity
markets beyond Asia. Following McKinnon and Schnabl (2012) this broader effect of
a “dollar-peg” is based on the facts that trade in East Asia is invoiced in USD and
that the USD remains the dominant means of settling international payments.
IMF (2013) classifies China’s exchange rate arrangement as a crawl-like arrange-
ment where a monetary aggregate is targeted, which basically serves as an exchange
rate anchor to the USD. However, compared to the first period of a managed float-
ing exchange rate regime from July 2005 to August 2008, the second period which
started in June 2010 has received much less academic attention so far. Wang and
Xie (2013) find that the secret currency basket is again arranged with the USD as
the most important currency followed in decreasing order by the EUR, the JPY, and
the Korean won (KRW).
3.3.3 Literature Review - Policy Implications
Chinese exchange rate management is often blamed to be a source of global current
account imbalances by not allowing the renminbi to float freely. In addition, the
Chinese administration is often criticized as keeping its exports artificially cheap by
not allowing the renminbi to appreciate. In particular, during the last presidential
elections in the USA, these issues were heatedly debated (Lo, 2012), and they also
received some attention at international gatherings of high-level politicians.
Given China’s position in the global supply chain, Thorbecke and Smith (2010)
argue that a RMB appreciation alone cannot solve the global imbalances. The ques-
tion of whether an appreciation of the RMB against the USD can also rectify trade
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imbalances between the two countries is theoretically addressed by McKinnon and
Schnabl (2009), McKinnon and Schnabl (2012), and Qiao (2007), as well as empir-
ically by Zhang and Sato (2012). McKinnon and Schnabl (2009, 2012) argue that
an appreciating RMB would turn China into a higher cost country, thereby forcing
globally oriented firms to invest elsewhere. As a result, China’s saving-investment
balance and trade surplus could increase rather than decrease. Empirically, the dy-
namic effect of the bilateral exchange rate of China and the US on China’s trade
balance is very limited (Zhang and Sato, 2012). Despite the RMB’s appreciation in
nominal terms against the USD between 2005 and 2008, the bilateral trade balance
between the two countries increased.
Nair and Sinnakkannu (2010) find that between July 2005 and June 2009, a period
of an appreciating RMB against the USD, has not altered China’s international
trade competitiveness. In contrast, Thorbecke and Smith (2010) find that a 10%
unilateral appreciation of the RMB against the currencies of those countries buying
Chinese final exports would diminish manufacturing exports by almost 12%. With
respect to growth, Rodrik (2008, 2010) reports estimates which imply that a 10%
real appreciation would reduce growth in China by 0.86 percentage points.
3.4 Data Description
We have daily exchange rate data of the RMB and selected major currencies,
namely USD, JPY, and EUR between June 2010 and November 2014 (for descrip-
tive statics we use longer time periods). Furthermore, we include the KRW and the
Thai baht (THB) as two additional Asian currencies.4 According to the PBC’s com-
munication, earlier literature, and our preliminary analysis on the additional Asian
currencies, our focus on the role the selected major currencies is justified. However,
the inclusion of Asian currencies is necessary in order check whether those curren-
cies have become more important over time. Motivated by the existing gap in the
4According to IMF (2013), Thailand and South Korea run a floating exchange regime in an inflation-targeting
framework.
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literature, the empirical part concentrates on the second period of managed floating,
characterized by a relatively variable RMB exchange rate between June 2010 and
November 2014. The data are according to Bloomberg. Exchange rate data relate to
trading days of the New York Stock Exchange but result from 24/7 over-the-counter
quotes from market contributors. Hence, given the simultaneity of our data, differ-
ent time zones related to different geographical locations of stock exchanges have not
been taken into consideration.
We select the Australian dollar (AUD) and the Swedish krona (SEK) as reference
currencies, following the argument of Calvo and Reinhart (2002), as they are both
considered to be a typical free floating currency of a relatively small country. We
are aware that the Australian dollar is included in the list of the target currencies
published by the PBC. Given that the previous analyses did not find any significant
de facto weight for this currency, we believe that the possible bias is negligible.
We do not take the Swiss franc (CHF) into account, which was recommended by
Funke and Gronwald (2008), because the Swiss Central Bank has tried to avoid
excessive appreciation of the CHF against the EUR and has even set appreciation
limits recently, which could bias the results for the euro.
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Figure 3.1: Stylized Facts on the RMB
(a) NDF (b) RMB/USD
(c) JPY/RMB (d) EUR/RMB
(e) RMB against Major Currencies (f) RMB against Asian Currencies
Notes: (a) Prices of Non-Deliverable Forwards (NDFs) and Spot Price (01/2000 – 11/2014). (b) - (d)
Exchange Rate of the renminbi against the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro (01/2000 – 11/2014).
(e) - (f) Value of the RMB in terms of other major currencies: second period of managed floating; per RMB
(indexed: January 2010 = 1). Source: Bloomberg.
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We start our analysis with the presentation of descriptive statistics for different
sub-periods of Chinese exchange rate policy. Figure 3.1b illustrates that changes
in the Chinese exchange rate policy can be easily identified by visual inspection of
the exchange rate of the RMB against the USD. The exchange rates of the RMB
against the JYP and EUR, respectively, do not appear to be politically managed (see
Figure 3.1c and Figure 3.1d). Finally, comparing all three exchange rates indexed
at the beginning of 2010, the exchange rate of the RMB against the USD gradually
appreciates, whereas the JPY and the EUR reveal much more variability and, thus,
appear to be less managed than the USD (see Figure 3.1e). Similarly, the THB and
the KRW, respectively, reveal an almost equivalent picture in terms of less political
intervention compared to the USD (see Figure 3.1f). Table 3.1 shows that the mean
change in the exchange rate of the RMB against the USD from July 2005 to June
2008 and from June 2010 to November 2014 is statistically significantly different from
zero. Mean changes of the RMB against the JPY, the EUR, the KRW, and the THB
over time as well as during the sub-periods are not significantly different from zero.
This provides the first evidence that the USD has been playing a more important
role for the Chinese exchange rate policy than the remaining currencies.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the RMB, January 1996 to September 2014
01/00-11/14 01/00-07/05 07/05-06/08 07/08-06/10 06/10-011/14












iff Mean -0.055 0.000 -0.181 -0.009 -0.041
Std. Dev. 0.584 0.024 0.902 0.507 0.636
t-statistic -5.864 -0.355 -5.649 -0.412 -2.641






Mean 7.393 8.277 7.685 6.833 6.478
Std. Dev. 0.854 0.001 0.386 0.010 0.286
Min 6.041 8.276 6.811 6.797 6.041












iff Mean -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
Std. Dev. 0.049 0.051 0.042 0.067 0.050
t-statistic -0.962 -0.405 -0.834 0.750 -0.603






Mean 0.071 0.072 0.067 0.072 0.072
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.008
Min 0.052 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.052












iff Mean -0.022 0.108 0.076 -0.464 -0.195
Std. Dev. 5.704 5.914 5.000 7.842 5.833
t-statistic -0.236 0.696 0.428 -1.312 -1.361






Mean 9.035 8.717 10.263 9.397 8.737
Std. Dev. 1.105 1.291 0.416 0.537 0.665
Min 6.848 6.848 9.433 8.146 7.588












iff Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.006
t-statistic -0.528 0.315 -0.875 -0.456 -0.483






Mean 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.006
Std. Dev. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Min 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.004












iff Mean -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001
Std. Dev. 0.099 0.074 0.176 0.051 0.058
t-statistic -0.593 -0.967 0.156 0.571 -0.739






Mean 0.205 0.199 0.219 0.201 0.203
Std. Dev. 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.006 0.009
Min 0.181 0.181 0.194 0.189 0.183
Max 0.261 0.224 0.261 0.212 0.225
Note: The first differences of the bilateral exchange rates against the RMB are multiplied by 100. a - fluctuation band was
extended in April 2012 and March 2014.
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For reliable statistical inference in the following empirical analysis it is necessary
to check whether the time series under consideration are stationary or not. The
traditional approach for analyzing the composition of the Chinese exchange rate
basket relies on OLS regressions employing data in first differences. Since levels might
be more informative than first differences, and for technical reasons, we make use of
the Kalman filter. All time series under consideration ought to be non-stationary in
levels. Given such statistical properties, the Kalman filter represents an alternative
to traditional OLS regressions. Applying both augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests (available upon request), we have robust evidence that all time series are
non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences of the natural logarithm.
3.5 Estimation of the Implicit Currency Basket
Even though the actual composition of the currency basket is unknown to the
public, implicit weights can be estimated on the base of actual exchange rate devel-
opments of the RMB vis-à-vis a list of potential target currencies. Originally this
approach was proposed by Haldane and Hall (1991) and applied to China by Frankel
and Wei (2007, 2008) and then followed in the literature. Although OLS regressions
and rolling regression5 have dominated the previous literature, they are subject to
possible drawbacks, which were ignored in this literature. First, the relationship has
to be estimated over some time period, while the weights may be subject to frequent
or even continuous changes. Therefore, the majority of studies estimate rolling re-
gressions usually using a comparatively short window. However, this often results in
a relatively low number of observations despite the use of daily data. Moreover, the
structural changes are then artificially smoothed and cannot be clearly attributed to
a specific date. This can result in higher and correlated errors from the regression.
5OLS regressions and rolling regressions are available upon request from authors.
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3.5.1 Kalman Filter
Following Harvey (1989) and Ogawa and Sakane (2006), the structure of the cur-
rency basket with time varying weights is estimated by the Kalman filter. By the
use of the Kalman filter we address both points of criticism. Firstly, we take into
account the possibility that coefficients are changing gradually, by using an alter-
native methodology of estimation. Secondly, we use data in levels (without taking
logs) to see whether non-differenced time series are more informative regarding the
changes of de facto exchange rate policy. The Kalman filter is appropriate for the
estimation of the relationship between integrated variables. The estimation equation
for exchange rate e can be stated as
ermb/cur,t = α +
K∑
k=1
ωk,tek/cur,t + εt, (3.1)
where α is the intercept, the reference currency is denoted by cur and is either
AUD or SEK, k stands for analyzed currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, KRW, THB), and
the remaining parameters are estimated as time varying parameter processes which
follow a random walk
ωi,t = ωi,t−1 + ηi,t where i = usd, eur, jpy, krw, thb. (3.2)
As the analysis of the first period of flexible exchange rate showed that only the main
currencies were actually used for the determination of the exchange rate, we focus
on the USD, the EUR and the JPY in our analysis. However, we include additional
Asian currencies.
3.6 Time-Varying Approach in Levels
As emphasized, the results obtained by OLS regressions are subject to many
drawbacks and do not reflect policy changes accurately. We address this issue by
estimating the implicit currency weights by the Kalman filter in levels, using the
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methodology proposed by Fidrmuc et al. (2010) to estimate equation (3.1) with time
varying coefficients. In order to avoid results selective to the choice of the reference
currency, cur, we use the Australian dollar (AUD) as well as the Swedish krona
(SEK) as reference currencies.
3.6.1 Australian Dollar as Reference Currency
Block A of Table 3.2 shows the final state estimates6 of equation (3.1) using
the Australian dollar as reference currency. Figure 3.2 provides the corresponding
time-varying weights and confidence intervals. We start with a simple specification
for the USD as the single explanatory currency of the RMB’s exchange rate. The
development pattern of estimated coefficients corresponds closely to the announced
policy changes (see Figure 3.2, first column). The coefficient of the USD starts to
fluctuate in June 2010, departing from a value of 1 implied by the peg prior to
the policy change. This specification shows that, after an initial decline, the weight
of the USD stabilized again starting around mid-2011, increased in summer 2012,
and dropped after summer 2012, which may correspond to the presidential elections
in the US that were taking place at that time. However, the trend of a declining
weight attached to the USD continued in 2013. Finally, the coefficient of the USD
moderated after an increase in the beginning of 2014, which corresponds to the RMB
depreciation but also coincides with the tapering of the Federal Reserve System
(FED) in the United States. The FED initially announced its plans to reduce the
purchase of asset-backed securities in June 2013 and finally decided to do so in
December 2013.
6However, we have to keep in mind that the estimated weights presented in the table refer to one time point only.
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Table 3.2: Time-varying weights (final states estimates) & Robustness
Block A: AUD as Reference Currency
USD USD-EUR USD-JPY USD-KRW USD-THB USD-EUR-JPY USD-EUR-KRW USD-EUR-THB ALL
USD 0.878*** 0.899*** 0.885*** 0.876*** 0.848*** 0.895*** 0.888*** 0.852*** 0.853***
(877.978) (47.097) (57.702) (60.007) (44.236) (51.249) (51.913) (41.812) (34.475)
EUR -0.018*** -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015
(-1.029) (-0.761) (-0.992) (-1.183) (-0.935)
JPY -0.007 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.595) (-0.257) (-0.317)
KRW 0.008 0.011 0.000
(0.466) (0.699) (-0.017)
THB 0.046** 0.058*** 0.061**
(2.267) (2.864) (2.502)
Const 1.926*** 1.767 2.107** 1.415** 0.505 1.832 1.430 0.685 0.767
(4.148) (0.921) (2.573) (2.151) (0.542) (1.557) (1.514) (0.563) (0.548)
LL 463.051 366.292 455.104 499.504 497.239 451.238 472.743 475.595 373.005
AIC -0.802 -0.634 -0.788 -0.865 -0.862 -0.782 -0.819 -0.824 -0.646
SC -0.798 -0.630 -0.784 -0.861 -0.857 -0.777 -0.815 -0.820 -0.641
No of obs. 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152
Block B: SEK as Reference Currency
USD USD-EUR USD-JPY USD-KRW USD-THB USD-EUR-JPY USD-EUR-KRW USD-EUR-THB ALL
USD 0.881*** 0.911*** 0.886*** 0.875*** 0.857*** 0.902*** 0.893*** 0.867*** 0.861***
(881.126) (47.578) (57.785) (82.632) (45.459) (51.654) (56.426) (43.127) (35.486)
EUR -0.033* -0.027* -0.029** -0.032** -0.032*
(0.053) (-1.878) (-2.190) (-2.285) (-1.957)
JPY -0.005 0.001 -0.001
(-0.409) 0.105 (-0.045)
KRW 0.014 0.018 0.015
(1.114) (1.527) (1.099)
THB 0.035* 0.050** 0.044
(1.766) (2.473) (1.860)
Const 1.671*** 2.456 1.784*** 1.064 0.719 2.477** 2.197* 1.929 1.837*
(4.577) (1.237) (2.728) (1.528) (0.992) (2.038) (1.813) (1.537) (1.039)
LL 566.391 477.898 567.084 607.575 601.438 563.964 585.900 584.052 483.188
AIC -0.982 -0.828 -0.983 -1.053 -1.042 -0.977 -1.015 -1.012 -0.837
SC -0.977 -0.824 -0.978 -1.049 -1.038 -0.973 -1.011 -1.008 -0.833
No of obs. 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152
Block C: RMB Exchange Rate Determination over Selected Horizons
1 day 1 week 1 month 1 quarter 6 months 1 year
USD 0.995*** 0.992*** 0.987*** 0.982*** 0.975*** 0.982***
(994.622) (992.013) (986.748) (981.805) (975.316) (982.444)
Const 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.019***
(4.375) (7.905) (10.452) (9.645) (3.214) (10.649)
LL 4555.843 4931.476 4941.794 4860.654 4743.603 4080.285
AIC -7.908 -8.56 -8.578 -8.437 -8.387 -8.317
SC -7.903 -8.555 -8.573 -8.433 -8.382 -8.312
No of obs. 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152 1152
Note: z-statistics are reported in parentheses.
* (**) [***] stands for significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
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Next we include all other currencies (EUR, JPY, KRW, and THB) into equa-
tion (3.1). The estimated parameter for the USD remains robust, but the confidence
bands expand (see Figure 3.2) if more currencies are included. It is interesting to
note that the specification with the euro shows a stabilization of the weight of the
USD in 2014, but its increase in the summer of 2012 is less pronounced. This may
indicate that RMB appreciation against the USD was caused by the development
of the EUR and possibly other currencies as well. Moreover, we can see that the
estimated implicit weights for the EUR decrease over the sample period and the
weight is not significantly different from zero. The deepening of the sovereign debt
crisis in the EMU and increasing uncertainties regarding the future of the common
currency are mirrored in declining coefficients for the euro, which converges to zero
at the time when the sovereign debt crisis peaked in the summer of 2011. Adding the
JPY to equation (3.1) does not alter the previous results regarding the USD but we
cannot observe any time-varying behaviour of the weight attached to the JPY. The
pattern of the KRW looks quite similar to the one of the EUR. Finally, the THB
reveals a positive and statistically significant weight. Compared to the first period of
managed floating (Fidrmuc et al., 2010) this represents a major policy change and
illustrates the increasing importance of one major Asian currency.
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Figure 3.2: Time-varying Weights and Confidence Bands, AUD as Reference Cur-
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Finally, we estimate equation (3.1) including all currencies available. It is notwor-
thy that across specifications the pattern of the USD remains fairly unchanged (see
Figure 3.2, last column) and the THB enters each estimation with a positive and
statistically significant weight. Thus, the results for the USD are highly robust and
deviations from the gradual decrease in the weight attached to the USD correspond
to major political and economic events in the United States, namely the presiden-
tial elections in 2012 and the FED’s decision reduce the purchase of asset-backed
securities in December 2013.
3.7 Robustness Analysis
3.7.1 Swedish Krona as Reference Currency
Block B of Table 3.2 shows the final state estimates of equation (3.1) using the
Swedish krona as reference currency, the corresponding figures of the time-varying
weights and confidence intervals are available upon request. Compared with using the
AUD as a reference currency the decline of the weight attached to the USD is much
more gradual. However, the recent stabilization which coincides with tapering of the
FED is still easily observable by visual inspection. The main difference between the
use of the different reference currencies is that the EUR is statistically significant
and takes on a negative sign. This finding might be attributed to the orientation of
the SEK towards the EUR.
3.7.2 Time Horizon of Exchange Rate Policy
Exchange rate policy in general is likely to follow short-term, medium-term and
long-term objectives. The advantage of our approach is that we can analyze the sta-
bilization of the exchange rate in different time horizons. In particular, equation (3.1)
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where the remaining parameters are defined similarly as in equation (3.1). The pre-
vious analysis showed that the euro, Korean won and Thai baht could play some
role in the Chinese exchange rate policy, however, the estimated weights remained
very close to zero during the whole period. Therefore, we concentrate here only on
the role of the US dollar.
In Block C of Table 3.2, we present the impact of the USD exchange rate on the
RMB exchange rate over selected time horizons: one trading day, one week (that is,
five days), one month (20 days), one quarter (60 days), six months (150 days), and
one year (300 days). This analysis reveals several interesting insights for the possible
horizons of Chinese exchange rate policy. First, the focus of the Chinese exchange
rate policy on the US dollar is incomplete which means a coefficient below one. The
estimated coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero for all analyzed
time horizons. The difference is closer to one for shorter periods. Thus, the estimated
coefficient is 0.995 for the horizon of one trading day, 0.975 for one month, and 0.95
for one year. Second, there is little structural change if short-term fluctuations (one
day or one week) of the exchange rate are analyzed, while exchange rate changes
cumulate if the analyzed period is longer than one month (see Figure 3.3).
Third, we can see that for longer horizons coefficient variability increased in 2013
and 2014. This confirms that there was a gradual liberalization of exchange rate
policy. Finally, only the analysis for the one year horizon shows a clear distinction
between exchange rate behavior before and after June 2010. In sum, it seems that
short term horizons of less than one month dominate the exchange rate policy in
China. This finding is further supported by the information criteria, which also favor
the specification of exchange rate growth over a horizon of one month.
In further analysis, we estimated the impact of all currencies on the RMB exchange
rate over different time horizons. Although some currencies, especially the Thai baht,
had significant weight for the levels, the impact of these currencies remained zero
and insignificant if growth rates were considered. This indicates that the positive
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Figure 3.3: RMB Exchange Rate Determination over Selected Horizons, June 2010
to November 2014
weights of these currencies in the levels may be due to other factors, for example due
to orientation of these currencies towards the US dollar and the impact of regional
or global unobservable factors on all analyzed currencies.
3.8 Conclusion
Economic policy announcements often differ from perceived de facto policy. There
are numerous examples among developed and emerging economies. Among the latter,
the Chinese exchange rate policy belongs to the cases which attracts significant
attention in economic research and policy. The political discussion is mainly driven
by the USA due to its trade deficit, but also by the rising importance of global
imbalances in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Since June 2010, the exchange
rate of the RMB has been declared to follow a managed floating regime after being
re-pegged to the USD with the onset of the US sub-prime crisis. This reform was met
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internationally with a high degree of skepticism due to the experience of a rather
insufficient exchange rate liberalization between 2005 and 2008.
We analyze this second regime of managed floating after the financial crisis. In-
deed, we confirm again the dominant role of the USD also during the recent period,
but observe a declining weight attached to the USD between 2010 and 2014. Gener-
ally, through this second regime of managed floating, the gradually declining weight
attached to the USD is accompanied by a gradual appreciation of the RMB against
the USD. However, a temporary increase of the weight attached to the USD in early
2014 corresponds with a depreciation of the RMB against USD at the beginning of
2014. In addition, we find that major political and economic events in the United
States coincide with deviations from the gradual decline of the weight attached to
the USD through this second regime of managed floating after the financial crisis.
The EUR played some role at the beginning of the recent period of managed
floating or before the peak of the European debt crisis, respectively, and possibly
also during the presidential elections in the US in 2012. Although the results are
very similar for the JPY, the estimated coefficient for JPY remains insignificant
during the whole period analyzed. However, significant weights are found for the
Thai baht which represents a major policy change compared to the first period of
managed floating.
Independently from the different currencies included and the choice of the refer-
ence currency, the results obtained for time-varying weights attached to the USD
reveal a consistent picture. Hence, the conduct of the Chinese exchange rate policy
remains largely unchanged, meaning that it is focusing almost solely on the USD but




Determinants of Inefficient Use of
Assets
4.1 Abstract and Details of the Article
4.1.1 Abstract
We analyze the relationship between institutional quality and firm efficiency. Us-
ing rich data on firms in the European Union between 2005 and 2012, we show that
high institutional quality lowers the share of persistently inefficiently used assets.
This adverse effect of low institutional quality may be one of the narrow channels
through which institutions affect income per capita in the long-run. Our approach
combines institutional economics and Schumpeterian creative destruction. In ad-
dition, we observe similarities between inefficiently used assets in Europe and the
phenomenon of zombie lending in Japan during the last decades.
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JEL Classifications: O43, K23, C33.
4.1.2 Details of the Article
This article is joint work with Jarko Fidrmuc.1 I presented it at the following
conferences:
• 8th Biennial Conference of the Czech Economic Society, Prague/ Czech Rebu-
plic, November 2014.
• 1st International Research Conference on Macroeconomic Policies and Financial
Stability Issues in Emerging Markets, Baku/ Azerbaijan, November 2014.
• Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society 2015, Groningen/
Netherlands, April 2015.
• Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2015, Ghent/ Belgium, May 2015.
• The 13th INFINITI Conference on International Finance, Ljubljana/ Slovenia,
June 2015.
• 7th Joint IOS/APB/EACES Summer Academy on Central and Eastern Europe,
Tutzing/ Germany, July 2015.
4.2 Introduction
Institutional quality is generally believed to be an important precondition for both
long-term growth and per capita income (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Nonethe-
less, there are numerous examples that countries with low institutional quality can
grow fast as well. The most prominent examples include the Soviet Union in the
1950s and 1960s (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) or, more recently, China more re-
cently. However, the former example illustrates that growth in countries with low
institutional quality may stop suddenly and that it is difficult for these countries
1I would like to thank Magdalena Ignatowski, Richard Frensch, Jan Hanousek and the participants of several
conferences for helpful comments and discussions.
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to return to previous high growth dynamics. The recent literature has been putting
more emphasis on the role of institutions related to economic growth and income
per capita. And yet, institutions are manifold and often remain vague. Thus, a pre-
cise definition of institutions and the corresponding channels via which institutions
impact long-run growth is mostly neglected by the literature.
Our empirical analysis confirms that more efficient institutions ensure a more
efficient use of assets in the economy. We employ a very specific definition of institu-
tional efficiency, namely institutions’ ability to resolve insolvency. In general, weak
institutions may reduce the ability as well as the incentives to clean up the economy
from unproductively used assets and may be less successful in ensuring necessary
competition. We propose that this adverse effect of weak institutions is one of the
potentially many but narrow channels, through which institutions potentially affect
income per capita in the long-run. We observe that insolvency resolving institutions
are relatively weak in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) compared
to mature economies like Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Our benchmark for effi-
ciency at the firm-level is provided by the interest coverage ratio, as firms should
be able to serve at least their interest payments from current earnings. Firms which
fall below a specific threshold for one year or longer are potentially wasting the en-
trepreneurs’ resources and suffer from severe inefficiency, since they have to provide
interest payments from internal sources. The existence of such firms is facilitated by
institutional weaknesses.
Motivated by this puzzle in institutional economics, we analyze the relationship
between institutional quality and the efficient use of assets at the firm-level. Thereby,
we propose a narrow channel, through which institutions potentially affect income
per capita in the long-run. In particular, we investigate whether more efficient in-
stitutions, which are able to recover a higher share of assets in the case of firm
insolvency, lower the share of unproductively used assets in the economy. The idea
is that a better resolving insolvency framework facilitates the re-allocation of re-
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sources. In other words, an economy with more efficient institutions is more open to
Schumpeterian creative destruction. Institutions, which assure that firms tying up
unproductive assets can be resolved efficiently, contribute to income and productivity
growth. We test the hypothesis of whether more efficient institutions lead to a more
efficient use of assets in an economy. Indeed, our results confirm that institutional
quality is important.
The issue of firm efficiency received a lot of attention at the beginning of the
economic transition in CEECs, especially regarding the importance of privatization
(Estrin et al., 2009; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Campos and Coricelli, 2002). In
contrast, the issue of severe firm inefficiency due to financing conditions has not
been intensively analyzed in the more recent literature. In addition and to the best
of our knowledge, the triangular relationship between domestic institutional quality,
financing conditions and firm inefficiency has been omitted from the discussion as
well. Thus, our contribution closes this gap in the recent literature. Through the
analysis of this severe form of firm inefficiency, our paper contributes indirectly to
the growth literature. We aim to address the relationship between the institutional
ability to resolve insolvency and the use of assets at the firm-level. Moreover, our
study contributes to the discussion regarding European integration, since there are
substantial differences in institutional quality between EU countries. Finally, by ad-
dressing basically macroeconomic issues with the use of micro data, our approach is
closely related to a current methodological trend in economics (Buera et al., 2014;
Gollin et al., 2014; Kaboski et al., 2014).
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4.3 Literature Review
4.3.1 Competition, Institutions and Growth
4.3.1.1 Competition and Growth
Nickell (1996) finds that competition, as measured by the number of competi-
tors, is associated with a significantly higher growth rate of total factor productivity
growth. Since innovations matter with respect to productivity, another relevant find-
ing is that less competitive industries generate fewer aggregate innovations, but that
at the firm-level those firms with a higher market share tend to be more innovative
(Blundell et al., 1999). Also at the firm level, Aghion et al. (2005) show that the
relationship between competition and innovation follows a hump-shaped pattern. In
addition to empirical analyses at the firm or industry levels, Dutz and Hayri (2000)
provide a cross-country study, which indicates that the effectiveness of antitrust
and competition policy enforcement is positively associated with long-run growth.
Aghion et al. (2008) find that high mark-ups or low-level product competition, re-
spectively, have a large negative effect on productivity growth in the South African
manufacturing industry.
To sum it up, the relationship between competition and growth differs, depending
on whether it is considered at the firm-level or at an aggregated level. The narrow
channel we propose here, through which resolving insolvency institutions potentially
affects growth in the long-run, relies on the connection of competition and growth
at the aggregated level.
4.3.1.2 Institutions and Growth
Following seminal empirical contributions on growth (Mankiw et al., 1992; Levine
and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001)
established the role of institutions in the empirical literature. By using European
settler mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions in African coun-
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tries,Acemoglu et al. (2001) show a large effect of institutions on income per capita.
This initial contribution paved the way for an intense discussion of the relationship
between institutions and income. Yet, this initial contribution is not exempt of crit-
icism, see in particular Albouy (2012). However, Acemoglu et al. (2012) address the
critique using an alternative formulation of their instrument that provides additional
robust evidence for the long-run effect of institutions on income per capita. In addi-
ton, Glaeser et al. (2004) criticized the omission of human capital in Acemoglu et al.
(2001). In response, Acemoglu et al. (2014) show that the impact of institutions on
long-run development is robust with respect to historically determined differences
in human capital. Moreover, Alesina and Giuliano (2013) find that culture matters
for a variety of economic outcomes, based on analysing the relationship of culture
with institutions. In addition, Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) emphasize the interplay
between social norms and the enforcement of law.
However, institutions themselves remain a broad concept in the recent literature.
The literature distinguishes between de jure and de facto institutions, which re-
flects the distinction between legal rules and their enforcement. Furthermore, there
is still little understanding about the specific channels, through which institutions
are influencing growth. Acemoglu et al. (2014) describe institutions as fundamental
determinants in a causal chain working through channels but also concede that (p.
28): “Most empirical literature on this topic is agnostic about channels via which
institutions impact long-run development [...]”.
4.3.2 Institutional Quality
In the empirical literature there are many approaches to measure the “quality of
institutions” as a numerical variable for use in further analyses. The Political Risk
Services report an index reflecting protection against expropriation. This index is
commonly used, brought forward, for example, by Acemoglu et al. (2001). However,
Glaeser et al. (2004) criticize that a country under dictatorship can achieve the same
level of protection against expropriation as a democratic country, in terms of this
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index. Further examples are the Polity IV dataset, which provides a measure of
democracy, and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator, which reports
on six dimensions of governance for more than 200 countries. Besides these well-
known measures, many additional measures are constructed to gauge the “quality of
government” related to the functioning of the public sector, efficiency of bureaucracy,
corruption etc. From a similar perspective, La Porta et al. (1998) emphasize the role
of legal origins with respect to current investor protection.
In our empirical analysis we will employ an index provided by the World Bank,
which is conceptually grounded on Djankov et al. (2008). Using data on time, cost,
and the likely disposition of assets, Djankov et al. (2008) construct a measure of
the efficiency of debt enforcement for 88 countries. In order to construct the index,
they confront insolvency practitioners with a standardized case of an insolvent firm.
The case assumes a midsize firm whose legal form is limited liability. It has one
major shareholder and one large secured creditor. Hence, the firm will default on
straight debt and there is no financial complexity, which could help to circumvent
formal default. It is assumed that the firm could serve bank debt for the next two
years but would then run into trouble, due its long-term inability to repay the debt.
Employees want the firm to stay in business and the tax administration will follow
the procedure that maximizes its expected recovery rate. There are three possible
procedures in place, namely foreclosure, reorganization, and liquidation. Liquidation
can be followed by two possible outcomes: going concern or piecemeal sale. The
major benefit of the World Bank’s methodology, as comapred to other measures, is
that it provides a recurrent and comparable measure that differs depending on the
country-specific design of institutions.
Based on this example, Djankov et al. (2008) provide a measure of institutional
efficiency, which is defined as the present value of the firm’s terminal value after
bankruptcy costs, referred to as the recovery rate. This measure does not only reflect
the institutional quality. We understand this measure to also reflect the incentives
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of different parties at stake when considering whether to enter formal bankruptcy.
Thus, a higher recovery rate means that different parties at stake may initiate a for-
mal bankruptcy procedure sooner rather than later. In addition, the design of such
institutions related to formal bankruptcy has ex ante effects on firms’ performance,
due to its influence of firms’ capital structure (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Finally, in-
stitutional quality proxied by the institutional ability to resolve insolvency is neither
perfectly related to institutions-as-equilibria nor institutions-as-rules.2
4.3.3 Hypothesis
The IMF (2013) proposes an intuitive measure to identify firms facing debt-
servicing difficulties and describes such firms as (p. 32): “These firms would be unable
to service their debts in the medium term unless they make adjustments such as re-
ducing debt, operating costs, or capital expenditures.” Correspondingly, such firms
cannot use their assets efficiently, which in turn causes a severe inefficiency at the
firm-level and negatively affects potential growth for the whole economy.
We hypothesize that economies with more efficient institutions in terms of resolv-
ing insolvency suffer less from unproductive assets tied up in firms with debt-servicing
difficulties. A lower recovery rate creates an incentive to keep a firm operating even
if its assets cannot be employed most productively anymore. Thereby, market entry
of new firms is hindered, which is economically not undesirable, since it prevents
the re-allocation of resources. More efficient insolvency resolving institutions ensure
that the operation of such firms will not be artificially prolonged and that the share
of assets employed in inefficient firms will be lower. This makes the economy more
Schumpeterian creative destruction, since it facilitates market entry and the cor-
responding re-allocation of resources. According to Schumpeterian growth theory3,
market entry is desirable, since the ensuing reallocation of resources from incum-
bents to new entrants is one major source of productivity growth (Aghion et al.,
2See Alesina and Giuliano (2013) for a discussion of both definitions.
3See Aghion et al. (2015) for a summary and predictions.
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2013). In other words, a better resolving insolvency framework is proposed to en-
hance creative destruction. In turn, one could argue that the Schumpeterian theory
of creative destruction implies a harmful effect of high competition on growth. How-
ever, recent empirical analyses4 confirm this relationship at the firm level, but reveal
a positive correlation between productivity growth and competition at the industry
level; the corresponding theoretical modification is provided by Bento (2014). In ad-
dition, Chun et al. (2008) show a positive empirical link between creative destruction
and industry-specific productivity. Our interpretation of weak resolving insolvency
frameworks as a subsidy to incumbents is in line with the arguments presented by
Acemoglu et al. (2013).
To sum it up, the narrow channel through which institutional quality is proposed
to work here are those assets which are tied up in firms facing restrictions on em-
ploying their assets efficiently. Hence, we address the question of how the existence
of these assets is influenced by the institutional ability to resolve insolvency.
Although different phenomena in their origins, we see many similarities between
the described type of firms and so called “zombie firms”. A zombie firm is defined as
a firm which would become insolvent, if banks did not continue lending, referred to
as “evergreening”. Caballero et al. (2008) find that misdirected bank lending played
a substantial role in extending the macroeconomic stagnation in Japan beginning in
the 1990s. In their findings, they summarize how the existence of zombie firms causes
the following economic consequences: first, they document a reduction of profits of
healthy firms, which discourages market entry and investment; second, sectors dom-
inated by zombie firms are often characterized by more depressed job creation and
low productivity growth; finally, they find that even healthy firms generate depressed
employment growth. These stylized facts indicate that zombie firms have significant
negative spillovers on the remaining firms in the same sector and the overall econ-
omy. Giannetti and Simonov (2013) conclude from the Japanese phenomenon that
4See our discussion of subsection 4.3.1.1 above.
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bank bailouts characterized by insufficiently large capital injections during a banking
crisis have encouraged the evergreening of nonperforming loans, which differs from
our definition of firms which are restricted in employing their assets efficiently.
4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.4.1 Country Selection
We collect detailed firm data for twelve member states of the European Union
– namely Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, and Sweden. We selected these coun-
tries because they show large differences in institutional quality. Moreover, institu-
tions in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have improved mainly
stepwise as a part of the accession to the EU, which included the adoption of the
acquis communautaire. Thus, institutional quality can be viewed as somewhat ex-
ogenous in these countries.
Some CEECs could not be included, due to limited data availability. We include
Austria, France, Germany, and Sweden as examples of mature developed economies
in the European Union, which represent different origins of law (La Porta et al.,
1998). Relatively detailed firm data are available from 2005 to 2012 for all countries
in the sample except Latvia, for which data is only available from 2008 to 2012.
We forgo including other mature developed economies in the European Union, in
order to avoid biased results caused by firms suffering from inefficiencies due to a
domestic banking crisis. We consider the existence of “zombie firms” as more likely
in the European periphery than in those mature developed economies included here.
Bank loans subject to “evergreening” lead to a misidentification of firms with debt-
servicing difficulties and, thus, would bias our results.
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4.4.2 Institutional Quality Index
The World Bank provides various indices of governance and institutional quality.
Among them, the efficiency of insolvency frameworks across economies is chosen for
our analysis, as was described in more detail above. It is measured by the recovery
rate of creditors in case of insolvency. A higher recovery rate of creditors in case of
insolvency reflects more efficient institutions (Djankov et al., 2008). The recovery
rate of creditors naturally ranges between 0 and 1 which corresponds to 0 and 100
per cent.5 Table 4.1 provides an overview of the World Bank index. The arithmetic
mean of the recovery rate across countries and years is roughly 0.47 and the median
is 0.42; the minimum average recovery rate is 0.23 (Romania) and the maximum is
0.82 (Germany). Taking into account the development over time among the CEECs,
even though overall still having weak institutional quality, Romania and the Czech
Republic improved considerably between 2005 and 2012. Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic made progress as well. Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland seem to be
stuck at an institutional quality level below the median. On average more than half
of the value of a resolved firm is lost in CEECs. The fact that French institutional
quality is below that of Germany, Sweden, and Austria is assumed to be due to
different origins of law (La Porta et al., 1998).
5The World Bank describes the relevance of its indicator as: “When a weak insolvency framework does not provide
for effective formal and out-of-court mechanisms to address financial distress, more debts remain unsolved and more
companies languish, unprofitable but with their assets unavailable to their creditors and little chance of turnaround.”























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































92 CHAPTER 4. INSTITUTIONS
4.4.3 Firm-Level Data
We focus on non-listed companies. In order to avoid financial complexity, we addi-
tionally restrict our analysis to companies whose debt is fully bank financed. Firstly,
this corresponds closely to the example of the insolvent firm discussed by Djankov
et al. (2008). And secondly, this group of firms also represents the most important
domestic firms in the CEECs, where domestic capital markets are generally under-
developed and access to international capital markets is limited. In general, data
collection is as closely as possible in line with the standardized case of an insolvent
firm by Djankov et al. (2008). We use the Amadeus databank provided by the Bureau
van Dijk, which provides detailed data for European firms, including balance sheets,
profit and loss accounts, the legal form, and the industrial code (Nace, Rev. 2). In-
dustrial codes are used for sectoral aggregation. We use the following information
for each firm: cash flow (CF), total assets (TA), long-term debt (LTD), short-term
debt (STD), interest expenses (IE), depreciation (DP), and earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Based on these data, we define the





where EBITit equals EBITDAit minus DPit. Brealey et al. (2008) call this ratio
time-interest-earned and describe it as a measure of “how much clear air there is
between hurdle and hurdler”. This means that current earnings should cover at least
the interest expenses, otherwise internal financing sources of the firm have to be used
for repayment. Therefore, the ICR will be the key variable for further analysis and
we will use it for our definition of firms that tie up assets in inefficient uses. The
explanatory variables at the firm-level are cash flow divided by total assets, CF/A,
as well as debt6 divided by total assets, D/A, and follow the findings of the previ-
ous literature (Benito and Whitley, 2003; Mojon et al., 2002). In total, we collect
6Debt equals long-term debt plus short-term debt.
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roughly 1.5 million observations across countries between 2005 and 2012. Table 4.2
Table 4.2: Pairwise Correlation
ICR CF/A D/A INST
ICR 1.000
CF/A 0.024* 1.000
D/A -0.019* -0.280* 1.000
INST 0.022* -0.001 0.013* 1.000
* denotes significance at the 5%-level.
shows pairwise correlation coefficients of the analyzed variables using individual data.
The ratio of cash flow to total assets is positively and statistically significantly cor-
related with the interest coverage ratio. Debt to total assets ratio is negatively and
significantly correlated with the interest coverage ratio. Hence, both variables are
correlated with the interest coverage ratio as expected. The recovery rate of credi-
tors, which is employed in order to proxy institutional quality, is positively correlated
with corporate financial health, which also confirms our expectations.
Table 4.3 illustrates differences between healthy firms and firms with an ICR
below one, whereby a comparison of group means with t-tests reveal intuitive re-
sults. Firms with an interest coverage ratio below are more indebted. Furthermore,
comparing firms facing debt-servicing difficulties only during one period with those
facing debt-servicing difficulties for more than one period provides some interesting
findings that are also shown in Table 4.3. Firstly, firms facing debt-servicing diffi-
culties for more than one period are larger and more indebted, but not significantly
less liquid. Secondly and surprisingly, they do not face much tougher financing con-
ditions, even though they are more indebted: the implicit lending rate, which equals
interest expenses divided by outstanding bank debt, does not differ between those
two groups of weak firms. In case our hypothesis holds, this can be interpreted as a
lower recovery rate of creditors facilitating “evergreening”.7
7This is where we see once again similarities to the arguments presented by Caballero et al. (2008) but also a
major difference, since our results do not reflect evergreening of nonperforming loans, due to insufficient bank bailouts
like in Japan (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013).
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The puzzling fact that firms which face financial distress but are still operating are
larger than healthy firms might be attributed to the political willingness to keep large
firms operating. Another possible explanation could be loss aversion of stakeholders
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Odean, 1998).
4.4.4 Macroeconomic Data and Cross-Sectional Relationship
The next step of our analysis lies in the comparison of microeconomic and macroe-
conomic data. Macroeconomic data are taken from the World Economic Outlook
Database of the International Monetary Fund (real growth rate of GDP, total in-
vestment as share of GDP, and gross national savings as share of GDP) and from
the Ameco Database provided by the European Commision (GDP at current market
prices per person employed).
The long-run correlation between institutions and GDP per capita is relatively
well understood in the literature. Since we proxy institutional quality by the recovery
rate of creditors, we first have to test whether our measure satisfies this long-run re-
lationship in the cross-section of analyzed countries. We take GDP at current market
prices per person employed as a productivity indicator. In a Schumpeterian sense,
productivity ought to be higher in countries with higher competition. In addition,
we include a “savings gap” which equals gross national saving (as a share of GDP)
less total investment (as a share of GDP). Figure 4.1 illustrates the following stylized
facts: first, the mean/median of GDP per capita is higher for countries whose insti-
tutional quality is above the mean/median. Second, the mean/median of the savings
gap is negative for countries whose institutional quality is below the mean/median.
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Figure 4.1: Institutional Quality, GDP per Capita, and Saving Gap
Notes:
(1) Institutional quality is proxied by the resolving insolvency measure provided by the World Bank.
(2) Saving gap equals gross national saving (in % of GDP) minus total investment (in % of GDP).
(3) GDP per capita equals gross domestic product at current market prices per person employed.
(4) Sources: Ameco, IMF, World Bank.
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4.4.5 Sectoral Aggregation
In general, there are several channels through which institutional quality may
affect economic performance in the long-run. We focus on the inefficient use of assets
by firms facing debt-servicing difficulties. If a firm faces financial distress, defined
by an interest coverage ratio below one, it will use internal sources to repay credits.
In the long run, such firms will starve slowly to death and their assets will be fully
wasted. Moreover, we distinguish between firms which face financial distress for only
one period and those which do so for two consecutive observations. In this way, we try
to distinguish between those firms with some and those with no long-term prospects,
respectively.8
Using individual firm data, we define one sectoral variable of interest, Asset Ratio,
as the ratio of assets tied up in firms facing financial distress aggregated for sectors
within countries. The lower the share of assets tied up unproductively in an industry,
the more open this industry is to the benefits of Schumpeterian creative destruction,
such as market entry and the corresponding re-allocation of resources. This variable
is constructed based on firms which face debt-servicing difficulties for either one
period or two consecutive observations.
8According to Djankov et al. (2008), firm in the standardized case is able to serve bank debt for the next two
years but then it will run into trouble, due its long-term inability to repay the debt.
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Figure 4.2: Share of Assets Tied Up in Weak Firms, GDP per Capita, and Saving
Gap
Notes:
(1) AR2 measures the share of assets tied up for two consecutive observations in weak firms.
(2) Saving gap equals gross national saving (in % of GDP) minus total investment (in % of GDP).
(3) GDP per capita equals gross domestic product at current market prices per person employed.
(4) Sources: Amadeus, Ameco, IMF, World Bank.
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The measure of main interest is the Asset Ratio for two consecutive observations.
Our intuition is that the longer the inefficient use of assets persists, the lower the
growth potential of the economy, as reflected in GDP per capita. Thus, we expect
the relationship between Asset Ratio and GDP to reflect characteristics observed in
Figure 4.1. Figure 4.2 illustrates that the Asset Ratio for two consecutive observa-
tions indeed shares – even though less pronounced – the long-run characteristics of
our proxy for institutional quality.
The amount of individual data is impressive, but its use does not yet directly ad-
dress our research question. As discussed above, competition has a different impact
at the firm-level than at the sector-level. With respect to formal bankruptcy, Maksi-
movic and Phillips (1998), for example, show that industry effects are important de-
terminants of the frequency of bankruptcy and of economic decisions in bankruptcy.
Thus, we construct sectoral aggregates and run analyses for sectors within countries.
An additional advantage of this approach is that it gives us deeper information about
country-specific sectoral effects.
As noted above, firms that face unsustainable debt-servicing difficulties and are
thus not able to employ assets efficiently, are defined by an interest coverage ratio
of below one either for one or for two consecutive observations. As the dependent
variable, we calculate the share of assets tied up in these firms for each sector in
each country each year, labelled as Asset Ratio, ARp;s;t. p is either 1 or 2 depending
on whether we use firms facing debt-servicing difficulties for one or at least two
consecutive observations. s represents a specific sector in a country and t the year
of observation. The measure for two consecutive observations, AR2;s;t, will be our
preferred indicator at the sectoral level. We drop sectors including less than 20 firms.
Similarly, we aggregate cash flow and debt for sectors and divide them by sectoral
total assets. Table 4.4 shows pairwise correlation coefficients of the most important
variables employed. As can be seen, only the aggregated micro variables consistently
show the expected correlation coefficient. However, the lower part of the table reveals
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an interesting finding: the more efficient institutions are, the less persistently assets
are tied up in weak firms.
Table 4.4: Pairwise Correlation, Sectoral Aggregation
AR1 AR2 CF/A D/A INST
AR1 1.000
AR2 0.912* 1.000
CF/A -0.343* -0.298* 1.000
D/A 0.190* 0.141* -0.187* 1.000




* denotes significance at the 5%-level.
4.5 Estimation and Results
In order to identify the determinants of the share of assets tied up unproductively
in sectors within countries empirically, we have to take into account the dynamic
properties of the analyzed panel data. A fixed effects panel estimation would not be
able to satisfy this criterion. Moreover, we need to consider possible reverse causal-
ity and endogeneity problems. In our baseline regression, we employ cash flow and
debt both divided by total assets and institutional quality, proxied by the by the
recovery rate of creditors, as independent variables. All may be endogenous in our
estimations, e.g. due to reverse causality. For example, facing debt-servicing diffi-
culties constraints cash flow. Another important concern is that financial distress is
often highly persistent. Therefore, we control for the dynamic properties of our data
by estimating a dynamic panel model:






βkXs;t + Zs;tγ + εp;s;t. (4.2)
The dependent variable in equation (4.2) ARp;s;t is the Asset Ratio of firms facing
debt servicing difficulties for a sector within a country as already described. δ are
autoregressive parameters for L lags of the share of assets tied up unproductively in
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sectors within countries. X includes the three potentially endogenous independent
variables of our baseline regression, namely cash flow and debt both divided by total
assets and the recovery rate of creditors. Z includes additional control variables. We
also control for recessions using a binary variable. A recession is defined as a neg-
ative annual growth rate.9 We control for different institutional indices other than
the recovery rate of creditors.10 Since different measures of institutional quality are
normally correlated within countries, it is important to show that our results are
not driven by the “general” level of institutional quality. Therefore, we control for
measures of getting credit and the enforcement of contracts: first, Strength of Legal
Index which measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect
the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending; second, Depth of
Credit Information Index which measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility,
and quality of credit information available through public or private credit registries;
third, Enforcing Contracts which assesses the efficiency of the judicial system by
following the evolution of a commercial sale dispute over the quality of goods by
tracking the time it takes in days. Moreover, we calculate a Herfindahl-style Com-
petition Index (CI) for sectors based on EBITDA. The calculated Competition
Index is by definition a sectoral variable. However, a Competition Index based on
the EBITDA of firms in our sample does not necessarily capture sectoral competi-
tion appropriately. Firms in our sample also compete at a sectoral level with firms
that are not only bank financed and public firms, both of which are not included in
our sample data. In addition, we control for time and country effects by dummies. ε
represents the residual.
An OLS estimate may be significantly biased when the number of time periods is
small (Baltagi, 2008) because the lagged values of the dependent variable, ARp;s;t−l,
are correlated with the fixed effects, αp;s. Therefore, Arellano and Bond (1991) pro-
pose a GMM (General Methods of Moments) estimator which removes fixed effects
9This should be more or less identical to negative growth rates over two consecutive quarters, which is the standard
definition of recession.
10All indices used are provided by the World Bank.
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by difference transformation (difference GMM). However, the difference transforma-
tion leads to the so called weak instrument problem when the dynamic terms are
close to unity. Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) builds a
system of two equations (system GMM) in levels and in first differences. We use
two lags of each of the endogenous variables for the system GMM estimations. Time
effects are included as exogenous instruments.
Table 4.5: System GMM, Asset Ratio one Period, 2005 - 2012
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
dependent variable AR1 AR1 AR1 AR1 AR1 AR1
DependentV ariablet−1 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.264** 0.285*** 0.291*** 0.278***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.105) (0.095) (0.099) (0.091)
Cash Flow/Assets -0.825** -0.745** -1.055** -0.823** -0.796** -0.855**
(0.372) (0.356) (0.507) (0.372) (0.390) (0.375)
Debt/Assets 0.313** 0.318** 0.284* 0.313** 0.314** 0.298*
(0.159) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160)
Institution -0.162 -0.244* -0.128 -0.157 -0.174 -0.164
(0.128) (0.148) (0.128) (0.127) (0.125) (0.126)
Recession 0.035
(0.025)
Strength of Legal Index -0.037
(0.032)






Constant 0.001 0.005 0.245 0.009 0.091 0.009
(0.157) (0.157) (0.302) (0.193) (0.186) (0.157)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No of obs 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231
No of groups 188 188 188 188 188 188
Hansen p-value 0.332 0.331 0.371 0.300 0.281 0.300
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.745 0.726 0.718 0.747 0.762 0.679
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 show the results of our estimation and reveal satisfying test
statistics. Explaining the determinants of the share of assets tied up unproductively in
sectors within countries for one year, Table 4.5 reveals a highly persistent dependent
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variable. In addition to its persistence, the Asset Ratio is statistically significantly
determined by the aggregated micro-variables. Liquidity, CF/A, reduces the share of
assets tied up unproductively, whereas indebtedness, D/A, increases it. Thus, both
variables enter our analysis with the hypothesized sign. Other variables employed,
including the recovery rate of creditors, do not statistically significantly determine
the dependent variable. However, we are more interested in the explanation of the
share of assets tied up unproductively for at least two consecutive observations.
Table 4.6: System GMM, Asset Ratio two consecutive Observations, 2005 - 2012
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
dependent variable AR2 AR2 AR2 AR2 AR2 AR2
DependentV ariablet−1 0.386*** 0.387*** 0.382*** 0.377*** 0.381*** 0.366***
(0.132) (0.134) (0.134) (0.131) (0.133) (0.130)
Cash Flow/Assets -0.944** -0.961** -1.152** -0.967** -0.982** -1.034***
(0.415) (0.401) 0.521 (0.418) (0.436) (0.397)
Debt/Assets 0.164 0.161 (0.102) 0.182 0.164 0.129
(0.140) (0.142) 0.140 (0.139) (0.141) (0.152)
Institution -0.309** -0.285* -0.248* -0.245* -0.299** -0.322**
(0.142) (0.172) (0.128) (0.135) (0.141) (0.139)
Recession -0.009
(0.023)
Strength of Legal Index -0.043
(0.026)






Constant 0.174 0.173 0.456* 0.313* 0.077 0.194
(0.139) (0.140) (0.257) (0.186) (0.156) (0.143)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
No of obs 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231 1231
No of groups 188 188 188 188 188 188
Hansen p-value 0.500 0.585 0.561 0.561 0.447 0.434
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
AR(2) p-value 0.335 0.335 0.235 0.417 0.305 0.293
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 4.6 again reveals a highly persistent dependent variable. Liquidity still re-
duces the share of assets tied up unproductively, but indebteness does not enter the
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analysis significantly anymore. However, the recovery rate of creditors statistically
significantly reduces the share of assets tied up unproductively for at least two con-
secutive observations. This finding is line with our hypothesis. The results can be
interpreted to mean that aggregated micro-variables become less, but institutional
quality becomes more important the longer assets are tied up unproductively.
4.6 Conclusion
The use of a rich dataset at the firm-level allows us to aggregate data across sectors
within countries. We analyze a narrow channel through which institutions potentially
affect income in the long-run – the institutional ability to resolve insolvency. We test
whether the ability of institutions to resolve insolvency influences the existence of
assets not used efficiently. In order to identify the determinants of inefficiently used
assets at the sector level and to mitigate the corresponding endogeneity problem,
we use the dynamic panel system General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.
Estimations provide satisfying test statistics. The share of assets tied up in firms
facing debt-servicing difficulties for at least two consecutive observations is of main
interest. We find that more efficient institutions reduce the share of assets tied up
unproductively in firms facing debt-servicing difficulties for more than one year.
This result is in line with our hypothesis and provides statistical evidence for a very
specific effect of institutional quality in terms of resolving insolvency.
A further catch-up in terms of institutional quality by CEECs is highly recom-
mended. Taking into account the fact that cross-border differences in institutions
might be due to certain, country-specific cultural values, the implementation of in-
stitutional progress and, in particular, the enforcement of those changes are more
challenging than they appear at first glance. Hence, we recommend imposing laws
gradually, as proposed by Acemoglu and Jackson (2014), in order to allow social
norms to adopt. Regarding the improvement of institutional quality, we also fol-
low the advice of Djankov et al. (2008) that countries with weak institutions ought
4.6. CONCLUSION 105
to introduce relatively simple mechanisms, like foreclosure with no or limited court
oversight and floating charge, which essentially transfers control of the firm to the
secured creditor in the case of default. In addition, a side-benefit of institutional
improvement is that better insolvency frameworks correlate with more developed
financial markets.
Chapter 5
The Transmission of Bank Funding
to Corporate Loans: Deleveraging
in Germany
5.1 Abstract and Details of the Article
5.1.1 Abstract
Healthy banks are crucially important for smooth lending. Correspondingly, bank
regulations including Basel III intend to create a strong financial sector. However, the
higher capital requirements may also worsen the access to finance especially during
the transition period. Using data on firm-bank relationships in Germany between
2005 and 2007, we show that the debt ratio of banks is related to the bank loan
risk. In order to assess the potential effect of tighter capital requirements due to
regulatory changes, we analyze industry specific responses of loan conditions to bank
debt levels. Our findings imply that manufacturing, and to a lesser extent wholesale
and retail trade, will potentially face a more restricted access to bank loans after the
tightening of capital requirements.
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JEL Classifications: G21, G28, C33.
5.1.2 Details of the Article
This article is joined work with Jarko Fidrmuc and Philipp Schreiber.1 I presented
it at the following conferences:
• Eurozone Future: From Crisis to Stabilization, Reform and Growth, Brno/
Czech Republic, November 2013.
• INFER Annual Conference, Pescara/ Italy, May 2014.
• 6th IFABS Conference: Alternative Futures for Global Banking: Competition,
Regulation and Reform, Lisbon/ Portugal, June 2014.
• Econometric Methods for Banking and Finance Conference, Lisbon/ Portugal,
September2014.
Since May 2015, this article is published in Open Economies Review: Vol. 26,
Issue 3, pages 581-597.
5.2 Introduction
Bank lending is of crucial importance for economic growth and development. Only
strong and healthy banks can provide sufficient loans for expanding firms. With the
ongoing regulation in the banking industry it becomes increasingly important to
study the effects of proposed regulatory changes (Cochrane, 2011). Proposed changes
that potentially influence the refinancing opportunities of banks are particularly
important for Germany. The German economy is characterized by a strong role
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which are mainly financed through bank
loans. Therefore, Germany represents an example of a bank-based financial system
(Allen and Gale, 1995a). In addition, SMEs cannot easily substitute bank loans with
1We would like to thank Magdalena Ignatowski, Marcel Tyrell, Marcel Prokopczuk, Cordelius Ilgmann, Andrej
Gill, Josef Korte, Chardin Wese Simon, Jakob de Haan, Jan Hanousek, Roman Horváth, Laurent Weil, Zuzana
Fungáčová, and participants of several conferences for helpful comments and discussions.
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corporate debt during a credit crunch (Giesecke et al., 2012). A country-specific
analysis is not only justified by the characteristics of the German economy but also by
the fact that there are cross-country variations with respect to the adjustment process
of several variables in response to Basel III (IMF, 2013). Therefore, an assessment
of the proposed regulations regarding Germany is necessary.
Our discussion on Basel III is motivated by the possible effects generated by the
banks’ tighter capital requirements on the economy. To address the potential impact
of bank deleveraging, we use unique data on firm-bank relationships in Germany
between 2005 and 2007. Debt ratio and short-term funding ratio are calculated from
the balance sheet data, whereas the loan risk is proxied by implicit lending rates
at the company level. In addition, we utilize information on the bank relationships
of analyzed firms, which allows us to merge individual firm level data with the cor-
responding bank indicators. Furthermore, our multilevel modeling approach utilizes
the information given by the structure of the data set with respect to different crite-
ria. In particular, we use fixed effects and random effects for sectors, regions, banks,
and firms. We try to identify industry specific effects of deleveraging, because banks
will not reduce loans uniformly across the economy. Therefore, we estimate sector-
specific sensitivity of loans to banks’ debt ratio and identify the sectors that are
likely to be influenced most by the ongoing regulatory changes.
Our empirical results reveal that the banks’ debt ratio determines the lending
conditions especially for manufacturing and to a lesser extent for wholesale and
retail trade. Therefore, these industries will potentially be hit more by a regulatory
change causing a decrease in banks’ debt ratio. The extent of the transmission of
bank funding to corporate loans for manufacturing firms is the major contribution
of this study. Moreover, we provide an empirical insight into the connection between
banks’ financing and banks’ granting of loans.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we briefly describe
Basel III regulations. In section 3, we review the previous literature on selected
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aspects of bank lending and bank funding. Section 4 describes our data and explains
how firm and bank data have been merged. Section 5 discusses the estimation and
presents the empirical results. The final section concludes.
5.3 Basel III
In general, regulations on capital adequacy of banks should ensure that banks
hold enough capital relative to bank risk. Capital requirements have to take into ac-
count negative externalities arising from bank defaults. In general, risk-based capital
requirements can eliminate risk-taking incentives if risk weights are correctly chosen
(Rochet, 1992; Kim and Santomero, 1988). However, Hellwig (2010) criticizes the
illusion of measurability of risk whereas Blum (2008) emphasizes that the supervisor
has to rely on banks’ risk reports. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, regulatory
authorities as well as financial intermediaries have put much attention to a reform
of the regulation of capital requirements (Hellwig, 2010).
In December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a com-
prehensive set of reforms aiming at strengthening the regulation, supervision and risk
management of the banking sector, known as Basel III. Main changes in Basel III
are reflected in the fields of capital requirement, risk coverage, leverage ratio, and
liquidity. Revised capital requirements focus more on common equity, bringing the
total common equity standard to 7% and including a countercyclical buffer within
a range of 0 to 2.5%, comprising common equity. However, the main attention of
the economic policy discussion has been attracted so far by the proposed reduction
of the non risk-weighted leverage ratio to 3%. This reflects the criticism regarding
potentially flawed model-based approaches, referred to as internal ratings based ap-
proaches. In Germany, as in other EU countries, the recommendations of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision will be implemented via the Capital Require-
ments Directive IV (CRD IV) and the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). In
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Germany, these reforms are accompanied by the German restructuring law (Schäfer
et al., 2013).
5.4 Literature Review
5.4.1 Buffer Theory and Capital Requirements
The way banks adjust their balance sheets is crucial for the real economy (IMF,
2013). Buffer theory implies that if banks approach the minimum capital require-
ments, they will have an incentive to increase capital and reduce risk in order to
avoid a punishment by the regulatory authority (Milne and Whalley, 2001; Marcus,
1984). On the one hand, many authors (Angelini et al., 2011; IMF, 2013; Kashyap
et al., 2010; Rime, 2001) focus on capital increases necessitated by higher capital re-
quirements. On the other hand, banks may also address higher capital requirements
by a reduction of debt.
Using a survey aimed at identifying the impact of the Basel Accord, Jackson et al.
(1999) find that banks are likely to reduce lending if either economic conditions
are weak or issuing equity is costly. Hyun and Rhee (2011) analyze the effect of
shareholder dilution on banks’ decisions to meet capital requirements and show that
banks prefer loan reduction over the issuance of new equity. However, if banks address
higher capital ratios by raising equity which in turn increases their lending spread
(Kashyap et al., 2010), the same industries could lose access to bank loans due to
higher costs and due to the disappearance of banks’ willingness to lend. In response
to capital requirements, Rime (2001) finds for example that Swiss banks tend to
improve their capital adequacy by increasing their capital (retained earnings, equity
issues) and not by decreasing risk-taking. Considering large US institutions, Kashyap
et al. (2010) find an increase in banks’ lending spread if banks raise equity in order
to comply with Basel III. Thus, deleveraging is generally expected to lead to higher
lending rates or worse access to loans for some firms.
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5.4.2 Bank Funding
Many scholars have been analyzing the role of bank funding and, in particular, the
role of leverage and short-term funding. On the one hand, a series of contributions
(Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Admati et al., 2011; Pfleiderer, 2010) favor regulatory
limits on bank leverage. Their view is supported by the argument that excessive
leverage was the primary cause of the financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2012; Adrian
and Shin, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009). However, this argument is not uniformly shared
in the literature, van Wincoop (2013) is highly skeptical that the financial crisis
was transmitted through leveraged financial institutions. In addition, DeAngelo and
Stulz (2013) emphasize the need of high leverage for banks when liquidity is prized
at a premium and banks generate value by producing liquid claims for financially
constrained counterparties. Lé (2013) finds that between 1986 and 2011 the capital-
to-assets ratio of banks has decreased by approximately 15% after the implementation
of deposit insurance due to a pick-up in leverage by smaller banks.
In contrast to the role of leverage, there is a more general consensus regarding
the role of short-term funding. López-Espinosa et al. (2012) find that short-term
wholesale funding risk was underestimated prior to the financial crisis. Craig and
Dinger (2013) find a positive link between wholesale market conditions and bank risk
which they theoretically justify by the moral hazard view. Their findings suggest that
increasing bank competition increases banks’ incentives to invest in risky projects
due to higher funding costs. Dewally and Yingying (2014) examine the impact of
the liquidity shock in the wholesale funding market on the supply of bank credit
during the peak of the financial crisis. They find that the dry-up in liquidity reduced
lending relatively more in case of banks which relied more heavily on wholesale
funding. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that banks which had better access to
deposit funding or were less reliant on short-term debt, respectively, cut less lending
activity after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
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5.4.3 Bank Lending
Banks, as financial intermediaries, provide liquidity and credit to firms and house-
holds. They screen credit risks and extend loans to financially constrained borrowers
(DeAngelo and Stulz, 2013). They are especially important when the collateral value
of assets is low and specific collection skills are important (Diamond and Rajan,
2000).
The marginal costs of banks’ refinancing increase in debt. At the same time, banks
have to require higher lending rates for relatively risky projects. Hence, an increase
in banks’ debt facilitates the access to capital for relatively risky projects (adverse
selection problem). Moreover, the banks have more capital which can be used for
lending to projects which otherwise would not be financed. Alternatively, we could
argue that the marginal revenues of loans have to equal their marginal costs. Finally,
this approach is in line with what Acharya et al. (2012) describe as lending “down
the quality curve”.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the cut-off point for investment is com-
pletely unaffected by the type of security used to finance the investment. Translating
this into maturity transformation means that from a theoretical perspective bank
lending is unaffected by the maturity composition of bank liabilities.
5.5 Data
5.5.1 Dafne Databank
The Dafne databank, provided by the Bureau van Dijk, includes data on bal-
ance sheets, profit and loss accounts and the legal form for German firms. Although
some of the data is available as early as 1999, coverage is limited and therefore only
the three years period before the financial crisis, 2005 to 2007 is used. These three
years are characterized by a sound economic environment and no significant regula-
tory changes. In total, the amount of firms varies between 15, 000 and 20, 000. This
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accounts for approximately 42, 000 observations from 2005 to 2007. To obtain a mea-
sure for corporate lending costs, we define an implicit lending rate associated with
interest payments on bank loans using the reported balance sheet data. However, it
is necessary to keep in mind that the data is not detailed enough to calculate bank
or loan specific implicit lending rates. Thus, only an average implicit lending rate
that firm i pays in period t on its entire bank debt can be calculated. Specifically,





where Iit denotes the total interest payments of firm i = 1, ..., N in period t and Lit
are total bank loans reported by firm i in period t. The implicit lending rate is em-
ployed in order to proxy the risk of the financed project. ILRit does not only include
interest payments but also comprises fees, commissions, penalties for late payment,
expensive trade credit, and other costs associated with bank loans. Since the implicit
lending rate, ILRit, may be subject to errors due to e.g. new loans, loan repayment,
and received interest payments. We exclude outliers and errors defined by an implicit
rate above 30% lower than 0%, which corresponds approximately to the lowest and
top 5 percent of its distribution. Implicit lending rates for firms are for example used
by Benito and Whitley (2003) or Fidrmuc and Hainz (2013). On average an ILR of
8.73% is obtained. The 25th and 75th percentile equal 5.12% and 10.73%, respec-
tively. The distribution of the ILR is similar to the distribution of interest rates used
in previous studies. For example, Harhoff and Körting (1998a) use data originating
from a survey of small and medium-sized German firms and obtain interest rates on
average, where mean equals 9.2%, 25th percentile equals 7.5%, and 75th percentile
equals 10.5%, which is almost equal to the implicit lending rates calculated here.
Using data from the National Survey of Small Business Finances, in which trade
credit constitutes a considerable fraction, Petersen and Rajan (1994) report interest
rates of 11.3% on average with standard deviation of 2.2%. In addition to the im-
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plicit lending rate, the profit margin, the EBIT margin, and cashflow/turnover are
employed. Finally, we employ capital rentability in order to proxy financing demand
by firms. Table 5.1 illustrates summary statistics of firm specific variables.
Finally, sectoral classification (Nace, Rev. 2) is available for each firm. This classi-
fication is organized with increasing granularity from sections, divisions and groups
to classes. We take sections and classes into account to match each firm with an
industry. We exclude financial intermediaries from our estimations.
5.5.2 Bankscope Databank
For each firm we draw data of all respective bank relations from Bankscope. First,
the debt ratio of bank b in period t (DRbt) is defined as 1 minus equity ratio (ERbt),




where equity ratio equals equity (Ebt) divided by total assets (TAbt). Second, to
obtain the short-term funding ratio of bank b in period t (STbt) the balance sheet






In total, relevant bank relations comprise up to 900 different bank units or
branches which are identified according to the bank routing code. They account
for 2, 669 observations from 2005 to 2007.
Table 5.1 illustrates both bank funding measures and firm-specific variables from
2005 to 2007. Both bank funding measures are relatively constant across the years.
Similarly, firm-specific variables remain relatively unchanged across the years con-
sidered.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics







5 Debt Ratio 0.941 0.018 0.835 0.998
ST Funding Ratio 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.136
2
00
6 Debt Ratio 0.938 0.018 0.829 0.996
ST Funding Ratio 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.153
20
0
7 Debt Ratio 0.937 0.019 0.813 0.988







7 Debt Ratio 0.939 0.018 0.813 0.998







ILR 8.841 5.508 0.002 29.997
EBIT 6.440 10.060 -59.270 60.000
Profit 3.988 8.197 -58.800 59.790
Cashflow 8.053 9.610 -58.800 59.970
Capital Rentability 13.964 15.203 -16.970 55.980
20
06
ILR 8.649 5.425 0.007 29.939
EBIT 6.703 10.278 -59.870 59.910
Profit 4.470 8.500 -59.750 59.660
Cashflow 8.431 10.069 -56.080 59.990
Capital Rentability 15.727 15.534 -16.970 55.980
20
07
ILR 8.712 5.538 0.010 29.995
EBIT 7.105 10.644 -58.490 59.740
Profit 4.763 8.736 -58.430 59.850
Cashflow 8.930 10.445 -55.120 60.000






ILR 8.734 5.487 0.002 29.997
EBIT 6.700 10.289 -59.870 60.000
Profit 4.355 8.450 -59.750 59.850
Cashflow 8.408 9.995 -58.800 60.000
Capital Rentability 14.789 15.341 -16.990 55.990
Source: Bankscope; Dafne.
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Table 5.2 presents pairwise correlation coefficients for all variables specific to firm
i that runs a bank relation with bank b in period t. As expected, proxies for firms’
collateral (profit margin, EBIT margin and cashflow/turnover) are positively corre-
lated and each of them is negatively correlated with the implicit lending rate. As
expected, banks’ short-term funding ratio and debt ratio are positively correlated
with firms’ implicit lending rate. Thus, we have initial weak evidence that bank
funding is associated with the riskiness of funded projects. Both bank funding mea-
sures are positively correlated, since short-term funding contributes to bank debt.
Higher capital rentability ought to be positively associated with the implied lending
rate, which is reflected by the positive and significant correlation coefficient.

















ILR 0.022* 0.035* 1.000
Profit 0.030* 0.044* -0.054* 1.000
EBIT 0.024* 0.021* -0.140* 0.683* 1.000
Cashflow 0.030* 0.017* -0.203* 0.498* 0.620* 1.000
Capital
-0.014* 0.004* 0.093* 0.244* 0.061* -0.018* 1.000
Rentability
Note: * denotes significance at the 5%-level.
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5.6 Estimation and Results
5.6.1 Estimation
Our approach relies on the models developed by Diamond and Rajan (2000) and
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) where banks first tap capital markets before granting
loans to projects. Thus, higher bank debt makes relatively riskier projects more likely
to be financed, hence, we expect that the corporate lending rate depends positively
on the bank debt ratio. In line with Harhoff and Körting (1998a), collateral and
lending rate conditions are determined sequentially, in a way that the lending rate
setting follows the collateral decision. Higher collateral by firms facilitates access to
bank loans.
We estimate the impact of banks’ debt ratio and short-term funding ratio on
implicit lending rates,
ILRibt = β0 + β1DRibt + β2STibt + β3Cibt + β4Ribt + ψi + θt + uibt. (5.4)
Variables are specific to firm i and bank b. Our dependent variable, ILRibt, firms’
implicit lending rate is employed to capture the riskiness of firms’ projects financed
by banks. DRibt represents banks’ debt ratio and STibt represents banks’ short-term
funding ratio. To account for the important role of collateral regarding loan deci-
sions (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Bester, 1985; Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981), Cibt represents a proxy for collateral. Ribt measures firms’ capital
rentability and ought to control for the financing demand of risky projects. ψi reflects
firm size dummies including quartile 1 to 3, θt stands for time fixed effects, and uibt
denotes the residual.
A specific feature of our data set is that observations are nested. Four dimensions
are specified in order to apply a multilevel model (Kayo and Kimura, 2011): sectors
(Nace, Rev. 2), s, regions (federal states), r, banks, b, and firms, i. In such a multilevel
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model, the clusters themselves are nested in superclusters, forming a hierarchical
structure. It is known that business conditions and infrastructure differ for specific
industries with respect to the federal state where they are located. In addition,
competition in the German banking market differs across regions. The residual, uibt,
is decomposed into random effects and an error term,
uibt = usrbit = λsrbi + λrbi + λbi + λi + εsrbit, (5.5)
where λsrbi is the random intercept for sector s, region r, bank b, and firm i, λrbi is
the random intercept for region r, bank b, and firm i, λbi bank b and firm i, and λi is
the random intercept for firm i. The random effect for a sector, region, and bank is
nested within firms, in the sense that it does not take on the same value for a given
combination of sector, region, and bank across all firms, but takes on different values
for each combination of all dimensions. The between-firm heterogeneity is modeled
by the firm-level random intercept.
Coefficient β1 reflects a change in bank debt relative to total assets, keeping the
short-term funding ratio, firm’s collateral, firm’s capital rentability and firm size
constant. We hypothesize that banks with higher debt ratios will grant riskier loans.
Thus, bank debt is positively associated with the riskiness of financed projects. Cor-
respondingly, we expect β1 to be positive. It is noteworthy that a one unit change
in debt ratio by far exceeds a change of one percentage point in debt, since debt
ratio equals debt standardized by total assets. Coefficient β2 reflects a change in
a bank’s liability composition. With respect to the short-term funding ratio, there
are opposing arguments in the previous literature (see e.g. Modigliani and Miller,
1958; Dewally and Yingying, 2014; Craig and Dinger, 2013; López-Espinosa et al.,
2012; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). However, including STibt allows to control
for the maturity composition of banks’ liabilities. The coefficient for the collateral
proxy is hypothesized to decrease the implicit lending rate, correspondingly β3 is
expected to be negative. Higher collateral reduces monitoring costs and in turn the
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risk premium. Collateral is proxied by profit margin, the EBIT margin, and cash-
flow/turnover, which are comparable across industries. Firms’ capital rentability is
hypothesized to be positively associated with firms’ project risk. The Firm size dum-
mies are employed in order to control for firm heterogeneity.
5.6.2 Baseline Regressions
We start our empirical analysis with the estimation of equation (5.4) for all firms
available, excluding financial intermediaries. We include sectoral random effects spec-
ified at the class-level (about 450 classes). Table 5.3 presents estimation results. The
coefficient of the debt ratio enters the regressions positively and statistically signifi-
cantly at a 1%-level. Also, its size is similar for all three different proxies for collateral
(column I to III). Hence, the estimated coefficient of the debt ratio confirms our hy-
pothesis that more indebted banks allocate more capital to riskier projects.
We confirm the hypothesis that the maturity composition of funding is important
to the allotment of capital to risky projects. Moreover, the coefficients for the short-
term funding ratio are significant for all proxies of collateral at the 5%-level. In
turn, these results are in line with the recent empirical literature arguing that short-
term funding matters with respect to lending. As expected, all proxies for collateral
significantly reduce the implicit lending rate. A higher capital rentability is associated
with a higher project risk. The coefficients of the firm size dummies are not reported
in Table 5.3 but show that smaller firms face lower implicit lending rates.
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Table 5.3: Bank Funding, Basic Specification, 2005 - 2007
(I) (II) (III)
Random Effects
region, sector (class), region, sector (class), region, sector (class),
bank, firm bank, firm bank, firm
Fixed Effects time time time
Collateral





Debt Ratio 5.230*** 5.455*** 5.246***
[Bank] (1.886) (1.888) (1.889)
ST Funding Ratio 3.561** 3.401** 3.658**
[Bank] (1.646) (1.647) (1.648)
Collateral -0.011*** -0.058*** -0.025***
[Firm] (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital Rentability 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.016***
[Firm] (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 4.392** 4.536** 4.461**
(1.790) (1.792) (1.794)
No of obs 41863 41587 41798
LRL -126,309 -125,468 -126,214
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) LRL - Log restricted-likelihood.
(4) Label in brackets distinguishes between firm and bank specific variables.
Next, we compare firms which are engaged in relationship banking (Rajan, 1992)
and arm’s length banking. The former are identified as firms which have only one
bank relation, the latter are the firms with more than one bank relation. Table 5.4
shows that financing conditions of firms engaged in relationship banking are not
affected by banks’ financing in Germany. This may correspond to specific character-
istics of banks and firms engaged in relationship banking. On the other hand, the
results of firms with multiple bank relations are similar to those obtained for the
whole sample. However, the short-term funding ratio is only marginally significant if
profit margin and cash flow to turnover ratio are used as a proxy for collateral.
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Table 5.4: Bank Funding, 2005 - 2007, Relationship vs. Arm’s Length Banking
Relationship Banking (I) (II) (III)
Random Effects
region, sector (class), region, sector (class), region, sector (class),
bank, firm bank, firm bank, firm
Fixed effects time time time
Collateral





Debt Ratio 5.770 6.601 6.588
[Bank] (4.978) (5.017) (4.988)
ST Funding Ratio 2.230 3.438 2.261
[Bank] (4.188) (4.219) (4.193)
Collateral -0.014* -0.050*** -0.029***
[Firm] (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Capital Rentability 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017***
[Firm] (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 3.492 3.158 2.896
(4.714) (4.752) (4.723)
No of obs 6151 6061 6088
LRL -18,683 -18,452 -18,536
Arm’s Length Banking (I) (II) (III)
Random Effects
region, sector (class), region, sector (class), region, sector (class),
bank, firm bank, firm bank, firm
Fixed effects time time time
Collateral





Debt Ratio 4.577** 4.836** 4.179**
[Bank] (2.021) (2.017) (1.745)
ST Funding Ratio 3.231* 3.126* 3.764**
[Bank] (1.780) (1.774) (1.559)
Collateral -0.011** -0.067*** -0.038***
[Firm] (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Capital Rentability 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.018***
[Firm] (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 5.072*** 5.197*** 5.433***
(1.918) (1.913) (1.656)
No of obs 35712 35526 35710
LRL -107,588 -106,954 -109,686
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) LRL - Log restricted-likelihood.
(4) Label in brackets distinguishes between firm and bank specific variables.
(5) Relationship banking and arm’s length banking are identified as one and multiple bank rela-
tionships, respectively.
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5.6.3 Industry Specific Regressions
In order to analyze the effect of deleveraging on an industry level, we run industry-
specific regressions specified, again by equation (5.4).2 Thereby, industries are defined
at section level according to the Nace Classification (Rev. 2). Because this analysis
requires a sufficiently large number of observations at the section level, only sections
of about 500 observations are taken into consideration. This reduces our sample of
19 different sections to 12 sections3. Similarly to the baseline analysis, three different
proxies for collateral and firm size dummies are used.
For a given industry, a strong impact of the banks’ debt ratio on the implicit
lending rate implies that the industry is highly sensitive to bank deleveraging. Such
industry would experience deteriorating access to loans if regulatory changes cause
banks to delever, since firms facing a high implicit lending rate run riskier projects
and represent the worst credit assets (Hyun and Rhee, 2011) in banks’ balance sheets.
Furthermore, we look at sectors with the highest impact of collateral variables be-
cause tighter financing conditions are likely to influence sectors where collateraliza-
tion is important.
Table 5.5 reports the results of the industry specific regressions. Since results are
not sensitive to the use of different proxies for collateral, only outcomes employing the
EBIT margin as a proxy for collateral are reported.4 Manufacturing (C), wholesale
and retail trade (G) and human health and social work activities (Q) are identified
as the industries which are most dependent on banks’ debt ratio. However, the co-
efficient for manufacturing is significant at the 1%-level, whereas it is only weakly
significant for wholesale and health. In addition, the collateral variable is also highly
2Likewise, this analysis is repeated multiple times with one particular industry excluded each time, in order to
identify the most influential industries. The results are available upon request from authors.
3A – Agriculture (Agriculture, forestry and fishing), C – Manufacturing, D – Electricity (Electricity, gas, steam
and air conditioning supply), E – Water (Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities),
F – Construction, G – Wholesale (Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles), H –
Transportation (Transportation and storage), J – Information (Information and communication), L – Real Estate
(Real estate activities), M – Professional (Professional, scientific and technical activities), N – Administration
(Administrative and support service activities), and Q – Health (Human health and social work activities).
4Results for the remaining regressions are available upon request.
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significant for manufacturing. On the contrary, for almost all other industries, ex-
cluding construction, real estate and professional, the effect of the collateral variables
on the implicit lending rate is insignificant.





culture facturing tricity struction sale
Debt Ratio -15.327 10.291*** 2.651 6.512 -2.340 6.267*
[Bank] (10.204) (3.647) (8.771) (11.235) (6.593) (3.788)
ST Funding Ratio 31.088*** -2.375 6.486 9.744 4.263 -0.341
[Bank] (10.734) (3.045) (7.436) (9.746) (5.641) (3.457)
Ebit Margin -0.027 -0.041*** -0.007 0.003 -0.058*** -0.031**
[Firm] (0.024) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.014)
Capital Rentability 0.042*** 0.010*** -0.020* 0.006 0.012** 0.012***
[Firm] (0.013) (0.004) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant 22.583** 0.524 6.411 1.686 12.830** 4.283
(9.634) (3.462) (8.316) (10.654) (6.236) (3.587)
No of obs 772 12011 1554 931 4423 10465
LRL -2,164 -36,700 -4,338 -2,564 -13,800 -32,100
Transpor- Infor- Real Profe- Admin-
Health
tation mation Easte ssional istration
Debt Ratio -12.546 -21.402 5.991 17.229 7.876 14.101*
[Bank] (8.369) (15.842) (5.189) (11.488) (10.064) (7.719)
ST Funding Ratio 3.763 17.147 9.757 -4.454 6.651 21.121**
[Bank] (7.161) (13.620) (4.403) (9.831) (7.987) (8.237)
Ebit Margin -0.013 0.023 -0.009** -0.063*** -0.011 0.028
[Firm] (0.011) (0.028) (0.004) (0.022) (0.010) (0.018)
Capital Rentability -0.004 -0.008 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.014 -0.007
[Firm] (0.007) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 19.982** 29.486** 0.336 -7.483 1.268 -7.280
(7.949) (15.037) (4.921) (10.882) (9.522) (7.345)
No of obs 1782 662 3466 1267 1532 1794
LRL -5,191 -2,088 -9,090 -3,971 -4,671 -4,910
Notes:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) LRL - Log restricted-likelihood.
(4) Label in brackets distinguishes between firm and bank specific variables.
(5) All specifications include random effects for region, sector (class), bank, and firm as well as
fixed effects time and firm size dummies.
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Banks’ debt ratio has a strong effect on the implicit lending rate that is highly
significant for manufacturing. This suggests that the access to loans for firms in
manufacturing depends more on banks’ ability to lever, compared to other industries.
A possible explanation could be, for example, that on average firms in manufacturing
have higher capital expenditures than firms in other industries. In Germany, the
majority of capital expenditure is assigned to the manufacturing industry. Investment
in these long term assets is mostly financed by bank loans. Therefore, deleveraging
strongly affects the manufacturing sector.
The characteristics of firms in manufacturing (C), wholesale and retail trade (G)
and human health and social work activities (Q) are illustrated in Table 5.6. Manufac-
turing reveals the expected characteristics: the implicit lending rate is, on average,
statistically higher compared to the remaining sections. Excluding profit margin,
firms in manufacturing face statistically lower collateral proxies on average. Capital
rentability exceeds on average those of the remaining sectors. In addition, firms in
manufacturing have, on average, more bank relations. The share of firms with only
one bank relation is 8 percentage points lower for manufacturing if compared with the
remaining sectors. Finally, firms from the manufacturing section operate with larger
banks. The mean of the total assets of banks which operate with manufacturing firms
is statistically higher than the mean of the total assets of banks operating with all
other sectors. Thus, we identify manufacturing as the sector to suffer most from a
regulatory change causing bank deleveraging, which sums up to a consistent over-
all picture. Wholesale and retail trade share some characteristics of manufacturing,
whereas human health and social work activities represent a specific case.
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Table 5.6: Characteristics of manufacturing (section C), whole-
sale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
(section G) and human health and social work activities (section
Q)





ILR 8.841 9.767 9.381 6.154
t-statistic (-13.741) (-7.777) (13.113)
Ebit Margin 6.440 4.964 3.265 2.816
t-statistic (10.423) (22.618) (9.142)
Profit Margin 3.988 4.152 2.491 1.783
t-statistic (-1.412) (12.927) (6.817)
Cashflow/Turnover 8.053 6.181 3.499 7.925
t-statistic (13.884) (34.662) (0.339)
Capital Rentability 13.964 16.285 16.186 7.171





ILR 8.649 9.510 9.299 5.815
t-statistic (-13.898) (-9.942) (15.626)
Ebit Margin 6.703 5.168 3.386 3.397
t-statistic (10.325) (22.052) (8.590)
Profit Margin 4.470 4.380 2.685 2.343
t-statistic (0.862) (14.329) (6.752)
Cashflow/Turnover 8.431 6.348 3.505 7.978
t-statistic (14.535) (34.304) (1.234)
Capital Rentability 15.727 18.133 17.998 7.955





ILR 8.712 9.818 9.330 5.926
t-statistic (-15.353) (-7.761) (14.647)
Ebit Margin 7.105 5.595 3.285 2.907
t-statistic (8.156) (19.512) (9.970)
Profit Margin 4.763 4.926 2.601 2.474
t-statistic (-1.018) (13.267) (6.612)
Cashflow/Turnover 8.930 6.349 3.474 7.724
t-statistic (14.097) (28.835) (2.854)
Capital Rentability 14.585 17.806 15.933 7.919
t-statistic (-16.445) (-6.272) (12.709)
Notes: The t-test shows whether the mean of the reported section is equal to the
mean of the remaining sections. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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5.7 Conclusion
We discuss the relationship between bank funding and corporate lending in Ger-
many. This topic has received much importance in the recent economic policy dis-
cussion, because banks will have to comply with a comprehensive set of reforms
including tighter capital requirements. As bank financing is the main source of fi-
nance in Germany, the new regulations may have a strong impact on its economy.
Using a unique dataset for banks and their corporate lenders in Germany between
2005 and 2007, we analyze the transmission of bank funding to corporate lending
in Germany. We show that the financial leverage of banks determines the corporate
sector’s access to financing. We find that a reduction in bank debt might differently
translate into the allocation of capital to specific industries.
In order to identify industries which are expected to face tighter access to bank
loans if banks have to delever, we analyze sector-specific multilevel regressions.
Thereby, firms involved in manufacturing and to a lesser degree in wholesale and
retail trade are found to be particularly vulnerable to changes in banks’ debt. The
extent of the transmission of bank funding to corporate loans for manufacturing firms
is the main finding of this study. The analysis reveals that the access to loans for
firms in manufacturing depends heavily on the debt ratio of their bank relations. At
the same time, the lending conditions in manufacturing are already strongly deter-
mined by the available collateral. Firms in manufacturing face on average a higher
implicit lending rate, have lower collateral, are less engaged in relationship banking,
and operate with larger banks.
Furthermore, our results show that the lending conditions in industries that are
significantly determined by banks’ debt ratio depend also most significantly on the
collateral value. Therefore, the possibility for these firms to react to potential bank




Banking of German SMEs
6.1 Abstract and Details of the Article
6.1.1 Abstract
We focus on the determinants and potentially associated benefits of relationship
banking. Based on the existing literature and the unique role intangible assets play
regarding firms’ capital structure, we test two hypotheses using rich data on firm-
bank relationships in Germany. We show that firstly, a high share of intangible assets
does not worsen the access of firms to external finance. And secondly, firms’ share
of intangible assets statistically significantly determines firms’ choice of an exclusive
and persistent bank relation.
JEL Classifications: G21, G32, D82, C21.
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6.1.2 Details of the Article
This article is joint work with Jarko Fidrmuc and Philipp Schreiber.1 I presented
it at the following conference:
• Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2015 Conference, Changsha/ China, July
2015.
Since August 2015, an earlier version of this article is published in FEN (Financial
Economics Network) Asian Finance Association (AsianFA) 2015 Conference, Vol. 1
No. 4, 08/17/2015.
6.2 Introduction
Germany represents an example of a bank-based financial system (Allen and Gale,
1995b) characterized by strong ties between banks and firms. The German economy
is shaped by a strong role of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which are mainly
financed through bank loans, making firm-bank relationships very important in Ger-
many. Furthermore, SMEs cannot easily substitute bank loans with corporate debt
during a credit crunch (Giesecke et al., 2012). In addition, one very specific character-
istic of the German banking system is the existence of long-term bank relationships
that firms engage in with specific banks, referred to as “house banks”. A house
bank acts as the main lender of a firm and acquires more relevant and more timely
information about it.
Recent work by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) provides robust empirical evi-
dence that financial sector growth is a drag on real growth. Regarding the mechanism
behind this finding, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) introduce the assumption that
growth in finance reflects improving technology for recovering debt in cases of de-
fault. Their theoretical model implies that financial sector growth disproportionally
1We would like to thank Marcel Tyrell, Mark Mietzner, Dirk Schiereck and conference participants for helpful
comments and discussions.
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benefits sectors with output or assets that are more tangible. Confronting their theo-
retical model with the data, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) find that financial sector
growth benefits industries with higher asset tangibility, but harms R&D-intensive in-
dustries. This distributional effect of financial sector growth harms what economists
consider engines of growth - namely, industries with lower asset tangibility or high
R&D-activities (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015).
Compared with arm’s-length lending, there are two distortions due to relation-
ship banking (Rajan, 1992) emphasized in the literature. Firstly, relationship lending
causes poor price signals which can distort the allocation of funds. Hoshi et al. (1990)
find that investments of firms with strong bank ties are less sensitive to their op-
erating cash flow. Peek and Rosengren (1998) find that Japanese banks reallocated
profitable funds into declining markets, due to strong relations with borrowers. Sec-
ondly, relationship lending reduces the liquidity of financial assets (Diamond and
Rajan, 2001). In addition, a more bank-based system has a comparative disadvan-
tage in financing intangible assets (Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Hoshi et al., 1991).
However, Germany’s economy, characterized by a bank-based financial system,
strong ties between banks and firms and a high share of small and medium enter-
prises, delivered a stable performance during the years of crises and attracted inter-
national attention. German banks with strong ties to their clients actually fo finance
intangible assets, as we will show during the remainder of this paper. Therefore,
the specific characteristics of relationship banking in the German financial system
warrant more detailed inspection.
Our paper contributes to a broad literature. Theoretical contributions emphasize
the benefits of reduced asymmetric information but also the costs of an information
monopoly by banks (Boot, 2000). Results of empirical studies regarding financing
conditions associated with relationship banking are mixed (Kysucky and Norden,
2014). Studies devoted to financing conditions were followed by studies focusing on
firms’ choice of the number of bank relations (see e.g. Farinha and Santos, 2002;
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Ogawa et al., 2007). However, we should keep in mind that the question of how
many bank relations a firm chooses is inherently different from the question of why
a firms chooses a single instead of multiple bank relations. In the following, we will
focus only on the second question.
In particular, we discuss the relationship between intangible assets, capital struc-
ture and relationship banking for German SMEs. To the best of our knowledge, the
relationship between intangible assets and relationship banking has not yet been
analyzed in the previous literature. Yet, intangible assets represent an increasingly
important phenomenon (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). Using a large dataset for
German SMEs and their bank relations between 2005 and 2012, we test two hy-
potheses. Firstly, do intangible assets worsen firms’ access to external finance, as
capital structure literature predicts? Following the rejection of this hypothesis, we
test, secondly, whether firms with a high fraction of intangible assets are more likely
to engage in relationship banking?
The centerpiece of our contribution is the question of why firms decide to have a
single bank relation. Based on the results of testing the first hypothesis, we employ
intangible assets as an explanatory variable in a binary regression in order to identify
the determinants of relationship banking. The share of intangible assets ought to
increase the probability of a strong firm-bank relation due to the firm’s need to use
the associated soft information channel in order to reduce financing frictions. We
find that the share of intangible assets significantly increases the probability of an
exclusive and persistent bank relation.
6.3 Literature Review
6.3.1 Theoretical Considerations
The seminal contribution of Diamond (1984) illustrates that a bank is the opti-
mal channel for funds from investors to firms given costly information asymmetries
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between both parties. This so-called delegated monitoring model implies that firms
operate with a single bank which pools the costs of asymmetric information (Di-
amond, 1984). By having only one lender the firm minimizes its transaction costs.
The optimality of a single bank relation changes when repeated lending is considered
(Sharpe, 1990). Other theoretical reasons for choosing more than one bank relation
are e.g. diversification as insurance against the loss of value-relevant information (De-
tragiache et al., 2000) or the lack of coordination among investors (see e.g. Bolton
and Scharfstein, 1996; Hart, 1995; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). However, it is
widely observed that many firms have multiple bank relations, whereas other very
similar firms prefer a strong firm-bank relation.
The theoretical literature comes to the conclusion that there are two sides to a
strong firm-bank relation (Boot, 2000). On the one hand, a strong firm-bank relation-
ship can be beneficial, as information asymmetry is reduced and loan terms better
reflect the actual quality of the borrower. On the other hand, the lender can use this
information monopoly to extract additional rents. Therefore, a strong relationship
can produce a hold-up problem.
6.3.1.1 Information Asymmetry
The idea of an advantage in the firm-bank relationship arising from the resolved
information asymmetry goes back to Boot and Thakor (1994) and Petersen and
Rajan (1995).
Boot and Thakor (1994) consider a model with an infinitely repeated bank-
borrower relationship. Thereby, they assume risk-neutrality and the absence of learn-
ing and find that nonetheless, the firm profits from a durable bank relation in the
following sense: a bank charges higher interest rates and demands collateral for loans
that go to firms which are not established yet. If the bank observes a positive outcome,
e.g. a project success, the firm becomes established and is awarded with unsecured
loans and lower interest rates. Therefore, the bank acquires information about the
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firm by engaging in costly monitoring. However, both, the firm and the bank profit
from the close firm-bank relation.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that in a two-period model with good and bad
entrepreneurs banks also have an incentive to charge high interest rates initially
and improve financing conditions for good entrepreneurs subsequently. The idea is
similar to Boot and Thakor (1994) in the sense that information asymmetry about the
quality of the entrepreneurs exists at the beginning and is resolved in later periods.
Taken together, both studies support the idea that a close firm-bank relationship
is advantageous for firms and banks if asymmetric information exists.
6.3.1.2 Hold-up Problem
The hold-up problem describes the concept that borrowing from a single bank
can be costly for the firm. If a close bank-firm relationship reduces information
asymmetry and if the firm cannot credibly transfer information to other parties, the
bank can use this information advantage to extract additional rents (see e.g. Farinha
and Santos, 2002; Sharpe, 1990; Greenbaum et al., 1989). The bank, with which the
firm is in a close relationship has an information monopoly and becomes sort of an
insider regarding information about the firms creditworthiness. In a world without
information asymmetry, a close firm-bank relation would not produce a the hold-up
problem, since the firm could easily convey information to other lenders. Therefore,
the problem should be more pronounced if information asymmetry is high, i.e. if
the difference between information of insiders vs. outsiders increases. One possible
solution of the hold-up problem is to establish multiple bank relations and therefore
reduce the rents that arise due to the hold-up situation (Thadden, 1995).
6.3.2 Empirical Evidence
To assess costs and benefits of a strong firm-bank relation empirically, one has to
proxy for the strength of the relation. Kysucky and Norden (2014) conduct a meta
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analysis of the relationship banking literature and show that the most prominent
proxies are the length of the firm-bank relation, the exclusivity of the relation (e.g.
the number of banks the firm lends from), physical distance and the integration of
the firm-bank relation (e.g. the number of financial services the firm obtains).
Empirical results are mixed. Petersen and Rajan (1994) were the first to em-
pirically study the relation between different dimensions of the strength of lending
relationships with the availability and cost of funds. In a sample of US SMEs, col-
lected from the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), they find that
firms borrowing from multiple lenders are charged significantly higher rates. The
length and integration of the relationship does not affect price conditions. However,
the availability of credit increases if firms spend more time in a relationship, if they
increase the number of financial services they obtain in a relationship and if they
concentrate their borrowing to a single or only a few lenders. In addition, Berger and
Udell (1995) also use the NSSBF sample and focus their analysis on floating-rate
lines of credit. They provide evidence that the length of the firm-bank relationship
is negatively related to loan prices and to the probability that the lender will require
collateral to secure the loan. In contrast, using a more recent NSSBF dataset, Cole
(1998) finds that only the existence of a previous relationship, but not its length, is
an important factor for credit availability.
Harhoff and Körting (1998b) study a large sample of German SMEs. They proxy
for the strength of the firm-bank relationship using the duration of the lending rela-
tionship, the number of financial institutions the firm is actually borrowing from, and
a subjective indicator of trust. They find that neither the duration nor the number of
financial institutions influences the costs of credit. However, collateral requirements
improve with the strength of the relationship, as measured by both of these proxies.
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) follow a different approach. They study factors that
determine whether a firm engages in relationship banking. To proxy for relationship
banking, a written statement of the firm about whether or not a bank has house bank
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status is used. They show that factors related to the information access of banks are
important determinants. However, the duration of the bank-borrower relationship is
not related to house bank status. They empirically show that house banks provide
liquidity insurance in case of unexpected deteriorations of borrower ratings. Mayer
et al. (1988) describe this insurance as banks using monopoly power in good times to
charge above-market rates and in exchange therefore providing insurance by means
of below-market rates in bad times. However, in a study investigating the determi-
nants of the existence of house banks, Elsas (2005) finds that house bank relationships
become more likely as competition increases. This contradicts the conjecture that re-
lationship banking requires monopolistic market structures and encourages research
addressing firms’ choice of bank relations.
Degryse and Ongena (2005) study the effect of geographical distance on bank loan
rates. Using a unique data set of loans made to SMEs and single-person businesses
by a Belgium bank, they show that loan rates improve with the distance between the
firm and the bank and deteriorate with the distance between the firm and competing
banks. In a similar vein, Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that in more concentrated
markets relationship lending is more likely and that relatively more credit is available
to young firms. This finding is reflected in below-market rates for young firms and,
conversely, above-market rates for more mature firms.
Schenone (2010) compares firms’ interest rates before and after a large infor-
mation shock (IPO) which exogenously levels the playing field among banks and,
thus, erodes the relationship bank’s information monopoly. Schenone (2010) finds
that firms’ interest rates prior to the IPO are a U-shaped function of relationship
intensity but change to a decreasing function of relationship intensity after the IPO.
The U-shaped pattern of interest rates is rationalized by information asymmetries
between relationship banks and outside banks.
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6.3.3 Number of Bank Relations
Early studies of relationship banking (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Harhoff
and Körting, 1998b; Cole, 1998) use the number of bank relationships as a proxy
for competition among banks. The investigation of banks’ choice of the number of
relations then followed these initial contributions related to relationship banking.
Ongena and Smith (2000) investigate the determinants of multiple-bank relation-
ships in a cross-country study including 1079 firms from 20 European countries.
Their measure of the number of bank relationships relies on firms’ reported number
of banks they use for cash management purposes, which includes short-term lending,
within their own country. They find that firms have more bank relationships in coun-
tries with a decentralized and healthy banking system, in countries with inefficient
judicial systems, and in countries where the enforcement of creditors’ rights is weak.
Similarly to Houston and James (1996), Ongena and Smith (2000) find that firms
with multiple bank relations tend to be larger.
In order to identify the advantages of close banking relationships, Houston and
James (2001) focus on bank financing of publicly traded firms in the United States.
They find that firms’ size, leverage and market-to-book ratio decreases the likelihood
of having a single bank relationship. Market-to-book ratio is employed to proxy firms’
growth potential, meaning that their results indicate that firms with considerable
growth options are less likely to be financed by a single bank. Houston and James
(2001) explain this finding by banks’ lending being focused on so-called hard assets
and their corresponding inability to fund firms with substantial amounts of intangible
growth opportunities.
Farinha and Santos (2002) focus on firms’ decisions to replace a single bank re-
lation with several relationships and employ data of young small Portuguese firms
between 1980 and 1996. They show that the likelihood of firms substituting a sin-
gle bank relation in favor of several bank relation increases with the duration of its
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initial single bank relation. Furthermore, Farinha and Santos (2002) show that this
substitution happens more frequently with firms which that have more growth op-
portunities or perform poorly, respectively. The first finding is explained by a lemon
premium, increasing over time, which firms face when approaching an additional
lender. The second finding is explained by banks limiting their exposure to poor
credit, which causes poor performing firms to approach an additional lender.
Ogawa et al. (2007) analyze the choice of the number of long-term banking rela-
tions of large listed Japanese firms between 1982 and 1999. In particular, they study
why firms have additional bank relations besides their main bank and the optimal
number of creditors for a firm given the existence of a main lender. It is noteworthy
that their data include a period of deregulation in Japan and, most importantly, the
period of stagnation in the aftermath of the collapse of Japan’s economy in 1990,
characterized by banks burdened with a huge amount of non-performing loans. How-
ever, they present a binomial logit regression to address the question of why firms
choose a single or multiple loans. Hence, their question and approach is closely re-
lated to our analysis. Ogawa et al. (2007) find that a higher indebtedness decreases
the probability of a single loan relation and liquidity increases it. Firm size and prof-
itability do not have a systematic impact. In a multinomial logit regression they find
that the determinants of the amount of bank relations conditional on having more
than one bank relation are different the determinants of the choice of a single bank
relation.
6.4 Hypotheses
Relationship banking received considerable attention throughout the literature.
However, we intend to be less agnostic regarding the decision of engaging in only one
bank relation.
6.4. HYPOTHESES 137
Motivated by Hall and Lerner (2010), who argue that intangible assets2 and knowl-
edge created by innovation are difficult to quantify as collateral for debt financing, we
emphasize the role of a firm’s share of intangible assets when deciding on borrowing
relations. It is worth noting that research and development as well as a highly skilled
workforce are among the main determinants of the creation of intangible assets.
Even though they are in themselves conflicting theories, both the trade-off theory
of capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and the pecking order theory (My-
ers and Majluf, 1984) imply difficulties to debt-finance intangible assets. The trade-
off theory of capital structure describes a firm’s debt-equity decision as a trade-off
between an interest tax shield and the costs of financial distress, where intangible
assets ought to rely primarily on equity financing (Brealey et al., 2008). The pecking
order theory implies that management prefers the issuance of debt over equity, but
this does not apply to intangible assets for which equity is the preferable way of
financing (Brealey et al., 2008).
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) construct a measure of asset redeployability as
a proxy of the value of collateral to creditors in case of default. Higher asset re-
deployability increases the liquidation value of the collateral. They show that asset
redeployability is negatively related to credit spreads, and positively related to credit
ratings as well as loan-to-value ratios in an economically significant manner. In ad-
dition, Fabbri and Menichini (2010) find that firms’ financing decisions depend in
multiple ways on the collateral value of their inputs, such that for example trade
credit for sufficiently liquid inputs purchased on account is not subject to credit ra-
tioning. Distinguishing between current assets and intangible assets, the former are
understood to be relatively liquid and easier to redeploy than the latter.
2Across the literature, definitions of intangible assets are manifold (see for example Ahonen (2000), Petty (2000),
and Sveiby (1997)) and even from the perspective of financial reporting according to IFRS-3, valuing acquired as
well as self-generated intangible assets is still seen as a black art due to the enormous difficulties and risks associated
with measurement (Sharma, 2012).
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Thus, taking into account the capital structure literature and the role of asset
redeployability, we hypothesize that a higher share of intangible assets ought to be
associated with more equity-financing.
Hypothesis 1. A higher fraction of intangible assets leads to a higher equity ratio.
In order to bring these considerations into connection with relationship banking,
we look at the way that, as previously noted, relationship banking provides a channel
for soft information. To achieve optimal financing conditions, channeling soft infor-
mation is more beneficial to firms with a higher share of intangible assets. Moreover,
conditionally conservative accounting systems (Gör and Wagenhofer, 2009) may the-
oretically give rise to the need of channeling soft information.
Thus, if achieving optimal financing conditions is a reason to engage in relationship
banking and intangible assets represent by their nature a source of financing frictions,
the causal chain we propose becomes clear. To the best of our knowledge, a causal
relationship between intangible assets and relationship banking has not been studied
in the literature yet.3
Hypothesis 2. Firms with a high fraction of intangible assets are more likely to
engage in relationship banking.
Hence, our contribution focuses on firms’ financing conditions and the correspond-
ing borrowing relations; it thus emphasizes firms’ decisions to engage in relationship
banking.
6.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data come from the Amadeus databank provided by the Bureau van Dijk.
The dataset includes information on balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, the
legal form, and the industrial code (Nace, Rev. 2) for German firms. The coverage
3In addition, high quality firms, which are highly innovative and invest a lot in R&D activities, might prefer a
single lender, since they are not willing to share their knowledge with multiple lenders (Yosha, 1995). As noted,
research and development contributes to the creation of intangible assets.
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of firms is relatively good for data from the period of 2005 to 2012. We limit our
analysis to non-listed German firms of limited liability without floating debt between
2005 and 2012, for which we have at least 6 consecutive observations. Hence, firms
in our sample have debt and equity on their balance sheets, with the debt part being
composed of bank loans only.
In addition to information on balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, the
Amadeus databank provides the amount of bank relations firms had between 2005
and 2012. However, the information about the number of bank accounts is aggregated
in the following way: for each firm the number of different bank accounts within
the time period from 2005 to 2012 is given.4 Thus, this information is not time-
varying and we therefore limit our analysis to the cross section. After dropping
observations subject to logical errors, missing data, and outliers at the firm level, the
time-invariant nature of the variable for bank relations requires us to aggregate all
variables over years by calculating their arithmetic means, which reduces our sample
to a cross-section including roughly 22,000 observations.
By collapsing our data into the cross-section, the variable number of banks satisfies
two out of four prominent proxies for relationship banking (Kysucky and Norden,
2014). First, the length of the firm-bank relation, which has to be at least six years.
Second, the exclusivity of the relationship. If the amount of bank relations equals
one, we know that the corresponding firm operated solely with the same bank over
six years. This has the advantage that we can identify firms which operated with only
one bank between 2005 and 2012. In addition, we are able to distinguish between the
main players in the German banking market. For all firms that have only one bank
relation, we can distinguish between relations with Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank,
Cooperative Banks (Genossenschaftsbanken), and Saving Banks (Sparkassen).
4Assume for example a firm with bank accounts at bank A and B for the period from 2005 to 2008. If this firm
terminates both accounts in 2009 and opens a new account at bank C from 2009 to 2012, the number of banks for
this firm would equal three.
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Figure 6.1a to Figure 6.1f present the share of long- (LT Debt) and short-term
debt (ST Debt) as well as financing costs (IR) depending on the number of bank
relations. Interest rates are defined as interest expenses divided by debt. And as
already emphasized, debt corresponds to bank loans. Both the total share and the
development over time seem to be independent of the number of bank relations.
Firms shifted their financing from more long-term to more short-term debt between
2005 and 2012. However, it can be observed that, on average, firms with only one
bank relation pay lower interest rates than firms with more than one bank relation.
Figure 6.1g shows the distribution of bank relations. The majority of observations
lies between one and three bank relations and about one quarter of firms have a single
bank relation. According to the Bureau van Dijk, information regarding the number
of banks is collected from the firms’ annual report and capped at six. Therefore,
firms in the last category can have six or more bank relations. In the empirical
analysis, we will mainly distinguish between one and more than one bank relations.
Figure 6.1h shows that one third of all firms having a single bank relation are served
by Saving Banks, followed by Commerzbank (17%), Cooperative Banks (12%), and
Deutsche Bank (11%). One quarter of firms with a single bank relation are financed
by “non-main players” in the German banking market.
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Figure 6.1: Stylized Facts
(a) One Bank Relation (b) Two Bank Relations
(c) Three Bank Relations (d) Four Bank Relations
(e) Five Bank Relations (f) Six or more Bank Relations
(g) Bank Relations (h) Relationship Lending
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In Table 6.1, firms with only one bank relation are compared to all other firms.
Surprisingly, firms with only one bank relation are, on average, larger than other
firms (as measured by total assets). Most importantly, we find the most pronounced
difference in the shares of intangible and current assets. Firms with only one bank
relation have a higher share of intangible assets and a lower share of current assets
on average, which is in line with our hypothesis.
Table 6.1: Bank Characteristics


























Equity/Total Assets 0.335 0.339
(-1.159)
ST Debt/Total Assets 0.330 0.327
(0.952)
LT Debt/Total Assets 0.335 0.334
(0.243)
ST Debt/LT Debt 1.892 2.569
(-4.508)
Debt/Total Assets 0.665 0.661
(1.158)
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 0.012 0.019
(-10.118)









Interest Rate 0.026 0.024
(9.567)
Notes: The t-statistic is reported in parentheses and; highlighting in red indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level. Null hypothesis is diff=0 where diff equals
mean(0)-mean(1) and 1 represents the specific section.
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6.6 Estimation and Results
6.6.1 Capital Structure
Both the trade-off theory of capital structure and the pecking order theory imply
that intangible assets impair debt-financing. Thus, firms whose share of intangible
assets is above one of the thresholds used here ought to have higher equity ratios.
To address this question, we apply propensity score matching as introduced by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and implemented
by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). We define three treatment groups, which each comprise
firms whose share of intangible assets (IA) exceeds zero, the sample median (≈0.03%)
or the sample mean (≈1.44%), respectively. Firms whose share of intangible assets
is above one of these thresholds ought to face higher equity ratios, according to
the capital structure literature and the role of asset redeployability. Since the share
of intangible assets is not assigned completely at random to firms, the probability
of receiving treatment, D = 0 ∨ 1, will be estimated conditional on the following
confounders: sales; employees; tangible assets (standardized by total assets); current
assets (standardized by total assets); long-term debt (standardized by total assets);
short-term debt (standardized by total assets); cash flow; EBITDA; net income;
industry dummies; and main economic regions dummies. The outcome variable, EQ,
is firms’ equity ratio, which equals equity divided by total assets. The estimated
“Average Treatment Effect on the Treated” (ATT) is
ATT = E[EQ(1)|D = 1]− E[EQ(0)|D = 0] + SB, (6.1)
where E[EQ(1)|D = 1] is the expected outcome given treatment, E[EQ(0)|D = 0]
is the expected outcome in the absence of treatment, and SB is the selection bias.
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In an unmatched comparison, the equity ratio of firms whose share of intangible
assets is above one of the specified thresholds is statistically significantly higher.
However, if we employ equity ratio as the outcome variable Y according to equa-
tion (6.1), Table 6.2 shows that the differences in equity ratios disappear comparing
matched firms. This suggests that there is another way than equity to finance intan-
gible assets, which we expect to be relationship banking.
We estimate equation (6.1) in various permutations. The treatment is varied in
that it refers to the share of intangible assets exceeding either the sample mean or the
median or zero. The matching algorithm is varied between the nearest neighbor, the
two nearest neighbors, the three nearest neighbors or a normally distributed kernel
using a range of 0.06. Covering all possible combinations, we run twelve propensity
score matching estimations.
6.6. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 145
Table 6.2: Propensity Score Matching - Results - Intangible Assets and Capital Structure
Treatment IA > Mean IA > Mean
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.344 0.335 0.009 0.004 2.290 0.344 0.335 0.009 0.004 2.290
ATT 0.344 0.343 0.001 0.006 0.090 0.344 0.344 0.000 0.005 0.020
pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.104
Number of Obs 17004 17004
Treatment IA > Mean IA > Mean
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.344 0.335 0.009 0.004 2.290 0.344 0.335 0.009 0.004 2.290
ATT 0.344 0.345 -0.001 0.005 -0.270 0.344 0.343 0.001 0.006 0.090
pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.104
Number of Obs 17004 17004
Treatment IA > Median IA > Median
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.350 0.323 0.027 0.003 8.810 0.350 0.323 0.027 0.003 8.810
ATT 0.350 0.356 -0.006 0.005 -1.220 0.350 0.354 -0.004 0.005 -0.970
pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.112
Number of Obs 17004 17004
Treatment IA > Median IA > Median
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.350 0.323 0.027 0.003 8.810 0.350 0.323 0.027 0.003 8.810
ATT 0.350 0.354 -0.004 0.004 -0.900 0.350 0.356 -0.006 0.005 -1.220
pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.112
Number of Obs 17004 17004
Treatment IA > 0 IA > 0
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.341 0.289 0.052 0.005 9.620 0.341 0.289 0.052 0.005 9.620
ATT 0.341 0.351 -0.010 0.013 -0.730 0.341 0.341 0.001 0.012 0.050
pseudo R-squared 0.141 0.141
Number of Obs 17004 17004
Treatment IA > 0 IA > 0
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.341 0.289 0.052 0.005 9.620 0.341 0.289 0.052 0.005 9.620
ATT 0.341 0.345 -0.003 0.011 -0.280 0.341 0.351 -0.010 0.013 -0.730
pseudo R-squared 0.141 0.141
Number of Obs 17004 17004
The most important measures are difference and the corresponding t-statistics of the “Average Treatment Effect on the Treated”
(ATT).
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The low value of the pseudo R2 reveals that average heterogeneity is low. For
the main specifications, Figure 6.2 visualizes that observations are quite equally
distributed along the propensity score, especially when the mean and median are
used as thresholds. The technically high quality of our estimations supports the
approach.
All in all, results show that intangible assets do not prevent German SMEs from
financing externally. We expect that German SMEs can circumvent the financing
frictions associated with intangible assets by a strong bank relation, referred to as
relationship banking. This directly implies our second hypothesis, namely that a
higher share of intangible assets increases the probability of having an exclusive and
persistent bank relation.
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Figure 6.2: Propensity Score Matching - Quality - Intangible Assets and Capital
Structure
(a) Mean, nearest Neighbor. (b) Mean, Kernel.
(c) Median, nearest Neighbor. (d) Median, Kernel.
(e) Zero, nearest Neighbor. (f) Zero, Kernel.
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6.6.2 Determinants of Relationship Banking
Based on previous studies we combine the following variables in order to explain
the choice of the number of bank relations: firm size, proxied by either sales or
employees; redeployable collateral, proxied by current assets (as a share of total
assets); financing frictions, proxied by intangible assets (as a share of total assets);
indebtedness, proxied either by debt (as a share of total assets) or by the ratio of
short term debt to long term debt; and liquidity/profitability, proxied by EBITDA. In
order to assess whether a higher share of intangible assets determines firms’ number
of bank relations, we estimate the following baseline regression:
P (RBi = 1) =f(β1 SIZEi + β2 CAi + β3 IAi
+ β4 DEBTi + β5 EBITDAi +X
′ γ + ui)
(6.2)
where RB equals 1 for firms with one bank relation and 0 otherwise. The matrix X
includes further control variables: binary variables for industries at the section level
according to the industrial code (Nace, Rev. 2) and a binary variable which equals 1
in case the firm is located in one of three main economic regions of Germany (Bavaria,
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Nordrhein-Westfalen), where bank concentration can be ex-
pected to be higher than in other regions.
Firm size is expected to increase the number of bank relations (Houston and
James, 1996; Ongena and Smith, 2000). As we argue along the lines of collateral
redeployability (Benmelech and Bergman, 2009; Fabbri and Menichini, 2010), current
assets are expected to increase the number of bank relations because the soft channel
of a strong firm-bank relation is less needed. Indebteness is expected to increase the
probability of having only one bank relation since a strong bank relation may help
to ease credit constraints (Harhoff and Körting, 1998b). In the three main economic
regions of Germany we expect relationship banking to be less likely, as suggested by
to Petersen and Rajan (1995).
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6.6.3 Logistic Regression - Results
Since our dependent variable in equation (6.2) is a count variable, which is
discrete-valued and truncated, an OLS estimation produces biased results for both,
slope coefficient and standard errors. Given the nature of our dependent variable,
a probabilistic model is the most appropriate estimation method. Since the number
of bank relations between 2005 and 2012 is reported across years, we know that if
it equals 1 the corresponding firm had exactly one bank relation during the whole
period.
Table 6.3 presents the results of four logistic regression specifications. Two dif-
ferent proxies for firm size and indebtedness were used. In specification I and II the
number of employees proxy for size, whereas in specification III and IV total sales
are used. Indebtedness is proxied by total debt divided by total assets (specification
I and III) and by the fraction of short- to long-term debt (specification II and IV).
Following Hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis states that the share of intangible assets
does not affect the probability of running an exclusive and persistent bank relation.
We can reject the null hypothesis on a 1% significance level. The fraction of intan-
gible assets significantly increases the probability of having only one bank relation.
Thereby, the odds ratio can be interpreted as the factor by which the odds of having
only one bank relation increase5. The odds ratio for an explanatory variable i with an
coefficient βi is calculated as e
βi . In our case, this means, that a 1 percentage point
increase in the ratio of intangible assets ( 1
100




βi . For specification I, this results in an odds ratio of e0.02314 = 1.0234.
Therefore, the odds of having only one bank relation increase by 2.34% per 1 per-
centage point increase in the fraction of intangible assets. Our results are robust to
5For example, if a firm has a 10% probability of having only one bank relation, the odds for this firm are
10%
90%
= .11. An odds ratio now gives the change in the odds of having only one bank relation, if an explanatory
variable is increased by one unit. An odds ratio of 10.12, for example, translates to odds of having only one bank
relation of 0.11 ∗ 10.12 = 1.12, resulting in a new probability of having one bank relation of 53%. The odds ratio can
range from 0 to ∞ with an odds ratio of 1 implying no effect of the explanatory variable.
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the use of different size and indebtedness proxies. In summary, we can confirm our
second hypothesis.
Table 6.3: Logistic Regression - Determinants of Relationship Banking
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dependent variable Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1
Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Employees -0.009*** 1.000 -0.008*** 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Sales 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Current Assets/Total Assets -0.223*** 0.800 -0.253*** 0.776 -0.160* 0.852 -0.179** 0.836
(0.076) (0.077) (0.084) (0.085)
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 2.314*** 10.116 2.341*** 10.389 2.371*** 10.707 2.404*** 11.069
(0.354) (0.354) (0.369) (0.369)
Debt/Total Assets 0.269*** 1.309 0.280*** 1.323
(0.085) (0.096)
ST Debt/LT Debt 0.018*** 1.018 0.015*** 1.015
(0.004) (0.004)
EBITDA 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.469 -0.337 -0.508* -0.368
(0.288) (0.285) (0.295) (0.292)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Main Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
No of obs 21517 21517 17166 17166
Correctly Classified 73.10% 73.15% 71.60% 71.63%
Area under ROC Curve 0.639 0.642 0.632 0.635
Note:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) Employees expressed in terms of 100.
In addition, size proxies are neither statistically significant (sales) nor economi-
cally meaningful (employees). Both proxies for indebtedness are significant and pos-
itive. Firms with a higher fraction of debt are more likely to have a single bank
relation which is in line with Ogawa et al. (2007). One interpretation of this finding
is that greater indebtedness is a signal, albeit not necessarily a reliable one, for low
borrower quality to outside lenders. Therefore, firms are not able to establish a sec-
ond bank relation, since they cannot convincingly communicate their true quality.
Not reported but worth mentioning is the result that firms located in one of three
main economic regions of Germany are less engaged in relationship banking, which
is in line with Petersen and Rajan (1995).
Next, we estimate predicted probabilities and marginal effects of our logistic re-
gression with an emphasis on variation in the share of intangible assets. Since more
than 90% of firms have a share intangible assets between 0 and and 9%, we vary
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the share of intangible assets in that range and estimate the corresponding predicted
probabilities. The first row of Table 6.4 shows the predicted probability of an exclu-
sive and persistent bank relation, given that all independent variables are set to their
mean. Below, the predicted probability of an exclusive and persistent bank relation,
given that all independent variables are set to their mean but the share of intangi-
ble assets equals zero is shown. The next rows show the predicted probability of an
exclusive and persistent bank relation, given that all independent variables are set
to their mean but the share of intangible assets equals 1%, 3%, etc.
Table 6.4 shows that margins continuously increase in the share of intangible
assets. However, standard errors and in turn confidence intervals also increase in the
share of intangible assets.
Table 6.4: Logistic Regression - Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dependent variable Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1
Pred. Prob. all Variables at means 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.276*** 0.276***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pred. Prob. if IA/TA=0 0.254*** 0.254*** 0.268*** 0.269***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pred. Prob. if IA/TA=1% 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.273*** 0.273***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pred. Prob. if IA/TA=3% 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.283*** 0.283***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Pred. Prob. if IA/TA=5% 0.276*** 0.277*** 0.292*** 0.293***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pred. Prob. if IA/TA=7% 0.286*** 0.286*** 0.302*** 0.303***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Pred. Prob. if IA/TA=9% 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.312*** 0.313***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Note:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) Roman numerals in the header refer to Table 6.3.
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Figure 6.2 visualizes the margins and the corresponding confidence intervals. The
lower end of the confidence interval of the predicted probability at a share of intan-
gible assets of 9% remains in all cases untouched by the higher end of the confidence
intervals of shares of intangible assets of 3% and below.
Figure 6.3: Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects
(a) Specification (I) (b) Specification (II)
(c) Specification (III) (d) Specification (IV)
6.7 Robustness
In order to provide robust results, we estimate equation (6.1) and equation (6.2)
for selected sub-samples. Since we calculate averages over time and perform a cross-
sectional analysis, we run equation (6.1) and equation (6.2) for 2006 and 2012 with
the aim of illustrating whether our obtained results are stable over time.
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show that the equity ratio of firms whose share of intan-
gible assets is above one of the specified thresholds is not statistically significantly
higher, comparing matched firms. Thus, this relationship has not changed over time
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Table 6.5: Propensity Score Matching - Results - Intangible Assets and Capital Structure - 2006
Treatment IA > Mean IA > Mean
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.350 0.339 0.011 0.004 2.730 0.350 0.339 0.011 0.004 2.730
ATT 0.350 0.352 -0.002 0.006 -0.250 0.350 0.349 0.001 0.005 0.240
pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.099
Number of Obs 15209 15209
Treatment IA > Mean IA > Mean
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.350 0.339 0.011 0.004 2.730 0.350 0.339 0.011 0.004 2.730
ATT 0.350 0.351 -0.001 0.005 -0.160 0.350 0.352 -0.002 0.006 -0.250
pseudo R-squared 0.099 0.099
Number of Obs 15209 15209
Treatment IA > Median IA > Median
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.354 0.328 0.026 0.003 7.870 0.354 0.328 0.026 0.003 7.870
ATT 0.354 0.362 -0.008 0.005 -1.450 0.354 0.359 -0.005 0.005 -1.140
pseudo R-squared 0.110 0.110
Number of Obs 15209 15209
Treatment IA > Median IA > Median
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.354 0.328 0.026 0.003 7.870 0.354 0.328 0.026 0.003 7.870
ATT 0.354 0.361 -0.007 0.005 -1.490 0.354 0.362 -0.008 0.005 -1.450
pseudo R-squared 0.110 0.110
Number of Obs 15209 15209
Treatment IA > 0 IA > 0
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.345 0.298 0.047 0.006 7.830 0.345 0.298 0.047 0.006 7.830
ATT 0.345 0.344 0.001 0.014 0.080 0.345 0.340 0.005 0.013 0.380
pseudo R-squared 0.134 0.134
Number of Obs 15209 15209
Treatment IA > 0 IA > 0
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.345 0.298 0.047 0.006 7.830 0.345 0.298 0.047 0.006 7.830
ATT 0.345 0.345 0.000 0.012 -0.030 0.345 0.344 0.001 0.014 0.080
pseudo R-squared 0.134 0.134
Number of Obs 15209 15209
The most important measures are difference and the corresponding t-statistics of the “Average Treatment Effect on the Treated”
(ATT).
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in our sample. Again, treatment refers to the share of intangible assets exceeding
the sample mean or median or zero and the matching algorithm is either the near-
est neighbor, the two nearest neighbors, the three nearest neighbors or a normally
distributed kernel using a range of 0.06.
Table 6.6: Propensity Score Matching - Results - Intangible Assets and Capital Structure - 2012
Treatment IA > Mean IA > Mean
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.346 0.336 0.010 0.004 2.350 0.346 0.336 0.010 0.004 2.350
ATT 0.346 0.346 0.000 0.006 0.070 0.346 0.348 -0.002 0.005 -0.290
pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.104
Number of Obs 15226 15226
Treatment IA > Mean IA > Mean
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.346 0.336 0.010 0.004 2.350 0.346 0.336 0.010 0.004 2.350
ATT 0.346 0.350 -0.004 0.005 -0.810 0.346 0.346 0.000 0.006 0.070
pseudo R-squared 0.104 0.104
Number of Obs 15226 15226
Treatment IA > Median IA > Median
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.353 0.323 0.029 0.003 8.970 0.353 0.323 0.029 0.003 8.970
ATT 0.353 0.354 -0.001 0.005 -0.250 0.353 0.356 -0.004 0.005 -0.790
pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.112
Number of Obs 15226 15226
Treatment IA > Median IA > Median
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.353 0.323 0.029 0.003 8.970 0.353 0.323 0.029 0.003 8.970
ATT 0.353 0.357 -0.005 0.004 -1.080 0.353 0.354 -0.001 0.005 -0.250
pseudo R-squared 0.112 0.112
Number of Obs 15226 15226
Treatment IA > 0 IA > 0
Matching Nearest Neighbor 2 Nearest Neighbors
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.343 0.284 0.060 0.006 10.260 0.343 0.284 0.060 0.006 10.260
ATT 0.343 0.347 -0.003 0.014 -0.230 0.343 0.342 0.001 0.012 0.110
pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.140
Number of Obs 15226 15226
Treatment IA > 0 IA > 0
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbors Kernel
Model Logit Logit
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-Statistic
Unmatched 0.343 0.284 0.060 0.006 10.260 0.343 0.284 0.060 0.006 10.260
ATT 0.343 0.344 -0.001 0.011 -0.050 0.343 0.347 -0.003 0.014 -0.230
pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.140
Number of Obs 15226 15226
The most important measures are difference and the corresponding t-statistics of the “Average Treatment Effect on the Treated”
(ATT).
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Results in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 illustrate that the statistically significant rela-
tionship between the probability of having only one bank relation and the fraction
of intangible assets does not change over time. In the beginning, as well as in the
end of our sample period the fraction of intangible assets statistically significantly
increases the probability of having only one bank relation.
Table 6.7: Logistic Regression - Determinants of Relationship Banking - 2006
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dependent variable Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1
Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Employees -0.008** 1.000 -0.008** 1.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Sales 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Current Assets/Total Assets -0.360*** 0.697 -0.349*** 0.705 -0.341*** 0.711 -0.314*** 0.730
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095)
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 2.561*** 12.943 2.590*** 13.326 2.192*** 8.953 2.229*** 9.289
(0.404) (0.403) (0.390) (0.390)
Debt/Total Assets 0.284*** 1.328 0.265** 1.304
(0.107) (0.110)
ST Debt/LT Debt 0.004* 1.004 0.002 1.002
(0.002) (0.001)
EBITDA 0.000* 1.000 0.000* 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.498 -0.356 -0.697** -0.569*
(0.336) (0.329 (0.346) (0.341)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Main Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
No of obs 13989 13989 12410 12409
Correctly Classified 74.79% 74.85% 71.36% 71.43%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6498 0.6518 0.6348 0.6352
Note:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) Employees expressed in terms of 100.
However, the significance of the coefficient of current assets divided by total assets
and the size of the coefficient of intangible assets divided by total assets change from
2006 to 2012.
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Table 6.8: Logistic Regression - Determinants of Relationship Banking - 2012
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dependent variable Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1
Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Employees -0.007** 1.000 -0.007** 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Sales 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Current Assets/Total Assets -0.052 0.949 -0.046 0.955 0.015 1.015 0.039 1.040
(0.077) (0.078) (0.088) (0.088)
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 1.675*** 5.341 1.725*** 5.611 1.474*** 4.367 1.534*** 4.637
(0.361) (0.359) (0.375) (0.371)
Debt/Total Assets 0.294*** 1.342 0.345*** 1.411
(0.080) (0.096)
ST Debt/LT Debt 0.003** 1.003 0.001 1.001
(0.001) (0.001)
EBITDA 0.000** 1.000 0.000** 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.615** -0.474 -0.814** -0.649**
(0.297) (0.294) (0.329) (0.326)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Main Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
No of obs 20166 20166 13853 13850
Correctly Classified 73.65% 73.66% 70.74% 70.72%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6333 0.6343 0.6234 0.6221
Note:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) Employees expressed in terms of 100.
Since we already emphasized the distribution of the fraction of intangible assets
divided by total assets, we first exclude firms whose intangible assets equal zero.
Thus, we focus rather on variation in intangible assets than on the question whether
the firm owns intangible assets. Table 6.9 shows that also for this subsample the
share of intangible assets increases significantly the probability of having only one
bank relation.
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Table 6.9: Logistic Regression - Determinants of Relationship Banking - IA/TA > 0
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dependent variable Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1
Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Employees -0.007*** 1.000 -0.007*** 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Sales 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Current Assets/Total Assets -0.139* 0.871 -0.166** 0.847 -0.066 0.936 -0.083 0.920
(0.083) (0.084) (0.091) (0.092)
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 2.587*** 13.295 2.604*** 13.523 2.696*** 14.818 2.720*** 15.177
(0.359) (0.360) (0.377) (0.377)
Debt/Total Assets 0.209** 1.233 0.237** 1.268
(0.090) (0.102)
ST Debt/LT Debt 0.016*** 1.016 0.014*** 1.014
(0.004) (0.004)
EBITDA 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.574* -0.474 -0.627** -0.512*
(0.298) (0.294) (0.306) (0.302)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Main Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
No of obs 19633 19633 15616 15616
Correctly Classified 73.04% 73.10% 71.62% 71.60%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6391 0.6411 0.6338 0.6355
Note:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) Employees expressed in terms of 100.
In addition to excluding firms without intangible assets, we exclude firms whose
share of intangible assets is in the highest 1%-quantile. As before, the share of intan-
gible assets increases significantly the probability of having only one bank relation
(see Table 6.10 below). In sum, these analyses confirm the robustness of our results.
Table 6.10: Logistic Regression - Determinants of Relationship Banking - 0 < IA/TA < 99-quantile
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
dependent variable Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1 Relationship Banking 0/1
Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio Coeff. Odds Ratio
Employees -0.007** 1.000 -0.007** 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Sales 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Current Assets/Total Assets -0.141* 0.869 -0.167** 0.846 -0.072 0.931 -0.088 0.916
(0.083) (0.084) (0.092) (0.093)
Intangible Assets/Total Assets 3.582*** 35.957 3.651*** 38.523 3.502*** 33.169 3.575*** 35.682
(0.653) (0.652) (0.690) (0.689)
Debt/Total Assets 0.220** 1.245 0.249** 1.283
(0.092) (0.103)
ST Debt/LT Debt 0.016*** 1.016 0.014*** 1.014
(0.004) (0.004)
EBITDA 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.589** -0.485* -0.641** -0.521*
(0.298) (0.295) (0.306) (0.302)
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes
Main Region Dummies yes yes yes yes
No of obs 19415 19415 15419 15419
Correctly Classified 73.07% 73.08% 71.62% 71.62%
Area under ROC Curve 0.6363 0.6383 0.6307 0.6323
Note:
(1) * (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) Employees expressed in terms of 100.
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6.8 Conclusion
We discuss the relationship between intangible assets, capital structure and rela-
tionship banking for German SMEs. Separately, these topics have already received
much attention in the academic literature. We thus contribute significantly by com-
bining them and, in particular, by assigning a special role to the connection between
intangible assets and firms’ choice of bank relation.
Using a large dataset for German SMEs including their bank relations between
2005 and 2012, we test two hypotheses. Firstly, a higher fraction of intangible assets
should lead to a higher equity ratio. We find that in a matched comparison there is
no statistically significant difference in equity ratios among firms due to their share
of intangible assets. We propose a strong firm-bank relation to help firms circumvent
the financing frictions related to intangible assets emphasized in the literature. This
naturally yields our next hypothesis. Secondly, we hypothesize that firms with a high
fraction of intangible assets should be more likely to engage in relationship banking,
since a close-firm bank relation helps overcome debt-financing problems.
We divide firms into three treatment groups separated by their share of intangible
assets. A descriptive comparison reveals substantial differences in equity ratios. Given
the existence of potential confounders, we estimate a propensity score matching
model. Once, we are able to compare “treated” firms with the “controls”, we find
no statistically significant difference in equity ratios. If relationship banking helps
firms with a higher share of intangible assets to receive bank loans, firms’ borrower
decision ought to be determined by their share of intangible assets.
Hence, the centerpiece of our contribution is to address the question of why firms
decide to have only one bank relation. We have information regarding the number of
bank relations of each firm, which is best employed in a binary fashion. Using this
data, we indeed find that the share of intangible assets significantly increases the
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probability of an exclusive and persistent bank relation. This result turns out to be
robust with regard to the analysis of several sub-samples of our data.
Since our research is also motivated by Germany’s stable performance during
the global financial crisis and recent insights into the connection of financial sector
growth and real growth (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015), we show a possible, but
marginal explanation for these observations.
Given data availability, future research should be extended to cross-country stud-
ies. The three-pillar structure of German the banking system is similar to banking
systems in other European countries such as Austria, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden
(Brunner et al., 2004). A cross-country analysis including those European countries is
a natural extension of our analysis, which would allow to control for country-specific
characteristics of relationship banking.
Chapter 7
Summary
This section provides a brief summary and policy recommendation with respect to
European integration for each chapter; it concludes with an overall summary of the
whole work.
7.1 Chapter 2 - OCA
Optimum currency area theory requires a sufficient degree of business cycle syn-
chronization of the economies in a geographical region, in order for that region to
constitute an optimum currency area. Even though the “convergence criteria”, de-
fined by the Maastricht treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, miss a sound
economic justification, they aim at providing the functioning of the euro area. The
corresponding research question of this chapter is if the “convergence criteria” are
linked to the theory of optimum currency areas by aligning demand shocks among
euro area member states? Such a potential linkage is understood to be indirect given
the lack of a sound economic foundation of the “convergence criteria”.
This chapter finds that compliance with the “convergence criteria” plays a differ-
ent role when applied solely to new member countries. In case of new member states,
fiscal divergence is associated with bilateral demand shock divergence. This finding
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can be explained by the lower political power new member countries have. However,
it makes compliance with the “convergence criteria” for new member countries more
important.
In addition to this result, this article contributes by taking the time dimension
of the data explicitly into account. The existing literature often dilutes the time
dimension by averaging over periods. In order to take the dimension of demand
shocks into account, I use the modulus between two countries each period. This
approach creates a panel of country-pairs.
7.1.1 Policy Recommendation based on Chapter 2
The results of this chapter imply that new member states of the euro area should
enter the single currency with some fiscal capacity. However, such a recommendation
is difficult to implement. New member states are naturally equipped with less polit-
ical power. The overall results also imply that the bindingness of common rules has
to be improved in order to make rules work. The European Fiscal Compact, which
came into effect 2013, partly reflects this policy recommendation which is based on
data until 2012.
7.2 Chapter 3 - Exchange Rate Policy in China
This chapter aims at identifying the secret currency basket used by the Chinese
central bank managing the renminbi. In contrast to the majority of central banks
in advanced economies, the People’s Bank of China actively manages the Chinese
exchange rate. This fact makes it possible to examine whether the euro is considered
a reserve currency by the People’s Bank of China. In other words, the question of
what role the euro plays as an international currency can be addressed. In addition,
this study is relevant for economists and policy makers in general, since it sheds some
light upon secret currency weights used by the People’s Bank of China. Moreover,
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this study provides a better understanding of an economy which is expected to be
the world’s largest economy before 2030 according to the World Bank (2013).
We observe weak evidence that the euro was used as an exchange rate target at
the beginning of 2010, but its weight approached zero after the deepening of the
debt crisis in the euro area. Hence, even though the euro is often declared to be one
of the major global currencies, it does not play significant role in Chinese exchange
rate management. The US dollar remains the main anchor of Chinese exchange rate
management, but the Thai baht gained some importance compared to earlier studies.
Interestingly, a gradual decline of the weight attached to the US dollar coincides with
major political and economic events in the Unites States. In this respect, the findings
illustrate the importance of economic and political conditions for currencies.
This article also contributes methodologically by the application of the Kalman
filter. The Kalman filter is appropriate for the estimation of the relationship between
integrated variables and to represent gradual changes in the data. Non-differenced
time series are assumed to be more informative regarding the changes of de facto
exchange rate policy and the Kalman filter allows their use, which enables us to
provide valuable insights into the actual Chinese exchange rate policy.
7.2.1 Policy Recommendation based on Chapter 3
The results of this chapter imply that the economic stability of an economy is
vital in order for its currency to be treated as a global major currency. Economic
stability is naturally one of the main goals in Europe after the deep recent crisis.
Hence, this chapter indirectly provides further motivation of the other chapters in this
work which aim at identifying measures to enhance economic growth and stability.
European Safe Bonds could also enhance the euro’s role as an international currency
(Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
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7.3 Chapter 4 - Institutions
There is a large body of literature on the connection of institutions and economic
growth. However, most literature remains agnostic regarding the channels through
which institutions may cause growth. Motivated by this puzzle in institutional eco-
nomics, we analyze the relationship between institutional quality in terms of resolving
insolvency and the efficient use of assets at firm-level. Thereby, we propose a nar-
row channel through which institutions potentially affect income per capita in the
long-run.
Our benchmark for efficiency at the firm-level is provided by the interest coverage
ratio, as firms should be able to serve at least their interest payments from their
current earnings. Firms which fall below a specific threshold for one year or even
longer are potentially wasting the entrepreneurs’ resources and suffer from severe
inefficiency, since they have to provide interest payments from internal sources. The
existence of such firms is facilitated by institutional weaknesses.
The corresponding research question is whether more efficient institutions ensure
a more efficient use of assets in the economy. Indeed, we find that more efficient
institutions reduce the share of assets tied up unproductively in firms facing debt-
servicing difficulties for more than one year. This result provides statistical evidence
that very specific effect of institutional quality in terms of resolving insolvency. Based
on descriptive statistics, we observe that institutional quality in terms of resolving
insolvency is comparably weak in Central and Eastern European countries compared
to mature economies like Germany, Austria, and Sweden.
By addressing a macroeconomic issue with the use of micro data, our approach
contributes methodologically. A rich dataset at the firm-level allows us to aggregate
data across sectors within countries and not rely on already aggregated data. Po-
tential reverse causality problems are addressed by use or the dynamic panel system
General Method of Moments estimator.
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7.3.1 Policy Recommendation based on Chapter 4
Based on the empirical results a further catch-up in terms of institutional qual-
ity by central and eastern European countries is highly recommended. However,
the implementation of institutional progress and, in particular, the enforcement of
those changes are challenging due to considerable cultural differences. Hence, we
recommend implementing laws gradually in order to allow social norms to adapt.
Depending on the country specific level of institutional quality, relatively simple
mechanisms like foreclosure with no or limited court oversight and floating charge
can lead to immediate results.
7.4 Chapter 5 - Deleveraging
This chapter is motivated by the implementation of Basel III, which is an interna-
tional regulatory framework. The possible effects that tighter capital requirements for
banks might have on the economy are investigated for the case of Germany. Empiri-
cally addressing this issue aims at highlighting the potential country-specific effects of
cross-country regulatory changes. Indeed, we find that such regulatory changes may
transmit differently into different industries. Lending conditions especially for firms
in manufacturing and to a lesser extent in wholesale and retail trade are expected to
be affected most given tighter capital requirements for banks.
The casual chain behind these finding rely on the adverse selection problem, since
an increase in banks’ debt associated with higher refinancing costs facilitates the
access to capital for relatively risky projects. This equivalent to banks whose marginal
revenues of loans have to equal their marginal costs. In addition, this approach is in
line with what Acharya et al. (2012) describe as lending “down the quality curve”.
We make use of unique data on firm-bank relationships in Germany between 2005
and 2007 from two different databases. We utilize information on the bank relation-
ships of analyzed firms, which allows us to merge individual firm level data with the
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corresponding bank data. Moreover, our multilevel modeling approach utilizes the
information given by the structure of the data set with respect to different criteria.
In particular, we use fixed effects and random effects for sectors, regions, banks, and
firms. Not only working with large micro-data but also incorporating the structure
of the data is an efficient and valuable empirical approach.
7.4.1 Policy Recommendation based on Chapter 5
Results imply that country-specific banking characteristics must be taken into
account when implementing cross-country regulation. In Germany, tighter capital
requirements for banks could impair access to bank loans for manufacturing firms.
In other European countries to which the same rules apply, other industries’ access
to bank loans might be impaired due to regulatory changes. Regulation should take
this into account when applying uniform rules to banks across Europe.
7.5 Chapter 6 - Relationship Banking
As a bank-based financial system characterized by strong ties between banks and
firms and a fairly strong performance during the global financial crisis, the banking
system of Germany is worth studying. In addition, the creation of a European bank-
ing union makes it necessary to identify country-specific characteristics which have
to be considered carefully when applying uniform rules to a wide range of countries.
This study focuses on the financing conditions of German SMEs, which represent
the backbone of the German economy.
We contribute significantly by an integrated treatment of topics which have only
been addressed separately in the literature so far. Employing a large dataset for
German SME’s including their bank relations between 2005 and 2012, we find that
the share of intangible assets significantly increases the probability of an exclusive
and persistent bank relation. We expect that this finding is driven by firms which
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intend to circumvent financing frictions by maintaining a strong bank relation. We
also provide results contrasting accepted capital structure theories.
The fact that particularly research and development activities contribute to the
creation of intangible assets makes this finding especially interesting. In addition,
recent work by Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) illustrates the importance of financ-
ing intangible assets for real growth. They find that financial sector growth benefits
industries with higher asset tangibility but harms R&D-intensive industries. This dis-
tributional effect of financial sector growth harms industries lower asset tangibility
or high R&D-activities which are growth engines.
7.5.1 Policy Recommendations based on Chapter 6
The German banking system is doing well in debt-financing intangible assets due
to strong firm-bank relations − regulation should not impede this. It achieves ben-
eficial financing conditions for firms with a high share of intangible assets through
strong firm-bank ties. European regulation has to take into account such country-
specific characteristics. Impairing financing of intangible assets is economically un-
desirable, given that research and development contribute to their creation and its
meaning for real growth.
7.6 Overall Summary
The present work provides a wide range of empirical results and corresponding
policy recommendations. To further strengthen European integration much can be
done and is actually needed. The collection of articles here provides a clear illustration
that there is a lot of potential to amend the architecture of the European Union
and the euro area, respectively. It is well understood that the process of European
integration is a continuous process which requires adjustments from time to time.
This thesis provides results which indicate that very specific measures, such as
facilitating a catch-up in terms of institutional quality by central and eastern Euro-
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pean countries, would be beneficial for the process of European integration. This is
in line with the general claim that institutional harmonization has to be enhanced.
Moreover, the two chapters related to the euro show that within the narrower frame-
work of the euro area measures to enhance the functioning of the single currency are
needed as well. In sum, this implies a strong need for policy measures in response
to the recent developments of European integration. Moreover, results of Chapter 2
show that common rules have to be equally binding for all countries.
In fact, a number of necessary policy measures are already being implemented, for
example the implementation of Basel III. With respect to implementation, results
in the fifth and sixth chapter imply that such measures have to be implemented
carefully. Policy makers have to take into account country-specific characteristics
when implementing one-fits-all policy measures. Nonetheless, the uniform European
rules are not questioned here.
In addition to the results and corresponding policy recommendations, the bulk of
the research done here also contributes methodologically to economics. The increas-
ing availability of micro-data is used to address macroeconomic questions and derive
corresponding macroeconomic results and implications. Future research in economics
will most likely make more and more use of such data.
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